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INTRODUCTION
The United States has surpassed Russia as the world’s top
1
natural gas producer, and according to the world’s most respected energy forecaster, the U.S. will also overtake Saudi
2
Arabia as the largest oil producer by 2020. This surge in U.S.
1. BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY, JUNE 2013 22 (2013),
available
at
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/
statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf (U.S. production in 2012 was
681.4 billion cubic meters, compared with 592.3 for Russia).
2. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 23, 138 (2012)
[hereinafter IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012], available at http://
iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf;
see
also
LEONARDO MAUGERI, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, HARVARD
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oil and gas production would have seemed wildly improbable a
decade ago. It flows from a revolution in U.S. oil and gas production. Energy companies have learned to tap previously inaccessible oil and gas in shale and other impermeable (or “tight”)
3
rock formations. To do so, they use “hydraulic fracturing”
(“fracturing” or “fracking”), pumping fluid into shale at high
pressure to crack the rock and release gas and oil trapped inside. This “shale revolution” has created high-paying drilling
jobs, revived the petrochemicals industry as well as other domestic manufacturing, improved our balance of payments, and
increased the competitiveness of the United States in the global
economy. It has also reduced our reliance on energy imports
and enhanced our energy security. In addition, the shale revolution has enabled the United States to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions over the past seven years—the largest reduction anywhere—by substituting natural gas for coal.
Fracturing is controversial. By reducing the price of natural gas, it may undercut the fledgling renewable energy industry, at least in the near term. The fracturing boom may also exacerbate air pollution, traffic and congestion. The technology
uses significant amounts of water, and some aspects of fracturing operations may induce tremors and minor earthquakes. In
all these regards, fracturing is not unique, since each of these
risks arises in conventional oil and gas drilling and, for that
matter, in other economic activity as well.
The most unique risk associated with fracturing, which has
4
generated widespread public apprehension, is the potential
KENNEDY SCH., OIL: THE NEXT REVOLUTION 42 (2012).
3. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 75. In addition
to shale oil and shale gas, the analysis in this Article also applies to “tight
sands gas” and “tight oil,” which are found in sandstone, coal seams and carbonate. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: THE UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE US ECONOMY: NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 12 (2012) [hereinafter IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTIONS]. For simplicity’s sake, we use the phrase “shale oil and gas”
to cover all these sources of unconventional oil and gas.
4. See, e.g., EPA, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2012)
[hereinafter EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://www.epa.gov/
hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf (“[A]s the use of hydraulic fracturing has
increased, so have concerns about its potential human health and environmental impacts, especially for drinking water . . . .”); ERNEST J. MONIZ, HENRY
D. JACOBY & ANTHONY J.M. MEGGS, MIT STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF NATURAL
GAS 37 (2011), available at http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_
Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 MIT STUDY] (describing popular anxiety about
the fact that “the fracturing process risks injecting toxic fracture fluids into
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contamination of groundwater. The fluid used in fracturing
contains toxic chemicals. In a sense, this risk is also not new.
Although fracturing in shale has developed in the past decade,
fracturing has been used in conventional drilling for over sixty
years, so that two million wells have been “fracked” in the U.S.
There is little evidence so far that subterranean fracturing activity can directly contaminate groundwater. The layer of shale
that is fractured is usually thousands of feet below the water
table, with a buffer of dense rock or clay in between. But other
risks to groundwater may prove to be more meaningful, including surface spills of fracturing fluid, improper handling of
waste products, and the migration of natural gas into water
wells. In response, we need effective regulation. Since fracturing in shale began fairly recently, the regime for dealing with
some of these risks is not yet fully developed.
This Article considers how to regulate this risk of water
contamination. The task entails a careful balance of competing
considerations. The shale boom offers enormous benefits and
should be encouraged. At the same time, we need regulation to
ensure that it is safe, since water is a vitally important resource. In addition, the public must believe that shale drilling is
safe. Otherwise, the shale revolution could be vulnerable to
regulatory overkill, as media stories about flaming water faucets, brown well water, and sickly farm animals prompt widespread public apprehension about water contamination. In order to realize the potential benefits of fracturing, we need
regulation that is carefully calibrated to minimize the real
risks, without deterring socially valuable drilling.
This challenge is all the more difficult because fracturing
can potentially contaminate water in several ways. Some are
well understood from decades of conventional oil and gas production and can be controlled with best practices regulations.
shallow groundwater aquifers, which are in many cases the source of potable
water for public use”); Mireya Navarro, Gas Drilling Jitters Unsettle Catskills
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at RE 1, 6 (noting that the possibility of
fracturing and its related water contamination risk has unsettled Catskills
real estate market); Lucija Muehlenbachs, Elisheba Spiller & Christopher
Timmins, Shale Gas Development and the Costs of Groundwater Contamination Risk (Res. for the Future, Working Paper 2013), available at http://rff
.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-40-REV.pdf (studying residential property
values in Washington County, PA and finding “that properties are positively
affected by the drilling of a nearby shale gas well—relative to the overall
change in economic activity within the county—unless the property depends
on groundwater, in which case the risk to groundwater (whether real or perceived) more than fully offsets these gains”).
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Others are highly speculative, may or may not present real
risks, and currently have no known solutions. As a result, regulatory responses should be dynamic, generating additional information about potential risks and stimulating innovations to
5
reduce these risks.
One element of our strategy is an evolving body of best
practices regulations designed to reduce the risks of water contamination. Rules based on “best available” technology have a
double advantage over other regulatory strategies. First, bestpractices regulation reassures the public that a responsible
regulatory body is focused on the issue and has directed the use
of state-of-the-art control measures. Second, although best
practices regulation may not always be optimally efficient, it
provides industry with a significant measure of certainty. Given the substantial investments required to exploit shale oil and
gas, the regulatory regime has to be relatively predictable.
At the same time, best practices regulation has two major
shortcomings in the context of the shale revolution. First, the
body of regulations will remain incomplete for the foreseeable
future because fracturing in shale poses new risks that are not
yet fully understood. Therefore, we need to provide a fallback
source of protection, and also to create incentives for regulators
and industry to close these regulatory gaps. Second, best practices regulations are only as effective as the mechanisms for enforcing them. If penalties are low and inspections are infrequent, best practices regulation will offer only limited
protection. Thus, it is important to build in incentives to encourage compliance.
To capture the advantages of best practices regulation
while minimizing its disadvantages, we propose to backstop
best practices regulation with liability rules. Specifically, we
need a liability rule for three different situations. First, assume
water is contaminated by a problem that is, in fact, governed by
best practices regulations. If the energy company has not complied with these regulations, it should be liable. Second (and
conversely), if the company has complied, this should be a de5. To borrow a term favored by some of our colleagues, the regime should
be “experimentalist.” See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1298 (2012); Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011). With respect to regulation of
the shale revolution, not only the specific control measures but the entire regulatory regime should be adaptive. See infra Part VII.
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fense against claims that it should have done more (although
we would not allow this defense if the regulation falls significantly below industry norms). Third, what if there are no best
practices regulations governing the particular circumstances
that caused the water contamination? If the energy company
caused the contamination, it should bear the burden to show it
was not at fault (e.g., that it could not have avoided the problem by taking reasonable precautions). In combination, these
three liability rules would encourage firms to comply with best
practices regulations, while also motivating them to help develop new best practices regulations covering novel water contamination risks. We would augment these incentives further by
eliminating punitive damages for any firm that complies with
all best practices regulations.
Since determinations of causation are critical under any liability system, we recommend information-forcing rules to facilitate more accurate determinations of causation. For example, we would require energy companies to test water quality
before they begin fracturing and to disclose the chemicals in
their fracturing fluid. We also suggest a number of other design
features for a liability system, including one-way fee shifting,
and provisions to ensure that defendants will not be judgment
proof.
To ensure that the regulatory regime is both dynamic and
tailored to local conditions, we recommend keeping the regulatory center of gravity in the states, instead of fashioning a new
federal regime. All states with oil and gas production have reg6
ulatory commissions that impose best practices regulations. As
a result, the states have a head start in developing best practices regulations, and are moving rapidly to adopt additional
regulations focused on fracturing. Likewise, state regulators
can take account of variations in local conditions. Fracturing
differs from one shale field to another, as do water supplies, ex7
posed populations, and the best ways to handle waste. State
regulation is also likely to be dynamic. Because state regulators
observe each other, successful regulatory initiatives are likely
to disseminate from one state to another. A federal regime, in
6. See, e.g., NORTH DAKOTA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL RESOURCES, OIL AND GAS DIVISION, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
7. See Kara Cheever, States’ Varied Approaches to Fracking Regulation,
REGBLOG (July 24, 2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2013/07/24
-cheever-state-fracking.html.
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contrast, would have to be developed from scratch after lengthy
and contested rulemaking proceedings. It might impose uniform rules that do not always fit local conditions, and that
could be harder to change once in place.
Part I offers a brief description of fracturing. Part II summarizes the economic, national security, and environmental
benefits of this practice. Part III surveys a number of risks that
are not unique to fracturing. Part IV considers the risks to
groundwater. Part V offers a general framework for choosing a
regulatory strategy, and uses it to recommend a combination of
best practices regulation and liability. Part VI fleshes out the
details of our proposed liability scheme, including: provisions to
enhance the accuracy of determinations of causation; the role of
best practices regulations in establishing liability; burdenshifting to energy companies in circumstances where there are
no applicable best practices regulations; adjustments to liability if plaintiffs contribute to contamination or have signed a release; the proper measure of damages and allocation of attorney’s fees; and ways to address the potential insolvency of
defendants. Part VII observes that these functional characteristics can be implemented in various ways—at the federal or
state level, and by legislatures or courts. The most realistic
course of action in the near term, in our view, is to use select
legislative amendments augmenting the authority of state regulatory commissions as needed, plus appropriate modifications
to the state common law of torts.
I. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP
IN DRILLING FOR SHALE OIL AND GAS
Traditionally, energy companies have drilled only in rock
that is permeable, and thus allows oil and gas to flow freely
through it. Petroleum engineers have long understood that deposits within permeable rock represent only a fraction of the oil
and gas beneath the earth’s surface. Far more is contained in
shale deposits, which were off limits because shale is not per8
meable enough for oil and gas to flow out of it.
8. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 12. The
exact amount of unconventional oil reserves remains uncertain, but recent estimates suggest the United States and Canada have a combined 1301.7 billion
barrels (bbl) in total technically recoverable unconventional oil, that is, oil
which may or may not be economically recoverable at present. In comparison,
the proved reserves (oil which can be economically recovered at current prices)
for the entire world are assessed at 1354.2 billion/bbl. AMY MYERS JAFFE ET
AL., JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, RICE UNIV., THE STATUS OF
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Yet in the past decade, energy companies have learned to
tap shale oil and gas reserves, developing new technologies that
9
are commercially feasible at current oil and gas prices. The
key innovation was to pair two technologies which were developed separately: the first is “hydraulic fracturing” or “fracturing,” and the second is horizontal drilling. Neither is new—
fracturing, for instance, was first used in the late 1940s—but
the use of both techniques in combination to extract gas from
10
subterranean shale deposits began about ten years ago.
Fracturing involves pumping water into rock at high pressure so the rock cracks (“fractures”), releasing gas and oil
trapped inside. The water is mixed with sand or some other
“proppant” to prop open the cracks, so they do not reseal and
11
the gas and oil can keep pouring out. To hold the sand in
place, and also to keep bacteria from degrading the gas and oil,
other chemicals are added to fracturing fluid as well. Pioneered
in the 1940s as a way to extract greater production from existing wells, this technique was then used in the 1980s to release
12
natural gas from coal beds. In the past sixty years, over 2 million fracturing treatments have been utilized in connection
13
with oil and gas wells. An oilman named George Mitchell pioneered the use of fracturing in shale deposits, investing $6 mil14
lion over ten years in the Barnett Shale in Texas.
The key to accessing natural gas and oil in shale is to combine fracturing with horizontal drilling. After drilling down between 6 thousand and 10 thousand feet, energy companies turn
WORLD OIL RESERVES: CONVENTIONAL AND
THE FUTURE SUPPLY MIX 18–19 (2011).

UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCES IN

9. See Gas Works: Shale Gas is Giving a Big Boost to America’s Economy,
ECONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 5–7 [hereinafter ECONOMIST], available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21558459.
10. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY REPORT 8 (2011) [hereinafter FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT], available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Final_90_day_Report.pdf (pairing hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling began in 2002 or 2003 to make shale
gas commercially viable).
11. Armando Benincasa, The Current and Future State of Shale Gas and
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation, TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 8.
12. Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing
in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 122–23 (2009) [hereinafter Wiseman, Untested Waters].
13. Kevin Fisher, Data Confirm Safety of Well Fracturing, AM. OIL & GAS
REP., July 2010, at 2, available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/pe/
contents/Papers_and_Articles/web/A_through_P/AOGR%20Article%20Data%
20Prove%20Safety%20of%20Frac.pdf.
14. ECONOMIST, supra note 9, at 8–9.
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the drill sideways. The purpose of drilling horizontally is to increase contact with the layer of shale that has gas or oil in it;
this so-called pay zone is sometimes likened to the filling in an
Oreo cookie, since it lies between rock layers that have no oil or
15
gas.
The result is a massive new domestic supply of natural gas
16
and oil. In 2000, shale supplied negligible amounts of oil and
17
only 2% of domestically produced natural gas in the U.S. As
recently as 2007, we were preparing to become a major import18
er of natural gas. Yet since 2008, domestic natural gas pro19
duction has increased by 25%. Today, 37% of our gas comes
from shale; tight sands and shale together account for 50%,
20
with 80% expected by 2035. Pennsylvania has the second
largest natural gas field in the world, and there are sizable deposits in Arkansas, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
21
North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia. While natural gas
generated 20% of the nation’s electricity in 2006, the percent22
age has increased to 31% in just six years. Of the additional
capacity to generate electricity that will be added in the next 25
15. Eric Konigsberg, Kuwait on the Prairie, NEW YORKER, Apr. 25, 2011,
at 45.
16. In the one-year period from 2009 to 2010 alone, U.S. proved reserves
of crude oil increased 12.8%, from 22.3 billion barrels (bbl) to 25.2 bbl, and
natural gas proved reserves increased 11.9%, from 283.9 trillion cubic feet (tcf)
to 317.6 tcf. U.S. INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND NATURAL
GAS LIQUIDS PROVED RESERVES, 2010 at 1 (2012), available at http://www.eia
.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/archive/2010/pdf/uscrudeoil.pdf. These increases represented the largest one-year additions since the U.S. Energy Information Administration began publishing reserve estimates in 1977, an increase the agency attributed to “the expanding application of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing in shale and other ‘tight’ formations.” Id.
17. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, THE ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTIONS OF SHALE GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2011) [hereinafter, IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT], available for download at http://www
.ihs.com/info/ecc/a/shale-gas-jobs-report.aspx.
18. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7; IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 3.
19. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 3.
20. Id. at 3, 15.
21. Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking Mess, VANITY FAIR (June
21, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/06/fracking-in
-pennsylvania-201006.
22. ECONOMIST, supra note 9; Benoit Faucon & Keith Johnson, U.S. Redraws World Oil Map, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2012, at A4 (quoting an estimate
of International Energy Agency that natural gas will replace oil as the largest
single fuel in the energy mix, and noting that natural gas accounted for 31% of
electricity in the first eight months of 2012).
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23

years, 60% is expected to come from natural gas.
In addition to natural gas, massive supplies of domestic oil
in shale beds have also been unlocked. “The rise in tight oil
production in the United States in the past few years,” the IEA
observed in November 2012, “has been nothing short of spec24
tacular.” While only 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil were
produced from shale in 2003, 2 million bpd were produced in
2012, and the level is expected to rise to 4.5 million bpd in the
25
coming years. While U.S. oil production had been in steep decline for decades, we experienced a 2.735 million bpd net increase in production from 2008 to the first four months of 2013,
26
representing a 40% increase. Production increased by a record
27
1 million bpd in 2012 alone. Notably, the Bakken Shale in
North Dakota is a 25,000 square mile sheet of embedded oil. It
is estimated to have 11 billion barrels of oil recoverable with
current technology, an estimate that keeps increasing; the ul28
timate number may be as much as 30 billion barrels. Although North Dakota was producing less than one percent of the
29
nation’s oil as recently as 2008, it passed California and Alaska in 2012 to become the second largest oil producing state in
30
the U.S. after Texas (where production is also surging). By
2020, the U.S. is expected to produce 11.1 million barrels a day,
23. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 13
(forecasting the addition of 481 gigawatts between 2010 and 2035, and projecting that 60% would be generated with natural gas).
24. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 108.
25. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 5, 17.
26. U.S. production was 6.784 million bpd in 2008, and the average for the
first four months of 2013 was 9.519 million bpd. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 37 (May 2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351305.pdf.
27. BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2013 at 8 (2013),
available
at
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical_review_of_
world_energy_2013.pdf (production increased from approximately 7.9 bpd to
8.9 bpd in 2012).
28. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 43–44, 52; see also, e.g., USGS, ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL RESOURCES IN THE BAKKEN AND THREE FORKS
FORMATIONS, WILLISTON BASIN PROVINCE, MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, AND
SOUTH DAKOTA (2013), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2013/3013/fs2013
-3013.pdf (estimating 7.4 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil in the
Bakken and Three Forks formations).
29. James MacPherson, North Dakota Oil Production Forecast to Surpass
Alaska’s, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2011, http://www.adn.com/2011/01/
02/1629025/north-dakota-oil-production-is.html.
30. Russell Gold, Oil and Gas Bubble Up All Over, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
2012, at A7 (noting the Bakken oil field produced 424,000 bpd in July 2011,
compared with 453,000 per day from Prudhoe Bay in Alaska).
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31

which will be more than Saudi Arabia.
There is some question about the staying power of these
32
new natural gas and oil reserves. For instance, drilling costs
for shale oil are high, so a global decline in prices could cause
33
companies to reduce production. In addition, some experts
caution that fractured wells may not produce as long as con34
ventional wells. Even so, estimates of recoverable reserves
35
have generally been increasing over time. It may well be, as
President Obama suggested in his 2012 State of the Union Address, that fracturing will generate 100 years of natural gas
supply for the United States at our current rate of consump36
tion.
31. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 107 (projecting
11.1mb/d in US in 2020); id. at 115 (projecting 10.6mb/d in Saudi Arabia in
2020); Faucon & Johnson, supra note 22, at 1 (quoting estimate of International Energy Agency).
32. See James Stafford, Shale Gas Will Be the Next Bubble to Pop: An Interview With Art Berman, OILPRICE.COM (Nov. 12, 2012, 11:11 PM), http://
oilprice.com/Interviews/Shale-Gas-Will-be-the-Next-Bubble-to-Pop-An
-Interview-with-Arthur-Berman.html (noting that decline rates in shale plays
are high and that shale gas has not been profitable).
33. Indeed, in 2012 U.S. natural gas prices fell below the marginal cost of
drilling (approximately $5.00 per MBtu), so that energy companies focused instead on oil or on so-called wet gas (i.e., natural gas wells that also provide
more-profitable natural gas liquids). U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL
GAS WEEKLY UPDATE (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/
weekly/archive/2013/09_05/index.cfm. Yet prices subsequently rose in 2013.
See Id. Indeed, if demand increases from exports, new dry gas wells could become profitable again. See IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2,
at 143–44.
34. Henry D. Jacoby et al., The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and
Environmental Policy, 1 ECON. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 37, 39–40 (2012)
(noting that shale wells experience steep production declines, but that these
declines have been taken into account in estimates of proven reserves).
35. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SHALE GAS: A RENAISSANCE IN US
MANUFACTURING?
2
(2011),
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industrial
-products/assets/pwc-shale-gas-us-manufacturing-renaissance.pdf; 2011 MIT
STUDY, supra note 4, at 7 (“Assessments of the recoverable volumes of shale
gas in the U.S. have increased dramatically over the last five years, and continue to grow.”).
36. President Barack Obama, 2012 State of the Union Address (Jan. 24,
2012) (transcript available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-24/
politics/35440939_1_fair-share-hard-work-world-war-ii). An MIT study estimates ninety-two years of supply (assuming continuation of the 2009 level of
gas consumption), and notes that this represents a 77% increase in estimates
of remaining gas resources since 1990. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 30,
32. Cf. KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III ET AL., JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB.
POL’Y AT RICE UNIV., SHALE GAS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2011), available
at
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas
-07192011.pdf (estimating 45 years of technically recoverable natural gas).
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II. ECONOMIC, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FROM FRACTURING
A. ECONOMIC GROWTH
The benefits from this new supply of energy for our economy, security, and environment are enormous. A cheap domestic
37
supply of energy is a powerful engine of economic growth.
Shale oil and gas are capital-intensive and high-paying industries, generating $87 billion of capital investments in the U.S.
2012. They are expected to generate $172.5 billion of investment annually by the end of the decade and $5.1 trillion in to38
tal by 2035. Every drilling job is estimated to create three to
four other jobs (e.g., among suppliers of machinery, geological
surveys, and financial services), a so-called employment multi39
plier that compares favorably with other industries. Not surprisingly, then, North Dakota has the lowest unemployment
40
rate in the nation, which is less than half the national rate. In
Pennsylvania, counties with more than 200 wells added jobs at
a 7% annual rate between 2007 and 2011, compared with a 3%
annual decline during the same period in counties with few or
41
no wells. Nor are economic growth and job creation confined to
37. See IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3 at 2.
38. Id. at 2, 6–7 (projecting $2.1 trillion of capital investment for unconventional oil and $3 trillion for unconventional natural gas between 2012 and
2035 and noting that supply chains for industry are principally domestic); id.
at 28 (noting that average hourly wage in unconventional oil and gas, $51.00
per hour, is more than double average wage in economy overall, $23.07).
39. Id. at 2, 31 (noting that jobs from drilling represent only 20% of total
jobs created and that employment multiplier is high compared with other industries); IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at
17, 21 (noting that shale gas industries employment multiplier of three is “one
of the larger employment multipliers,” ahead of “finance, construction, and
many of the manufacturing sectors”; further noting that drilling is also highpaying); GREG JANSEN & ETHAN LEVINE, COMMONFUND CAPITAL, BEHIND THE
ENERGY RENAISSANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (2012), available at http://
www.commonfund.org/InvestorResources/Publications/INSIGHT%20Articles%
20Only/Insight_Fall2012_Jansen.pdf (long supply chains and high pay in industry contribute to employment multiplier). One journalist reported that oil
industry workers in North Dakota can earn over $70,000 in five months, and
that their supervisors earn $320,000 in a year. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at
50.
40. North Dakota Unemployment, DEPARTMENT OF NUMBERS, http://www
.deptofnumbers.com/unemployment/north-dakota/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013)
(noting that in December 2012, North Dakota’s unemployment rate was 3.2%,
while the national rate was 7.8%).
41. DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & ANDREW GRAY, EMPIRE CTR. FOR N.Y.
STATE POL’Y, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HYDROFRACTURING ON LOCAL
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oil and gas producing states, since supply chains extend to oth42
er states as well. According to IHS Global Insight, shale oil
and gas supported 1.7 million U.S. jobs in 2012; this number is
expected to increase to 3 million in 2020, representing 2% of to43
tal employment in the U.S. Obviously, this is a significant
boon to an economy that shed 7 million jobs in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis and has created jobs haltingly in the five
44
years since.
Fracturing in shale beds can also enhance the purchasing
power of landowners. The media has reported that North Dakota landowners generally earn a bonus royalty of $3,000 per acre
plus a 20% stake in any oil that is produced. This means that a
“moderately productive plot of two square miles could bring the
owners— typically, groups of relatives and speculators— a million dollars up front, and five hundred thousand dollars a year
45
for two decades.”
Even more important, though, is the impact on consumers.
The shale gas boom has caused natural gas prices to plummet
46
to between one-third and one-half of their 2008 level. By contrast, natural gas prices are four to eight times higher in Europe and Asia, which gives a sense of what U.S. prices would be
if set by gas imports, instead of by domestically produced shale
47
gas. This savings ripples throughout the economy, since over
ECONOMIES: A COMPARISON OF NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2013),
available at http://www.empirecenter.org/Reports/2013/05/econeffectfracking
050613.cfm.
42. See generally IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE:
THE UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY:
STATE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS (2012).
43. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 2, 7–8,
27–28.
44. Jeffrey Bartash, U.S. Job Growth Better, But Is it Good?,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-job
-growth-is-better-but-is-it-good-2013-08-09.
45. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 51.
46. U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm (last updated
Aug. 30, 2013) (declining from $10.36 in June 2008 to $2.54 in June of 2012,
with prices stated in dollars per thousand cubic feet). Prices rebounded to approximately $3.00 in the fall of 2012. See Liam Pleven, What Glut? Gas Prices
Rise, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2012, at C4, and to approximately $4.00 in the
spring of 2013; Natural Gas Weekly Update, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/ (last updated Aug. 29.
2013).
47. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 129 (finding gas
prices in June 2012 were $2.10 per MBtu in the United States, $9.90/MBtu in
the United Kingdom, $12/MBtu for liquid natural gas in the Mediterranean
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half of U.S. energy consumption is for heating and electricity in
48
residential and commercial buildings. The savings averages
49
$926 per year for every American household —almost 2% of
50
the U.S. median household income —and is expected to grow
51
to $2,000 in 2035.
Since every business spends on energy, this savings also
hits the bottom line of U.S. businesses, enabling them to cut
52
costs, increase profits, and hire more people. Reductions in
natural gas prices, for instance, are expected to reduce electricity prices by 10%, and to trigger a 2.9% increase in industrial
53
production by 2017, and a 4.7% increase by 2035. The most
significant impact is on energy-intensive industries such as
glass, steel, cement, aluminum and, especially, the petrochemi54
cals industry. The latter also uses chemicals in natural gas,
such as ethane, as raw material for its products. In response to
declining U.S. natural gas prices, Methanex is moving a plant
55
from Chile to Louisiana, and Dow Chemical, Chevron Phillips
Chemical, and Exxon Mobil have also announced new invest56
ments in the United States. An Egyptian company is building
a fertilizer plant in Iowa, making the largest investment in the
57
state’s history. Industry analysts project that lower petrochemical and energy costs will yield one million more manufacand $17.40/MBtu in northeast Asia); see also JANSEN & LEVINE, supra note 39,
at 39 (finding U.S. natural gas prices are lowest in the world).
48. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4 (49.2 out of 94.6 quads).
49. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 26.
50. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2011 median household income in the United States was $50,054. Median Household Income by State—
Single-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/income/data/statemedian/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
51. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 26
(estimating savings of $926 per household from 2012–15, growing to $2000 per
household in 2035).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 36.
54. Id. at 4, 11.
55. Methanex Corp to Move Chile Plant to Louisiana, REUTERS (Apr. 25,
2013), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/methanex-plant-idINL2N0DC17
J20130425.
56. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 2,
28–31.
57. Ahmed A. Namatalla & Nadine Marroushi, Egypt’s OCI to Build $1.4
Billion Fertilizer Plant in Iowa, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/egypt-s-oci-to-build-1-dot-4-billion-fertilizer
-plant-in-iowa (“Orascom Construction Industries (OCIC), Egypt’s biggest publicly traded company, said it will build a $1.4-billion fertilizer plant in Iowa,
the biggest investment in the state’s history.”).
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turing jobs in the United States by 2025, adding .5% annual
58
growth to gross domestic product.
Since almost one-third of U.S. energy consumption is for
transportation, cheap natural gas can have even greater impact
over the long term by replacing petroleum for cars, trucks, and
59
buses. It is possible to power vehicles with natural gas, and
natural gas now costs less than a fifth of the cost of oil on an
energy-equivalent basis, creating a powerful economic incentive
60
to substitute natural gas for oil. Today, filling stations and
other infrastructure are overwhelmingly focused on petrole61
um. This is less of an issue, though, for buses, garbage trucks,
and other municipal vehicles, which have their own refueling
62
facilities. As a result, an increasing number of companies and
municipalities are buying natural-gas-powered buses and
63
trucks. The economics of powering long-haul trucks with natural gas are especially compelling. Electric cars and plug-in hybrids can also be powered by electricity generated with natural
gas, and there are chemical processes to convert natural gas in64
to a liquid fuel as well. If the enormous price differential between natural gas and petroleum persists, entrepreneurs will
figure out how to supply natural gas as a fuel for ordinary cars
65
and trucks.
58. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 35, at 1 (estimating one million additional jobs due to affordable energy and demand for products to extract shale gas); DAVID P. MURPHY, OUTLOOK NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, REENERGIZED (2012), available at http://americanpetproducts
.org/Uploads/MemServices/UBS_SummerOutlookJuly2012.pdf (noting that
UBS economists forecast that the U.S. energy boom is contributing additional
.5% annual GDP growth). But see Nelson D. Schwartz, Manufacturing’s Mirage: A Jobs Boom Built on Cheap Energy Has Yet to Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2013, at B1–B2 (cautioning that widespread automation may temper job
creation associated with a manufacturing rebound driven by cheap energy).
59. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4, 99.
60. See MURPHY, supra note 58.
61. Cf. 2011 MIT Study, supra note 4, at 121 (“Use of CNG requires a new
fueling infrastructure . . . .”).
62. See id. at 11 (“[I]nfrastructure issues do not impede development.”).
See generally CALEY JOHNSON, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUSINESS CASE
FOR COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS IN MUNICIPAL FLEETS, NREL TECHNICAL REPORT NREL/TP-7A247919 (2010), available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/
pdfs/47919.pdf (offering a model to project profitability of CNG use for fleets
such as buses and trucks).
63. Michael Rubinkam, Natural Gas Drillers Target US Truck, Bus Market YAHOO FINANCE (Nov. 25, 2012, 3:12 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
natural-gas-drillers-target-us-truck-bus-market-182633169-finance.html.
64. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4, 125–28.
65. Cf. id. at 123.
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All of these economic benefits will be reflected in our balance of payments. The 2012 current accounts deficit of the
66
United States was estimated to be $695 billion, which included $319 billion of oil imports. If not for the increase in shale oil
and gas production since 2008, the deficit would have been almost 25% larger (reflecting an additional $70 billion of oil and
67
$100 billion of natural gas for a total of $865 billion). If domestic oil production increases as expected, the deficit will be
reduced further by $185 billion (or 27%) over the coming
68
years —and by more if we export significant amounts of natural gas.
Through the combination of all these effects, shale oil and
gas contributed over $237 billion to U.S. GDP in 2012, and is
expected to contribute $416 billion in 2020 and $475 billion in
69
2035. Likewise, shale oil and gas contributed nearly $62 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue in 2012, a level that
is projected to grow to $111 billion in 2020, for a total of nearly
70
$2.5 trillion over the next quarter century.
B. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Reducing our dependence on imported energy has geopolit71
ical advantages as well. Some of the world’s leading oil and
natural gas exporters are either unstable or hostile to the United States or both. The top eight oil-exporting nations to the
world market are Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, the United Arab
72
Emirates, Norway, Iraq, Angola, and Nigeria. Likewise, 70%
of the world’s conventional gas reserves (i.e., not including
73
shale gas) are in Iran, Qatar, and Russia. Some of these regimes consistently seek to undermine U.S. foreign policy goals,
and added oil and gas revenue strengthens their ability to do
66. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 5.
67. Id. at 3, 5.
68. Id. at 6 (assuming a reduction of 6 million barrels per day of imports
at $112 per barrel, the average price per barrel during the first nine months of
2012).
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 2, 8.
71. John Bussey, Shale: A New Kingmaker in Energy Geopolitics, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 21, 2012, at B1 (“Had it not been for this growth in U.S. production, the sanctions on Iran could not have been as successful . . . .”) (quoting
Daniel Yergin).
72. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia
.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2013).
73. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 7.
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74

so. Indeed, in some cases, these resources may fund terrorist
75
networks that target the U.S. and our allies. Recent events in
the Middle East—the nuclear program in Iran, the attack on
the U.S. Embassy in Libya, the seizure of hostages by terrorists
at a natural gas facility in Algeria, etc.—suggest that, if anything, the Middle East is becoming more unstable and hostile
to the U.S.
It is fortunate, then, that the U.S. has gone from importing
60.3% of its oil (on a net basis) in 2005 to 36.2% in early 2013,
with further reductions in U.S. oil imports expected in the next
76
two decades. In fact, the IEA projects the U.S. to be 97% ener77
gy self-sufficient in net terms by 2035. The increase in U.S. oil
production since 2008 is more than what Iran was exporting before sanctions were imposed, a fact that has made those sanc78
tions more viable. Likewise, if Europe starts to buy natural
gas from the U.S. and other sources instead of Russia, Russia
79
will have less leverage over Europe. Meanwhile, China has
shale gas reserves that may be larger than those in the U.S. (as
well as significant reserves of shale oil), and ultimately may also depend less on the Middle East and other traditional energy
74. See John Hannah, Energy Insecurity: How Oil Dependence Undermines America's Effort to Stop the Iranian Bomb, FOREIGN POL'Y, Oct. 12,
2012,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/12/energy_insecurity_
how_oil_dependence_undermines_america_s_effort_to_stop_the_irania.
75. See Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the
War on Terror Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587, 614 (2003).
76. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 120 (predicting
that US oil imports fall from over 12 mb/d in 2005 to 3.4 mb/d in 2035, and
“North America as a whole becomes a net exporting region”); Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.S. Is Forecast to Be No. 1 Oil Producer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at
B6; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 26, at 41.
77. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 75 (projecting
US to be “97% energy self-sufficient in net terms” by 2035, as exports of coal,
gas, and bioenergy offset declining oil imports).
78. Daniel Yergin, The Real Stimulus: Low Cost Natural Gas, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 23, 2012, at A17 (“Without the additional oil coming from the surge in
U.S. oil output, the Iranian oil sanctions could not have worked as well as they
have.”); see also MEDLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 13 (tapping domestic shale
gas reserves “[r]educes Iran’s ability to tap energy diplomacy as a means to
strengthen its regional power or buttress its nuclear aspirations”). U.S. oil
production increased by 2.735 million bpd from 2008 through the first four
months of 2013. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. supra note 26. By contrast,
Iran was producing 4.396 million bpd in 2008 and consuming 1.906 million
bpd, leaving a net of 2.490 for export. See BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD
ENERGY 8–9 (2012), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/
globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_
review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/oil_section_2012.pdf.
79. MEDLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 54.
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80

suppliers. The United Kingdom recently doubled its estimate
of its shale gas reserves, and Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and other nations have significant reserves of shale oil
81
and gas as well. This greater diversity of energy supply is sure
to have geopolitical consequences.
For example, developing U.S. and other shale oil and gas
resources may enable the U.S. to cut its defense budget and
even to reduce the probability of future terrorist attacks and
wars. The U.S. spends $60 to $80 billion every year to police
the sea lanes from the Middle East, but as we import less oil,
82
we may be able to spend less. Admittedly, the U.S. remains
exposed to price shocks in the oil market, even with domestically produced oil (since prices are based on global, rather than lo83
cal, market conditions). Putting the need for energy aside,
moreover, there are other reasons why the U.S. has been, and
will remain, engaged in the Middle East, including the value of
84
averting instability and its associated costs. Yet even so, there
80. Elizabeth Muller, China Must Exploit its Shale Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2013, at A21 (“China has the potential to unearth large amounts of shale
gas through hydraulic fracturing. In 2011, the United States Energy Information Administration estimated that China had ‘technically recoverable’ reserves of 1.3 quadrillion cubic feet, nearly 50 percent more than the United
States.”). In July of 2013, PetroChina entered into an agreement with Hess to
begin developing a shale oil field in northwest China. Chen Aizhu & Judy
Hua, Hess, PetroChina Sign China’s First Shale Oil Deal, REUTERS (July 24,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-cnpc-hess-shale-idUSBRE
96N0EL20130724.
81. Sarah Young & John McGarrity, Update 2-Britain Doubles North England Shale Gas Estimate, REUTERS, June 27, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2013/06/27/uk-britain-shale-resources-idUKBRE95Q0CD20130627;
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas
Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the
United States (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/
worldshalegas/ (listing nations with most shale oil and shale gas reserves); see
Press Release, UK Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, Estimates of Shale Gas
Resource in North of England Published, Alongside a Package of Community
Benefits (June 27, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
estimates-of-shale-gas-resource-in-north-of-england-published-alongside-a
-package-of-community-benefits (“Scientists from the British Geological Survey have estimated on a central scenario that there is likely to be some 40 trillion cubic metres (1,300 trillion cubic feet) of shale gas in the ground in this
area.”).
82. Faucon & Johnson, supra note 22, at A4 (quoting prediction of International Energy Agency).
83. Id.
84. Indeed, if a collapse in oil prices destabilizes the region, this would
create a number of challenges for the U.S. and its allies. See, e.g., Charles C.
Mann, What if We Never Run Out of Oil?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2013, at
48, 61 (describing an “arc of instability stretching from Venezuela to Nigeria to
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are obvious advantages to energy independence, which explain
why every President in recent memory has championed this
85
goal. While it has not seemed attainable for decades, the energy reserves in U.S. shale beds have changed the equation.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS: AIR QUALITY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE
1. Cleaner Air from Using Gas Instead of Coal
Although this Article’s focus is on regulating potential environmental risks from fracturing, there are two potentially
significant environmental benefits as well. The first is cleaner
air, an indisputable benefit of replacing coal with natural gas.
Coal pollutes the air with particulate matter, sulphur dioxide,
and carbon monoxide, producing pea-soup like air (which can
be found, for instance, in Chinese cities), as well as attendant
86
health effects. By contrast, natural gas burns much cleaner
87
than coal. Until recently, coal generated almost half of the
electricity in the United States, but declining natural gas prices
have led power plants to switch to gas; as a result, the level of
coal-generated electricity declined to 42% in 2011 and 36% in
2012, the lowest levels since these numbers were first tracked
88
in 1949.

Saudi Arabia to Kazakhstan to Siberia”). But see Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Why
the Energy Mopes Are Wrong, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2013, at A15 (arguing that
prices are unlikely to fall to the extent that they would destabilize these regimes, and emphasizing the geopolitical advantages of reducing the coercive
capacity of petrostates).
85. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY, 260–61 (2011) (describing the importance of energy security).
86. Jeff Blagdon, China’s Air Pollution Led to 1.2 Million Premature
Deaths in 2010, THE VERGE (Apr. 3, 2013, 1:22 AM), http://www.theverge.com/
2013/4/3/4177568/china-air-pollution-causes-1-2-million-premature-deaths; see
also, e.g., Yuyu Chen et al., Evidence on the Impact of Sustained Exposure to
Air Pollution on Life Expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy, 110 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 12,936, 12,936 (2013); Anthony Seaton, William Macnee,
Kenneth Donaldson & David Godden, Particulate Air Pollution and Acute
Health Effects, 345 THE LANCET 176, 176 (1995) (describing health effects from
coal pollution); Richard Silk, Coal Pollution Cuts Life Expectancy in China,
Study Finds, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2013, at A14 (life expectancy cut by more
than five years in 1990’s).
87. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 3 (“Among the fossil fuels . . . [natural gas] burns cleanly and efficiently, with very few non-carbon emissions.”).
88. ECONOMIST, supra note 9, at 6.
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2. Climate Change: Reduced Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Burning Gas Instead of Coal
A second (more contested) environmental benefit from fracturing—and, in particular, from replacing coal with natural
gas—is the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and
thus to combat climate change. Burning natural gas produces
89
only half as much carbon dioxide as coal. This shift from coal
to natural gas is a key reason why U.S. carbon dioxide emissions declined by 12% from 2005 to 2012 (including a 3.8% de90
cline in 2012 alone), and are at their lowest level since 1994.
This decline is the largest anywhere in the world, and occurred
during a period when global emissions rose by 8%. China’s
emissions have risen dramatically as they have built more coal91
fired power plants. Likewise, Europe has made less progress
than the U.S.—notwithstanding its stricter regulations of
greenhouse gas emissions—because natural gas is more expen92
sive there, so that Europe has been increasing its use of coal.
Going forward, by making greater use of natural gas to
generate electric power, we can reduce U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions from this sector by 20%, or 8% overall, according to a
93
2011 MIT study. We can make even more progress by using
more natural gas to power industry, home heating, and trans-

89. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8; see also 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4,
at 3 (“Among the fossil fuels, [natural gas] has the lowest carbon intensity,
emitting less CO2 per unit of energy generated than other fossil fuels. It burns
cleanly and efficiently, with very few non-carbon emissions.”); id. at 121 (natural gas also burns cleaner than oil, producing 25% less CO2 compared to gasoline). For numerical estimates of the difference between coal and natural gas
on a lifecycle basis, see the studies cited infra notes 91 & 97.
90. Russell Gold, Rise in U.S. Gas Production Fuels Unexpected Plunge in
Emissions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2013, at A1 (citing study by the Energy Information Administration); Trevor Houser, Neck and Neck: US and European
GHG Emissions Trends, RHODIUM GROUP (May 29, 2013), http://rhg.com/
notes/neck-and-neck-us-and-european-ghg-emissions-trends.
91. See Muller, supra note 80 (“China’s greenhouse gas emissions are
twice those of the United States and growing at 8 percent to 10 percent per
year. Last year, China increased its coal-fired generating capacity by 50 gigawatts, enough to power a city that uses seven times the energy of New York
City.”).
92. Brad Plumer, How Long Before Fracking Spreads to Europe? A Decade, at Least, WASH. POST. WONKBLOG (Feb. 7, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/20B/02/07/will-fracking-ever-spread
-to-europe-maybe-in-a-decade.
93. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 2; see also id. at 9 (“Displacement of
coal-fired power by gas-fired power over the next 25 to 30 years is the most
cost-effective way of reducing CO2 emissions in the power sector.”).
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94

portation. Fracturing thus facilitates the use of natural gas as
a bridge fuel, reducing carbon emissions in the near term, while
solar and other renewable technologies are developed over the
95
long term. We also avoid the risks of nuclear power, demonstrated at Chernobyl and Fukushima.
3. Climate Change: Offsetting Effects of Fugitive Methane
Emissions
A caveat about greenhouse gas emissions is in order,
though. Although burning methane (the main ingredient in
natural gas) releases comparatively small amounts of CO2, releasing methane into the atmosphere—for instance, during
drilling or from pipeline leaks—is a potentially significant
source of greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, methane traps
96
twenty times more heat than carbon dioxide. Focusing on these fugitive emissions, Robert Howarth has argued that shifting
from coal to natural gas actually does not reduce greenhouse
97
gas emissions when measured on a “lifecycle” basis.
98
Yet this conclusion is not widely accepted. A number of
studies reach more favorable conclusions. They argue that Professor Howarth’s analysis is plagued by measurement and
methodological errors, such as failing to distinguish between
methane that is “vented” (deliberately leaked during drilling)
99
or “flared” (burned during drilling). The debate is ongoing,
94. Id. at 10–11.
95. Id. at 2 (“[N]atural gas provides a cost-effective bridge to . . . a lowcarbon future.”).
96. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, at
ES-12 (2013).
97. See Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro & Anthony Ingraffea, Methane
and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations, a
Letter, 106 CLIMATE CHANGE 679, 683 (2011).
98. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 17 (noting that Howarth’s
study’s conclusion is “not widely accepted”).
99. See, e.g, Jacoby, O’Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 34, at 44 n.2 (criticizing Howarth for “questionable interpretation of methane leakage data” and
for assuming “inappropriate substitution of gas for coal generation”); Francis
O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, Shale Gas Production: Potential Versus Actual
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 6 (2012), available at
http://m.iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/4/044030/pdf/1748-9326_7_4_044030
.pdf (rebutting the Howarth study and arguing that methane emissions from
fractured natural gas wells are comparable to methane emissions from conventional gas drilling); see also MARY LASHLEY BARCELLA ET AL., IHS
CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., MISMEASURING METHANE: ESTIMATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATE REPORT 9 (2011) (“IHS data . . . was misused and severely distorted in the Howarth paper. The analysis included wells that were not in the
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and a number of methodological and empirical questions need
to be resolved.
For example, when we analyze whether natural gas or coal
contributes more to greenhouse gas emissions and climate
change on a life-cycle basis, time horizon is an important issue.
Methane traps more heat than carbon dioxide, but only as long
as it remains in the atmosphere—for only twenty years, com100
pared with 100 years for carbon dioxide. As a result, estimates of methane’s impact over a twenty year time horizon are
greater than over a 100 year time horizon, but the latter is
101
probably a better measure of long-run effects on climate.
Another key question in this life-cycle comparison is the
rate of methane leakage from natural gas production. Esti102
mates range from a low of 1% to a high of 5% or even 8%. In
an April 2013 study, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) offered a reassuring assessment, concluding that me103
thane emissions declined by 8.2% between 1990 and 2011.
flowback phase at all; double-counted a particularly prolific well; and in the
single case of a well tested during the flowback process, assumed that methane was emitted when in fact it was captured for sale, as clearly stated in
the IHS report.”); id. (“The Howarth paper states that methane emissions
from unconventional gas wells average nearly 2 percent of the ultimate recovery of natural gas over the lifetime of the well . . . . By contrast, the authors
estimate that flowback methane emissions from a conventional gas well average only 0.01 percent of ultimate recovery.”).
100. Global Warming FAQ, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www
.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/global-warming-faq
.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
101. James Bradbury et al., Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Natural Gas Systems, 14–15 (World Resources
Institute, Working Paper Apr. 2013), available at http://pdf.wri.org/clearing_
the_air_full.pdf; David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral
Outrage vs. Cool Analysis, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228398. See generally Michael A. Levi,
Comment on “Hydrocarbon Emissions Characterization in the Colorado Front
Range: A Pilot Study” by Gabrielle Pétron et al., 117 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.
D21203 (2012) (measuing methane emissions from natural gas).
102. Ramon A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage
from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6435, 6437
(2012) (concluding that the cumulative leakage rate from natural-gas production is 3.2%); Michael Levi, Climate Consequences of Natural Gas as a Bridge
Fuel, 118 CLIMATIC CHANGE 609, 620 (2013) (“Most recent publications have
indicated that leakage in the United States is likely to be 1–2%, and have all
but rejected the possibility of leakage on the order of 5 percent . . . .”); Jeff
Tollefson, Methane Leaks Erode Green Credentials of Natural Gas, 493 NATURE 12, 12 (2013) (reporting on preliminary data from joint study by National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of Colorado indicating leakage rate may be as high as 9%).
103. EPA, supra note 96, at ES-12
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Although this period coincides with a dramatic increase in natural gas production, methane emissions from natural gas pro104
duction are down even more—by 10.2%. This progress is “due
largely to a decrease in emissions from transmission and storage,” EPA concluded, “due to increased voluntary reductions
and a decrease in distribution emissions due to a decrease in
105
cast iron and unprotected steel pipelines.” Likewise, the subset of methane leaks attributed to field production (as opposed
106
to pipelines) is down even more sharply—by 12%. This decline has not been linear: EPA reports that methane field production emissions actually increased by 43% from 1990 through
2006, and then declined by 38% from 2006 through 2011, even
107
though this later period is when the shale gas boom took off.
Compared with the assessment it issued in 2012, EPA’s 2013
assessment is significantly more favorable: it reduced its esti108
mate (a) of total methane emissions in 2010 by 11% and (b) of
109
methane emissions from natural gas systems in 2010 by 33%.
According to EPA’s 2013 report, U.S. natural gas production
emits only slightly more methane into the atmosphere than
110
livestock (i.e., from “enteric fermentation” or belches). Like104. Id. at ES-13 (reporting decline of 16.5 Tg C02 Eq.).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Compare EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990–2010, at ES–5 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-ES.pdf (reporting 666.5 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for 2010 in their 2012 report), with EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS:
1990–2011, at ES–6 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013-Main-Text.pdf (reporting
592.7 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for 2010 in their 2013 report). The
change from 666.5 to 592.7 is an 11% decline.
109. Compare EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990–2010, at ES–5 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-ES.pdf (reporting 215.4 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for natural gas systems in
2010 in their 2012 report), with EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011, at ES–6 (2013), available at http://www
.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013
-Main-Text.pdf (reporting 143.6 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for natural gas systems in 2010 in their 2013 report). The change from 215.4 to 143.6
is a 33% decline.
110. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS:
1990–2011, at ES-12–ES-13 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013-Main
-Text.pdf; EPA Methane Report Further Divides Fracking Camps, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 28, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/APe433c8a9448749f38fc513232d72
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wise, a September 2013 study organized by the Environmental
Defense Fund also finds relatively little methane leakage during the natural gas extraction process, based on measurements
from 190 onshore production sites; the measurements are in
line with EPA’s most recent estimates, although the distribution is somewhat different (with lower emissions from well
completion and higher emissions from pneumatic controllers
111
and equipment leaks). Further research will hopefully yield a
more definitive assessment over time.
What is clear, though, is that as long as methane leakage
can be contained at the low end of this range, switching from
112
coal to natural gas is beneficial from a climate perspective.
Fortunately, there are cost effective measures to contain methane leaks and energy companies have an economic incentive
to adopt them, so they can sell the methane that otherwise
113
would escape. They also have safety reasons to minimize methane leaks, since methane is highly flammable and inhaling it
114
can cause dizziness, headaches, and other symptoms. In addition, EPA’s recently promulgated regulations on fugitive emissions reinforce this incentive, requiring energy companies to
capture or burn methane released during drilling (so-called
d1e2.html (reporting 145 million metric tons annually from natural gas production versus 137 million from livestock).
111. David T. Allen et al., Measurements of Methane Emissions at Natural
Gas Production Sites in the United States, PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCIENCE 1
(2013).
112. See Alvarez et al., supra note 102, at 6435; Andrew Burnham et al.,
Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Shale Gas, Natural Gas, Coal, and
Petroleum, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 619, 624 (2011) (concluding that, on a lifecycle basis, electricity generated from coal produces 41% more greenhouse gas
emissions than electricity from conventional natural gas, while electricity from
shale gas produces 6% less greenhouse gas emissions than electricity from
conventional gas); Timothy J. Skone, Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Analysis of
Natural Gas Extraction & Delivery in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY
34 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/
NG_LC_GHG_ PRES_12MAY11.pdf (illustrating the Department of Energy’s
analysis concluding that power generation from natural gas produces 54% less
greenhouse gas than from coal on a life-cycle basis with a 100 year time horizon); Paulina Jaramillo et al.Comparative Life-Cycle Air Emissions of Coal,
Domestic Natural Gas, LNG, and SNG for Electricity Generation, 41 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 6290, 6293 (2007) (concluding that life-cycle carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generated with domestically produced natural gas is 50%
less than electricity generated from coal, though the difference is narrower for
liquefied and synthetic natural gas).
113. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 133 (noting both “environmental
and business reasons” to capture emissions from methane leaks).
114. BARCELLA ET AL., supra note 99, at 1–2 (noting incentive of energy
companies to minimize methane emissions for health and safety reasons).
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“green capture” and “flaring”) and mandating various other
115
control technologies.
III. FAMILIAR RISKS THAT ARE NOT UNIQUE TO
FRACTURING
Balanced against the benefits of fracturing are a number of
potential risks. In our view, the most important of these—and,
indeed, the one that is unique to fracturing — is the risk of contaminating groundwater. We describe this risk in Part IV and
consider how to address it in Parts V, VI, and VII.
But before we turn to water contamination, Part III reviews five other environmental risks: the economic competition
that shale gas and oil pose to renewable energy; air pollution;
congestion and pressure on local communities; water usage;
and induced tremors and earthquakes. A unifying theme
among these risks is that they are not unique to fracturing.
Almost all arise, for instance, when oil and natural gas wells
are drilled conventionally (i.e., without fracturing and horizon116
tal drilling). Some of these risks also arise in coal mining,
manufacturing, and even in opening new sports arenas and
shopping malls. Because these risks are familiar in other contexts, most are already governed by existing regulatory regimes. While fracturing might justify an increase in the scale or
intensity of these regulations, in most cases it is unlikely to require new fracturing-specific regimes for these risks.
A. ECONOMIC COMPETITION FOR SOLAR, WIND, AND OTHER
RENEWABLES
By increasing the supply of natural gas and oil, and thus
holding down their prices, fracturing diminishes price-based incentives to conserve energy. Does it also impede the development of renewable energy, such as solar, wind and geothermal?
Arguably, the answer is “no.” To the extent government initiatives guarantee a percentage of the energy market to renewable energy, shale gas does not undercut the incentive to
117
use renewables because it is not a renewable fuel. Aside from
115. New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16,
2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
116. Christopher L. Weber & Christopher Clavin, Life Cycle Carbon Footprint of Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and Implications, 46 ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 5688 (2012).
117. JANSEN & LEVINE, supra note 39, at 40 (noting that utilities invest in
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the protection afforded by such mandates, shale gas is often
viewed as a bridge fuel, which will help satisfy the nation’s en118
ergy needs until renewables are more competitive. In addition, since wind and solar are intermittent sources of energy,
they need another source to fill in when they are unavailable,
119
which usually is natural gas.
Nevertheless, there is a risk that cheap natural gas will
undercut the political support for renewable fuel mandates
and, more generally, will outcompete renewables so that they
120
never become economically viable.
Although opponents of
fracturing do not usually say so explicitly, one reason some may
favor a moratorium or costly new regulations for fracturing is
to shore up the competitive position of renewables.
While we agree with the goal of using taxes and other policy instruments to ensure that carbon fuel prices reflect their
true social cost, including externalities—and have made a pro121
posal in this spirit elsewhere —this strategy does not make
sense if applied only to shale gas and oil, but not to other carbon fuels. If fracturing is banned or becomes significantly more
expensive, while coal remains cheap, the result will not be more
122
solar and wind energy, but more coal. This is not an outcome
renewables in part because of state-based renewable portfolio standards).
118. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 70 (“Gas can be an effective bridge
to a lower CO2 emissions [in the] future . . . .”).
119. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 16; 2011
MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 73 (claiming natural gas provides baseload power
and system flexibility for intermittent sources).
120. Ryan Tracy, States Cooling to Renewable Energy, WALL ST. J., Mar.
28, 2013, at A3 (“Legislatures in half the states that require electric utilities to
buy renewable energy are considering proposals to roll back those mandates.”);
2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 2 (“[N]atural gas sets the cost benchmark
against which other clean power sources must compete to remove the marginal
ton of CO2.”); id. at 10 (noting that in some short- and long-term scenarios, renewables and gas substitute for each other on a nearly one-for-one basis); id.
at 54 (estimating cost per kilowatt hour of electricity is 5.4 cents for coal, 5.6
cents for gas, 6.0 cents for wind, 8.5 cents for biomass, and 19.3 cents for solar,
without including cost of backup and storage for renewables, which would lead
to a higher estimate); Jacoby et al., supra note 34, at 49 (modeling the effect of
cheap shale gas on economic viability of renewables through 2050 and finding
that “cheaper gas serves to reduce the rate of market penetration of renewable
generation”).
121. Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic
Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (2010).
122. Susan L. Brantley & Anna Meyendorff, Op-Ed., The Facts on
Fracking, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/
opinion/global/the-facts-on-fracking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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that environmentalists should favor, since gas burns more
cleanly than coal. Any such effort to reduce consumption of carbon fuels should apply in an even-handed manner to all carbon
fuels.
The global nature of climate change and energy production
reinforces this point. Even if the U.S. bans fracturing, other
123
countries will use it. For example, there are large shale oil
and gas reserves in China, Argentina, Ukraine, Poland, Libya,
Algeria, and in other nations as well; although it may take
some time for these nations to develop their capacity for shale
124
drilling, they presumably will do so eventually. If these resources undercut the development of renewables, there is little
the United States (alone) can do to stop them. An effort to stop
fracturing in the U.S. could therefore deprive the U.S. of the
benefits of fracturing without doing much to hasten the development of renewables on a global basis.
B. AIR POLLUTION
Another environmental risk from drilling in shale beds is
air pollution, which can arise in four ways. First, methane can
be released from a well or a leak in a pipeline, as discussed
125
above, contributing to greenhouse gas emissions, and in rare
cases can even cause explosions. Of course, methane emissions
arise not just from fractured wells, but also from conventional
126
wells, pipelines, and, for that matter, from landfills and cattle
123. MEDLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 11 (noting that shale gas production is being discussed in Europe, China, India, and Australia); 2011 MIT
STUDY, supra note 4, at 154 (noting that China has 1.2 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas reserves).
124. Russell Gold & Marynia Kruk, Global Gas Push Stalls, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2012, at A1 (noting that other nations lag behind the U.S. in technical
capacity as well as in knowledge of geological conditions, and also that the
U.S. property rights system, which vests landowners as opposed to the state
with mineral rights, creates added incentive to drill); id. at A6 (noting also
that other countries are likely to catch up to the U.S. eventually, though it
may take time). France, on the other hand, has indicated that it will not permit fracturing. See Op-Ed., No Fracking, We’re French, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
2012, at A16.
125. See generally Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the GreenhouseGas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE
679 (2011).
126. Indeed, a number of studies have compared air pollution and emissions from conventional and shale gas. See Weber & Clavin, supra note 116, at
5688. Although there is some uncertainty on the question, the evidence so far
suggests that life-cycle emissions from conventional and shale gas are comparable. See, e.g., Christopher L. Weber & Christopher Clavin, Life Cycle Carbon
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127

ranches. Over time, we will have better information about the
life-cycle emissions of shale and other sources of energy, so that
more definitive judgments can be made and additional regulatory steps can be considered as needed. In any event, we do not
offer a comprehensive analysis of this issue, since this Article
focuses on water contamination.
Second, fracturing fluid can contain volatile organic compounds (VOCs), such as benzene, which can be released into the
128
atmosphere when the fluid evaporates. VOCs can increase
the risk of cancer, as well as asthma, nausea, and other symp129
toms. As a result, some states monitor VOC emissions near
130
drilling sites (e.g., Texas), while others require energy companies to use “vapor recovery systems” or holding tanks to min131
imize VOC emissions (e.g., Colorado). In addition, EPA’s new
regulations are expected to reduce VOC emissions from the oil

Footprint of Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and Implications, 46 ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 5688, 5693 (2012) (“Our review of several studies published since
Howarth’s initial shale gas carbon footprint study shows that although the
carbon footprint of shale gas is highly uncertain, it is also difficult to distinguish from conventional onshore gas production.”) (footnote omitted).
127. Overview
of
Greenhouse
Gases,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (cataloging various sources of methane emissions, including landfills, animal husbandry, natural gas production, coal mining, and wastewater treatment). According to EPA, animal husbandry produced nearly as much methane
emissions as natural gas systems in 2009. Id. (189 TgCO2 compared to 221
TgCO2).
128. Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations From a Public Health
Perspective, 17 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: INT’L J. 1039, 1040–42
(2011).
129. Id. at 1045–46; see also The Potential Health Impacts of Hydraulic
Fracking Wastewater and Drill Cuttings: Hearing before the N.Y. State
Assemb. Standing Comms. on Envtl. Conservation & Health (May 26, 2011)
(statement of Sandra Steingraber, Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Ithaca
College), available at http://fingerlakescleanwaters.org/?page_id=94 (describing possible health effects from air polluted with benzene and other toxic
chemicals).
130. See A Commitment to Air Quality in the Barnett Shale, TEX. COMM’N
ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/publications/pd/020/10-04/a
-commitment-to-air-quality-in-the-barnett-shale (last visited Oct. 17, 2013)
(noting that “the ‘TCEQ has committed a tremendous amount of time and resources to the issue of Barnett Shale air quality, and we will continue to do
so,’” and that twenty-four hour air quality monitors have been operating for
several months) (quoting Chairman Bryan Shaw).
131. Rule 805 Air Quality & Odor, COLORADO OIL & GAS CONSERVATION
COMMISSION,
http://cogcc.state.co.us/RR_Training/presentations/805_
AirQuality.pdf (slide presentation describing new Rule 805.b(2) requiring control devices in condensate tanks).
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132

and gas industry by 25%. This would be useful, since EPA estimates that the oil and gas industry is the largest industrial
133
source of VOC emissions. Still, other activities, such as car
134
emissions and smoking, are equally significant. Indeed, after
a high profile charge that elevated VOC levels near drilling
135
sites causing health effects in Dish, Texas, studies by Texas
authorities found that VOC levels in the air generally were not
136
elevated. They also found that biological tests of Dish resi132. Proposed Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil and Natural Gas
Industry Fact Sheet, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/
20110728factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (“The proposal would cut
smog-forming volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions by nearly one-fourth
across the oil and gas industry, including a nearly 95 percent reduction in
VOCs emitted from new and modified hydraulically fractured gas wells.”); see
also New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), available at http://epa.gov/airquality/
oilandgas/pdfs/20120417finalrule.pdf (final rule requiring VOC containment
vessels to reduce VOC emissions by 95%).
133. Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards, Basic Information,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/basic.html (last visited Sept. 10,
2013). The precise contribution of the oil and gas industry is contested.
134. See, e.g., BARBARA ZIELINSKA ET AL., DESERT RES. INST., MONITORING
OF EMISSIONS FROM BARNETT SHALE NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
FOR POPULATION EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT (2010), available at https://sph.uth
.edu/mleland/attachments/Barnett%20Shale%20Study%20Final%20Report.pdf
(study of VOC emissions in Texas finding that “the dominant source category
was motor vehicle emissions to which 46 ± 14% was attributed,” while
“[c]ombined natural gas and condensate tank emissions were estimated to contribute about the same amount; 43 ± 5%,” and “[s]mall gasoline engines (e.g.
lawnmowers) accounted for about 17 ± 7% of the total”).
135. Wolf Eagle Environmental did a study showing elevated benzene levels in Dish, Texas, near Fort Worth, and the Earthworks Accountability project conducted a survey of health effects. See WOLF EAGLE ENVTL., TOWN OF
DISH TEXAS AMBIENT AIR MONITORING ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT (2009),
available at http://townofdish.com/objects/DISH_-_final_report_revised.pdf
(“Laboratory results confirmed the presence of multiple Recognized and Suspected Human Carcinogens . . . .”); WILMA SUBRA, EARTHWORKS OIL AND GAS
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT RESULTS OF HEALTH SURVEY OF CURRENT AND
FORMER DISH/CLARK, TEXAS RESIDENTS (2009), available at http://www
.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/DishTXHealthSurvey_FINAL_hi.pdf
(noting that 19% of survey participants described themselves as either sick, or
“both healthy and sick,” and that “61% of the health impacts reported by participants are known health effects of chemicals detected in the air”).
136. See Press Release, R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Chairman Carrillo Issues
Statement on Barnett Shale Emissions Issues (Jan. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/pressreleases/2010/011310.php (statement by the
Chair of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality reporting results of
air quality study that found “no cause for concern”). According to John Sadlier,
Deputy Director of the Office of Compliance and Enforcement, “the majority of
the testing during that trip found no detection of volatile organic compounds
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137

dents revealed elevated VOC’s only among smokers. Hopefully, further research will provide greater certainty on these issues.
Third, fracturing involves drilling deep under the earth,
where there are so-called “naturally occurring radioactive materials” or “NORMs,” and the drilling process can bring these to
138
the surface. There is a debate about whether this material
139
poses health risks to drillingworkers and others.
In any
140
event, the same issue can arise with conventional drilling,
and states and the federal government have various regula141
tions in place addressing this risk.
Finally, drilling equipment and trucks produce emis142
sions. Conventional wells pose the same issue, as do factories
and shopping malls. Substituting equipment and trucks powered by natural gas instead of diesel will help mitigate this
problem, and low natural gas prices offer an added incentive to
143
do so.
at all . . . .” Id.
137. Press Release, Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., Tests Indicate Exposures in Dish Similar to U.S. Population (May 12, 2010), available at http://
www.dshs.state.tx.us/news/releases/20100512.shtm (“Biological test results
from a Texas Department of State Health Services investigation in Dish, Texas, indicate that residents’ exposure to certain contaminants was not greater
than that of the general U.S. population . . . . The only residents who had
higher levels of benzene in their blood were smokers. Because cigarette smoke
contains benzene, finding it in smokers’ blood is not unusual.”).
138. Craig Slatin & Charles Levenstein, An Energy Policy that Provides
Clean and Green Policy, 23 NEW SOLUTIONS 1, 16 (2013).
139. For example, a study by Radioactive Waste Management Associates
concluded that there were risks to workers and possibly also to farmers.
MARVIN RESNIKOFF ET AL., RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES,
RADIOACTIVITY IN MARCELLUS SHALE (2010), available at http://energy.wilkes
.edu/PDFFiles/Library/Marcellus%20Shale%20Radioactivity%20Report%205
-18-2010.pdf. In response, another study questioned their assumptions and
concluded that the risks are minimal. See Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science
and the Reasonable Development of Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Resources in
Pennsylvania and New York, 32 ENERGY L.J. 125, 129–30 (2011) (arguing that
radioactivity risk is minimal).
140. For example, EPA’s discussion of the issue on the webpage indicates
that one potential source of exposure is from wells drilled before the 1970s
when the regulations went into effect. This obviously was long before fracturing in shale beds began. Radioactive Wastes from Oil and Gas Drilling, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/radtown/drilling-waste.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2012).
141. Id. (“Most states and federal land management agencies currently
have regulations which control the handling and disposal of radionuclides
which may be present in production sites.”).
142. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15.
143. Id. at 24.
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C. CONGESTION AND PRESSURE ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Environmental pressure of a different kind arises from the
influx of workers when oil or natural gas is discovered in a
shale bed. A population surge can put pressure on the local
housing stock, schools, and other services. Drilling can be
144
noisy. There is more traffic and, thus, additional wear and
145
tear on roads. Pipelines may be needed to bring in fracturing
146
fluid or to transport oil and gas. All this activity can disrupt
147
local habitats.
These challenges often arise with new economic activity
that brings jobs and purchasing power to rural areas, including
new conventional gas wells, coal mines, factories, and shopping
malls. In managing these costs, municipalities already have a
host of policy instruments, from land use regulation, to condi148
tioning drilling permits, to taxes and fines. For example, municipalities can require energy company trucks to follow designated routes or firms to post a bond and pay for the creation or
149
maintenance of roads. Or, as Pennsylvania has done, the
state can impose “impact fees” on energy companies, a portion
150
of which are dedicated to repairing local roads and bridges.
144. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMSECOND 90-DAY REPORT 8 (2011), available at http://www.shalegas
.energy.gov/resources/111811_final_report.pdf [hereinafter SECOND 2011 DOE
REPORT] (noting potential impact on traffic, noise, land use, wildlife, and habitats).
145. NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL GAS RESOURCES IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 8 (Dec.
2008), available at http://www.eesi.psu.edu/seminars-conferences/earthtalks
-spring2009-marcellus-supplements/NatParkService-GRD-M-Shale_12-11
-2008_view.pdf (a single well can require between 320 and 1365 truckloads of
equipment).
146. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4.
147. SECOND 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 144, at 8.
148. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that energy companies must obtain a permit before drilling a well).
149. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL,
GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 7-143 (2011), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (“Municipalities may require trucks transporting hazardous materials to travel on designated routes,
in accordance with a road use agreement . . . .”); Ryan Delaney, Fracking Will
Bring Heavy Truck Traffic, But Towns Are Ready, INNOVATION TRAIL (Sept. 4,
2012, 3:40 PM), http://innovationtrail.org/post/fracking-will-bring-heavy-truck
-traffic-towns-are-ready (explaining Steuben County requires energy companies to post a $250,000 bond or to pay to upgrade the road and post a $15,000
bond).
150. See 58 P.A. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2012).
MITTEE
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It is worth emphasizing, moreover, that drilling in shale
has an important advantage over conventional drilling in this
regard. When horizontal drilling is used, fewer drill pads are
needed on the surface, since a single pad can be used for multi151
ple wells. There is also more flexibility about where the drill
pad is located. If a deposit is found near a school, for instance,
the well does not have to be right next to the school, as with
conventional drilling; instead, it can be some distance away, us152
ing horizontal drilling below the surface to access the deposit.
D. WATER USAGE
Fracturing also requires a significant amount of water. A
153
single well uses 2 to 4 million gallons. EPA estimates that
fracturing will consume as much water as 5 million people if
154
35,000 wells are fractured each year.
Whether this demand is easy or hard to satisfy depends on
the local water supply where the wells are drilled. For instance,
according to a recent study of water resources, “the area overlying the Marcellus Shale [in Pennsylvania and New York] has
155
abundant precipitation, making water readily available.”
More generally, “[w]hile water availability varies across the
country,” a 2011 Department of Energy Report observes, “in
most regions water used in hydraulic fracturing represents a
156
small fraction of total water consumption.”
In all states
where shale gas drilling takes place, it uses less than 1% of the
157
state’s water (e.g., less than .1% in Pennsylvania). Even so,
151. See FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 26 (noting that multiwell drill pads minimize traffic).
152. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 145, at 4 (“While the horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing practices expected to be used in developing the Marcellus Shale may have negative environmental effects on the surrounding area, when compared to development of conventional oil and gas resources this
development method could result in fewer impacts than conventional vertical
wells due to greater flexibility in well location.”).
153. EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 80.
154. EPA, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 22 (2011), available at http://water
.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hf_study_
plan_110211_final_508.pdf [hereinafter EPA 2011 PLAN].
155. J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., WATER RESOURCES AND USE FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION 2, available at http://www
.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/ENVreports/FE0000797_
WaterResourceIssues.pdf.
156. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.
157. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 43–44.
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water supplies are constrained in Colorado, as well as in some
158
counties in Texas where fracturing takes place.
In using water, shale gas drilling is no different from many
other economic activities. In Texas, for example, 56% of the
state’s annual water consumption is for irrigation, 26% is for
159
municipal use, and less than 1% is for shale gas. Likewise,
livestock uses significantly more water in all states where shale
160
gas drilling takes place. Shale gas also uses less water per
unit of energy than many forms of energy, and is comparable to
161
coal.
Of course, it is more economical to use water that is extremely close to drilling sites, and in some locations water is
162
scarce in the immediate vicinity. Localities already have systems in place to allocate water rights and regulate water us163
164
age. Some require permitting or water usage plans. The

158. MONIKA FREYMAN & RYAN SALMON, CERES, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
& WATER STRESS: GROWING COMPETITIVE PRESSURES FOR WATER 3 (2013),
available
at
https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/hydraulic-fracturing
-water-stress-growing-competitive-pressures-for-water (analyzing stresses
that fracturing imposes on water supply).
159. Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas
Production in Texas, U.S., 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3580, 3584 (2012).
160. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 44. In the Barnett Shale in Texas,
for example, .4% of local water is used for shale gas drilling, compared with
2.3% for livestock. Id.
161. Id. (noting that shale gas’s water needs are “low compared to many
other energy sources” and comparing shale gas, which uses 1 gallon of water
per Million British thermal units (MMBtu) of energy, with ethanol, which uses
several thousand gallons of water per MMBtu); Nicot & Scanlon, supra note
159, at 3585 (“Texas shale gas has a cumulative water use efficiency of 8.3–
10.4 L per gigajoule (L/GJ) . . . . [D]ata collected in this study (including
8.3−16.6 L/GJ for coal and 6.1 L/GJ for uranium) show that net water use for
shale gas is within the same general range as that for other energy sources.”).
Shale gas uses water at the beginning of production, while coal uses it
throughout the mining process. Nicot & Scanlon, supra note 159, at 3585.
162. See ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 155, at 2 (“[G]round and surface water
sources most proximal to the well sites are most desirable.”). See also Nicot &
Scanlon, supra note 159, at 3583 tbl. 2, for a county-by-county analysis in Texas.
163. Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 101, 147–48 (2013).
164. See ARTHUR, URETSKY & WILSON, supra note 155, at 2 (“[A] primary
issue for water withdrawal will be the regulations governing permitting procedures . . . from the water bodies nearest the wells. In New York, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, withdrawal permitting is regulated by a matrix of state
and interstate regulatory agencies, whose regulations reflect the needs of individual states or watersheds.”).
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bottom line is that, if energy companies cannot buy water locally, they have to pipe or truck it in.
Fortunately, the issue has become less important since energy companies began reusing (or “recycling”) fracturing fluid;
165
in some areas, they reuse 80% of it. Not only does recycling
reduce the amount of water needed for fracturing, but it also
diminishes the volume of fracturing waste, easing the challenge
166
of disposing of it.
E. INDUCED TREMORS AND EARTHQUAKES
Finally, there have been reports that fracturing can cause
tremors and minor earthquakes. There is one confirmed case of
seismic activity induced by fracturing in Blackpool, England,
167
and another possible case in Oklahoma. In each instance, the
seismic disturbance was small and caused no surface dam168
age. A thorough study of the issue by the National Research
Council concludes that seismic events from fracturing will be
“small and rare,” most likely “due to the short duration of injection of fluids and the limited fluid volumes used in a small spa169
tial area.”
There is greater potential for earthquakes from disposal of
spent fracturing fluid in injection wells. Seismic activity related
to disposal of fracturing waste in injection wells has led to regu170
latory responses in Ohio and Arkansas. But the risk here is
165. Jeff Bell, Fracking Injection Wells Booming but Need May Lessen with
Time, BUSINESS FIRST (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/
print-edition/2012/11/23/fracking-injection-wells-booming-but.html?page=all
(stating 80% of fracturing fluid in Pennsylvania is recycled).
166. EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 104.
167. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADS., INDUCED SEISMICITY
POTENTIAL IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 156 (2012); Katie M. Keranen et al.,
Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between
Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 GEOLOGY
699, 702 (2013) (concluding that an Oklahoma earthquake was caused by
wastewater injection well); see also John Tagliabue, Parts of Low Country Are
Now Quake Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/27/world/europe/more-earthquakes-in-loppersum-the-netherlands
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (describing minor earthquakes in the Netherlands that may be related to natural gas drilling, although the drilling is in
porous rock and does not involve fracturing).
168. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 167, at 3.
169. Id. at 8, 93.
170. Ohio has amended its injection well regulations to require investigation of geological fault lines and monitoring for seismic activity. OHIO ADMIN.
CODE 1501:9-3-06(C)(2)–(3) (2012). Arkansas has proposed a moratorium on
injection wells in an area where seismic activity was detected. Request for an
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no different from disposal of waste water from conventional oil
171
and gas production or waste from other industrial operations.
Indeed, the greatest risk of seismic disturbance is likely to
come from carbon sequestration proposals for conventional coal
172
burning power plants.
To sum up, then, fracturing poses a number of potentially
significant risks that are not unique to fracturing, including the
competitive threat to renewable energy, air pollution, pressure
on local infrastructure, pressure on local water supplies, and
induced earthquakes. We assume these problems can be addressed by adapting or expanding existing regulatory systems.
All carbon fuels pose a competitive challenge to renewables. All
states have departments of transportation regulating the use of
local roads by trucks. EPA has regulatory authority over air
pollution risks, and all states have systems for dealing with
competing claims to groundwater. Earthquake risks, primarily
from disposal of spent fluid in injection wells, appear to be
small and are similar to the risks associated with other deep
173
injection projects.
IV. NOVEL RISKS OF WATER CONTAMINATION
Unlike the risks discussed in Part III, the risk of contaminating groundwater is, in important ways, unique to fracturing.
It is not surprising that this issue has attracted a great deal of
attention from the media and environmental organizations,
since groundwater obviously is an essential resource, every bit
as important as energy.
This Part describes four different ways that fracturing and
horizontal drilling in shale might contaminate groundwater:
first, during or after the fracturing itself, fracturing fluid might
migrate from the shale seam into water wells and aquifers; second, natural gas released or disturbed by fracturing might
seep into water wells and aquifers; third, vibrations from drilling or fracturing might disturb contaminants lying at the botOrder Imposing an Immediate Cessation of All Disposal Well Operations and
Establishment of a Moratorium Area for Any Class II or Class II Commercial
Disposal Wells in a Certain Area, Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (proposed July 8, 2011).
171. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 167 at 13.
172. Id. at 8–9, 89.
173. Although developing a regulatory regime for seismic risks is beyond
the scope of this Article, the regulatory strategy proposed here, backstopping
best practices rules with liability, could be applied to seismic risks if they
prove sufficiently serious to warrant this effort.
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tom of a water well, mixing them into the well water; fourth,
used fracturing fluid, or waste products generated by the production of oil and gas, might be disposed of in ways that pollute
water wells and aquifers. Unlike the risks described in Part III,
at least some of these risks are unlikely to arise in conventional
gas drilling or, for that matter, in other industrial and commercial activities. An important challenge for policymakers is that
the magnitude of these fracturing-specific risks is uncertain.
Although experience so far suggests that the risks are limited,
the practice is sufficiently new that definitive conclusions are
hard to draw.
In addition, in part because these risks are novel, there is
something of a regulatory vacuum for dealing with them. Im174
portant provisions of federal law exempt fracturing. Oil and
gas production are regulated primarily at the state and local
175
level. States have begun focusing on water contamination issues, but these efforts are currently in progress.
A. FIRST RISK: FRACTURING FLUID
Fracturing fluid is 99.5% water and sand, but the other
176
.5% currently includes toxic chemicals. Obviously, we do not
want toxic chemicals to seep into water wells and underground
aquifers.
Technological advances may reduce the use of toxic chemicals in shale oil and gas drilling. Leaks and spills are less worrisome if new fracturing technologies are developed that do not
include toxic chemicals. Halliburton has tested a fracturing fluid that uses enzymes and acids from food, and a senior Halliburton executive attracted media attention by drinking it (in
177
diluted form). A number of companies are also working on
178
developing “eco-friendly” fracturing fluid. Others are explor174. Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 12, at 134–35 (discussing fracturing’s exemption from the Safe Water Drinking Act).
175. Id. at 43.
176. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 52. Although different companies use
different formulas, fracturing fluid could include benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, boric acid, monoethanolamine, xylene, diesel-range organics, methanol,
formaldehyde, hydrochloric acid, ammonium bisulfite, 2-butoxyethanol, and 5chloro-2-methyl-4-isothiazotin-3-one. Bateman, supra note 21.
177. Steve Hargreaves, Clean Fracking: Moving to Replace Chemicals,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 16, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/16/news/economy/
clean_fracking/index.htm.
178. Joe Carroll, Chesapeake Testing ‘Green’ Fracking Fluids in Shale
Wells, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012 3:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-10-02/chesapeake-testing-green-fracking-fluids-in-u-s-shale-wells
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ing ways to fracture shale without using any water, substitut179
ing liquid propane, carbon dioxide, or some other gas. Hopefully these efforts will be successful. This would alleviate most
of the risks associated with transporting water to and from the
drilling site. Of course, these techniques may present other
risks, and it may still be necessary to inject the production zone
with toxic biocides to keep bacteria from degrading the oil and
180
gas.
Therefore, although these advances should prove helpful,
they probably will not represent a complete solution, at least in
the near term. How likely is it, then, that toxic chemicals used
in shale oil and gas drilling will migrate into drinking water?
In theory, this could happen in five different ways. We describe
each of these five fracking-fluid risks in turn.
1. First Fracturing Fluid Risk: Migration Through Subsurface
Cracks
The goal of fracturing is to produce cracks in underground
shale formations, so gas and oil will come out. One concern is
that fracturing fluid might migrate through these cracks into
water wells and aquifers. This is “[o]ne of the commonly perceived risks from hydraulic fracturing,” a 2011 Department of
181
Energy study observed.
Fortunately, though, geological considerations suggest that
this risk is remote. Fracturing in shale beds typically takes
place at 5,000 to 10,000 feet, which is one to two miles below
the surface, while the water table is typically only 500 to 1,000
182
feet down. In between are multiple layers of rock and clay,
some of which are highly impermeable. Toxic chemicals would
have to migrate upward—against the massive weight of rock
.html; Press Release, Business Wire, New EPA-Aproved Fracking Fluid 100%
Green (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20120110005568/en/EPA-Aproved-Fracking-Fluid-100-Green; Press Release,
Family Joule Holdings, Eco-Friendly Fracking Fluid Set for Debut (Dec. 6,
2011), available at http://www.prlog.org/11743014-eco-friendly-fracking-fluid
-set-for-debut.html (announcing release of nontoxic fracking fluid made from
waste tallow from beef processing by Family Joule Holdings, Inc.).
179. Kevin Bullis, Skipping the Water in Fracking, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar.
22, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/512656/skipping-the-water
-in-fracking; Kate Galbraith, Waterless Fracking Makes Headway in Texas,
Slowly, NPR (March 27, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/03/27/
waterless-fracking-makes-headway-in-texas-slowly/.
180. EPA 2011 PLAN, supra note 154, at 29.
181. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.
182. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 40 tbl. 2.4.

2013]

FRACKING AND WATER CONTAMINATION

183

and soil pressing down on the layer of shale being fractured—a
183
mile or more to contaminate groundwater. It is extremely unlikely that cracks produced on a horizontal plane this far below
the surface would produce permeable fissures extending upward thousands of feet, and a study analyzing thousands of
fractures in Texas and Pennsylvania shows they have not done
184
so.
Accordingly, a 2011 DOE study “shares the prevailing view
that the risk of fracturing fluid leakage into drinking water
sources through fractures made in deep shale reservoirs is remote” and observes that “there are few, if any, documented ex185
amples of such migration.” A 2011 MIT study co-authored by
Ernest Moniz, who became the Secretary of Energy two years
186
later, offers a similar assessment. Given EPA’s estimate that
187
35,000 U.S. gas wells were fractured in 2006 alone —and the
fact that two million fracturing treatments have been pumped
183. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, AQUIFERS (2013), available at http://ga
.water.usgs.gov/edu/pdf/earthgwaquifers.pdf (“On the average . . . the porosity
and permeability of rocks decreases as their depth below land surface increases; the pores and cracks in rocks at great depths are closed or greatly reduced
in size because of the weight of overlying rocks.”).
184. Fisher, supra note 13 (concluding from fractures mapped in the Barnett Shale in Texas and the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania, gathered from
over 15,000 fracturing operations, that the data “show the huge distances separating the fracs from the nearest aquifers at their closest points of approach,
conclusively demonstrating that hydraulic fractures are not growing into
groundwater supplies, and therefore, cannot contaminate them”); see also Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 52 (risk of underground contamination “as close to
scientifically impossible as anything can be said to be” (quoting Lynn Helms,
chief mineral-resources regulator in North Dakota)).
185. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 19.
186. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 7 (“Shale development requires
large-scale fracturing of the shale formation to induce economic production
rates. There has been concern that these fractures can also penetrate shallow
freshwater zones and contaminate them with fracturing fluid, but there is no
evidence that this is occurring.”); id. at 40 (“In the studies surveyed, no incidents are reported which conclusively demonstrate contamination of shallow
water zones with fracture fluids.”); id. app. 2E at 2 (“It is noteworthy that no
incidents of direct invasion of shallow water zones by fracture fluids during
the fracturing process have been recorded.”). A variation of this concern is that
there may be cracks or other pathways—not created by fracturing but occurring naturally—that connect shallow aquifers with shale formations that are
much deeper underground. A 2012 study theorizes that naturally occurring
brine from the shale can migrate through these pathways up to aquifers. Nathaniel R. Warner et al., Geochemical Evidence for Possible Natural Migration
of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 11961, 11965 (2012), available at http://www.biology.duke
.edu/jackson/pnas2012.pdf.
187. EPA 2011 PLAN, supra note 154, at 22.
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188

in the past sixty years —the paucity of confirmed incidents of
water contamination from the underground migration of fracturing fluid provides powerful evidence that the risk is small.
Even so, the risk is clearly disturbing to many people, and warrants further study and monitoring as the use of fracturing
spreads further.
2. Second Fracturing Fluid Risk: Surface Spills
There are other pathways in which fracturing fluid could
enter water supplies, each of which presents a more realistic
189
risk. Fracturing chemicals might be accidentally spilled on
the surface—before or after the drilling process—and might
190
then seep down into the water table. Trucks carrying toxic
chemicals, for instance, can be involved in traffic accidents.
“There are some legitimate risks to simply getting frack chemicals to the well,” North Dakota’s chief minerals resources regulator said. “You’ve got thirty gallons of biohazard at a well site
191
that can be very dangerous in its concentrated form.” Some
192
spills have been reported in the media although, as EPA has
observed, “the frequency and typical causes of these spills re193
main unclear.” In posing a risk of surface spills, fracturing
resembles other industrial and commercial activities that
transport and store toxic chemicals; the chemicals used in fracturing are commonly used in other products, including swimming pool cleaner (HCl), cosmetics, toothpaste and sauces (guar
gum), detergents and hair cosmetics (ammonium persulfate,
potassium, sodium perosydisulfate), glass cleaner and antiperspirant (isopropanol), and low sodium table salt (potassium
188. Fisher, supra note 13 at 1.
189. See generally Wiseman, supra note 163 (concluding, based on survey
of reports of violations of state standards, that the most pressing risks arise
not from injection of fracturing fluid underground but from other stages in the
well development process and the higher rate of well drilling spurred by fracturing).
190. Surface spills can also pose risks to soil and vegetation. In one experiment, researchers released approximately 300,000 gallons of fracturing fluid
in a West Virginia forest. The spill damaged ground vegetation, caused leaves
to drop prematurely, and increased the mortality rate of trees. Mary Beth Adams, Land Application of Hydrofracturing Fluids Damages a Deciduous Forest
Stand in West Virginia, 40 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 1340, 1341 (2011).
191. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 52 (quoting Lynn Helms).
192. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Frack Fluid Spill in Dimock Contaminates Stream, Killing Fish, PRO PUBLICA (Sept. 21, 2009, 4:09 PM), http://www
.propublica.org/article/frack-fluid-spill-in-dimock-contaminates-stream-killing
-fish-921.
193. EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 31–32.
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chloride). A range of regulations already govern the risks of
such spills, requiring spill prevention plans and rules govern195
ing the storage of chemicals. Of course, by increasing the total volume of toxic chemicals that are transported, fracturing
makes this risk more significant. The bottom line, then, is that
fracturing fluid needs to be transported and stored carefully.
3. Third Fracturing Fluid Risk: Flow-Back and Produced
Water
When shale cracks, the gas that is released pushes some
fluid back up to the surface. Some of this is used fracturing flu196
id, which is called “flow-back.” In addition, water that had accumulated naturally in the shale formation, called “produced
197
water,” is also pushed up. Although it does not contain toxic
fracturing chemicals, produced water has natural contaminants, including salt, other organic compounds, silt, clay, oil,
198
grease, and naturally occurring radioactive material. Energy
companies have to catch this fluid when it comes up, so it does
not seep down into the water table.
4. Fourth Fracturing Fluid Risk: Cracked Well Casings
There is a risk that the well itself might crack at or above
the water table, allowing fluid to leak into nearby wells or aqui199
fers. If there is a crack in the well casing (the layers of steel
and concrete encasing the well), then what is inside the wellbore—whether it is fracturing fluid, gas, or oil—could leak out.
As a result, it is essential for the concrete in the well casing to
set properly, and for the casing to be thick and deep enough to
prevent leaks near the water table. The need for effective well

194. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 42; see also EPA 2012 PROGRESS
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30 (“[S]ome of the chemicals commonly used in hydraulic fracturing fluid are ubiquitous . . . .”).
195. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 9 (describing current law governing surface activities).
196. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.
197. Id.
198. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (NORM) IN PRODUCED WATER AND OIL-FIELD EQUIPMENT—AN ISSUE
FOR THE ENERGY INDUSTRY (1999), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs
-0142-99/fs-0142-99.pdf (finding that produced water can bring to the surface
radium that comes from the shale deep underground).
199. See FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.
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casings is familiar to state oil and gas regulators, since it is es200
sential in conventional drilling as well.
5. Fifth Fracturing Fluid Risk: Blowouts
There can be a blowout—an uncontrolled release of gas or
fluid inside the well, in effect, a “gusher”—either at the surface
or inside the well. This can happen when energy companies encounter an unexpected level of pressure (e.g., a pocket of gas).
For example, three blowouts at Pennsylvania gas wells—two
operated by Chesapeake Energy and one by EOG Resources
Inc.—led to surface spills and attracted national media atten201
tion. Blowouts are a familiar risk to be managed in conven-

200. Id. at 20 (“[A] well with poorly cemented casing could potentially leak,
regardless of whether the well has been hydraulically fractured.”); Benincasa,
supra note 11, at 9 (“It should first be noted that the states have always had
well design, construction, and cementing standards to protect USDW [underground sources of drinking water] that are encountered during drilling operations. The states also have existing casing requirements to ensure that fluids
injected into the well and removed from the well are isolated from USDW.”);
see also, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1, RULES 308(a), 317(g)–(h) (2013)
(Colorado requires casing to fifty feet and set “in a manner sufficient to protect
all fresh water and to ensure against blowouts or uncontrolled flows,” minimum psi, and copies of “all logs run”); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-21, 31
(2013) (North Dakota requires casing “at sufficient depths to adequately protect and isolate all formations containing water, oil, or gas or any combination
of these,” new or pressure tested pipe, and bond logs); N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, MITIGATION MEASURES CH. 7 § 7.1.4.2–3, REVISED DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2011) (N.Y.
requires casing to seventy-five feet or into bedrock, whichever is deeper, new
or pressure tested pipe, and bond logs); 25 PA. CODE § 78.83–85 (2013) (Pennsylvania requires casing to fifty feet or into consolidated rock, whichever is
deeper, with internal pressure rating “that is at least 20% greater than the
anticipated maximum pressure,” cement that meets minimum specified
standards, and cement bond logs).
201. See Susan Phillips, Bradford County Blow-out Costs Chesapeake More
Than $250k, NPR STATE IMPACT (Feb. 9, 2012, 5:43PM), http://stateimpact
.npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/02/09/bradford-county-blow-out-costs-chesapeake
-more-than-200000/; Mike Soraghan, PA Well Blowout Tests Natural Gas Industry on Voluntary Fracking Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/04/04greenwire-pa-well-blowout-tests
-natural-gas-industry-on-36297.html; Mark Long & Jason Womack, Blowout
Occurs at Pennsylvania Gas Well, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424052748704764404575286910201269800.html; Lisa J.
Molofsky et al., Evaluation of Methane Sources in Groundwater in Northeastern Pennsylvania, 51 GROUNDWATER 333, 333 (May–June 2013) (“[O]ur assessment of isotopic and molecular analyses of hydrocarbon gases in Dimock
Township suggests that gases present in local water wells are most consistent
with Middle and Upper Devonian gases sampled in the annular spaces of local
gas wells, as opposed to Marcellus Production gas.”).
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tional drilling; they usually can be prevented with thick and
202
deep casing, as well as with so-called blowout preventers.
6. Studies on the Magnitude of These Fracking-Fluid Risks
The magnitude of all these risks is uncertain and highly
contested. A number of recent lawsuits have alleged water con203
tamination from fracturing.
For example, residents in
Dimock Township, Pennsylvania claimed their water turned
brown because of fracturing. However, EPA later surveyed
their groundwater and concluded that it was safe, and a subsequent academic study concluded that the methane in Dimock
water was naturally occurring “with no necessary contribution
204
from deeper Marcellus shale gas.” The Dimock lawsuit, which
was covered prominently in Vanity Fair and other media out205
206
lets, settled (with confidential terms) in August 2012. A
207
range of other allegations has been publicized widely, including claims about potential effects of fracturing on livestock and
208
the food supply. Parties in fracturing-related litigation have

202. Some states offer detailed and specific requirements governing blowout prevention, while others have more general requirements. See, e.g., ARK.
OIL & GAS COMMISSION GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. B–16 (2013)
(establishing a general requirement to take “[a]ll proper and necessary precautions . . . for keeping the well under control . . . including but not limited to
the use of blow-out preventers”); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1014 (2013) (detailing
blowout prevention regulations).
203. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506,
508 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Tucker v. S.W. Energy Co., 1:11-CV-44-DPM, 2012 WL
528253, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012).
204. Molofsky et al., supra note 201, at 345.
205. See Bateman, supra note 21; see also Michael Rubinkam, Dimock, PA
Water Tests Conducted by EPA Amid Fracking Concerns, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 25, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/dimock
-pa-water_n_1702992.html.
206. Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Drilling Town Agrees to Settlement in
Fracking Federal Lawsuit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 15, 2012), http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wries/2012/0815/Pa.-drilling-town
-agrees-to-settle-in-fracking-federal-lawsuit.html.
207. McKay et al., supra note 139, at 126 (“Media reports of landowner
complaints alleging problems with drinking water wells due to nearby Marcellus Shale operations abound.”).
208. Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on
Human and Animal Health, 22 NEW SOLUTIONS 51, 55–59 (2012) (identifying
illnesses in animals based on anonymous interviews with landowners near
drilling sites and their veterinarians); Elizabeth Royte, Fracking our Food
Supply, THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/
171504/fracking-our-food-supply#.html (describing concerns that fracking may
cause human health effects through the food supply).
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209

testified before Congress.
Popular and documentary films
210
have highlighted environmental concerns about fracturing,
211
and celebrities have taken an interest in the issue. Overall,
212
media coverage has been quite negative. There is also evidence that concerns about groundwater contamination from
213
fracturing have affected residential real estate prices.

209. Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 12, at 138; see also RUTH
WOOD ET AL., THE TYNDALL CENTRE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, SHALE GAS: A
PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 5 (2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/55017665/The-Tyndall
-Report-on-Fracking (“There is considerable anecdotal evidence from the US
that contamination of both ground and surface water has occurred in a range
of cases.”); Robert W. Howarth, Statement for the EPA Hydraulic Fracturing
Public Informational Meeting (Sep. 15, 2010), available at http://cce
.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/PDFs/
Howarth%20statement%20to%20EPA%—20%2015%20Sept%20%202010.pdf
(“Shale gas development clearly has the potential to contaminate surficial
groundwater with methane, as shown by the large number of incidences of explosions and contaminated wells in Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and Ohio in recent years.”).
210. See A.O. Scott, Deep Down, He Wants to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2012, at C1 (reviewing Promised Land with Matt Damon and describing its
“polemical intentions”); see also GAS LAND (Josh Fox, 2010) (documentary film
critical of fracturing).
211. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert, Matt Damon Fracking Film Lights Up Petroleum Lobby, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2012, at B1; Alex Katz, Yoko Ono’s AntiFracturing Coalition Includes Lady Gaga and . . . Paul McCartney?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/29/yoko-onos-anti-fracturing_n_1841291.html.
212. According to one study, out of 444 newspaper articles discussing fracturing, 288 (65%) were negative, 103 (23%) were neutral, and only 53 (12%)
were positive. CHARLES G. GROAT & THOMAS W. GRIMSHAW, THE UNIV. OF
TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INSTITUTE, FACT-BASED REGULATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 13–14 (2012), available at
http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ei_shale_gas_
regulation120215.pdf. TV coverage was even more negative. Of 224 TV segments, 152 (68%) were negative, 55 (25%) were neutral, and 17 (8%) were positive. Finally, of 311 online stories, 197 (63%) were negative, 92 (30%) were
neutral, and 22 (7%) were positive. Id. This study was part of a broader report
authored by the University of Texas Energy Institute, which was withdrawn
based on a finding that the report’s principal investigator had a conflict of interest that he had not disclosed in the report. Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Mark
Drajem, Texas Energy Institute Head Quits Amid Fracking Study Conflicts,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 3:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-12-06/texas-energy-institute-head-quits-amid-fracking-study-conflicts
.html.
213. See Muehlenbachs et al., supra note 4, at 29 (finding that among
Washington, PA houses near drilling sites, those that depend on groundwater
sell at a discount compared to comparable houses that use water piped in from
municipal sources).
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Yet according to a number of studies, after thousands of
wells have been fractured in shale beds, there are no documented cases in which fracturing fluid has migrated into aqui214
fers during the fracturing process. Surface spills are more of
an issue, as is methane contamination, which is discussed be215
low. A 1998 study by an association of state regulators known
as the Groundwater Protection Council—which focused on fracturing in coal beds, since fracturing in shale was not yet widespread—found only one complaint of groundwater contamina216
tion and concluded that it was unsubstantiated.
EPA did a study in 2004—again, of coal beds instead of
shale—surveying 200 peer review studies, and interviewing fifty state and local employees as well as approximately forty
217
people who complained of water contamination. It found “no
confirmed cases [of groundwater well contamination] that are
linked to fracturing fluid injection into CBM [coal bed methane]
wells or subsequent underground movement of fracturing flu218
ids.” Further, although thousands of CBM wells are fractured
annually, EPA did not find confirmed evidence that drinking
water wells have been contaminated “by hydraulic fracturing
219
fluid injection into CBM wells.”
214. See, e.g., EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 127–37; EPA
2011 PLAN, supra note 154, at 37–40; Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 46–47;
Wiseman, supra note 163, at 123.
215. See supra Part IV.A.2.
216. GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, SURVEY RESULTS ON INVENTORY AND EXTENT OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN COALBED METHANE WELLS IN
THE PRODUCING STATES 9 (1998).
217. McKay et al., supra note 139, at 135.
218. EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS,
NATIONAL STUDY FINAL REPORT 2 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/
safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattachuic-final-factsheet.pdf.
219. OFFICE OF GROUNDWATER & DRINKING WATER, EPA, EVALUATION OF
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS: NATIONAL STUDY FINAL REPORT ES-13 (2004). EPA went onto say that “[b]ased on the information collected and reviewed, EPA has determined that the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into CBM [coalbed methane wells] poses little or no threat to
ESDWs [underground sources of drinking water]. Continued investigation is
not warranted at this time.” Id. at ES-16. This study has been criticized on the
grounds that an analysis of coalbeds may not apply to shale. Leonard S. Rubin, Note, Frack to the Future: Considering a Strict Liability Standard for Hydraulic Fracturing Activities, 3 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 117, 120 (2012). But
see Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 12, at 140–41 (noting that coal is
probably riskier than shale, which is farther underground). An EPA employee
also charged that the study “appear[ed] to have a conflict-of-interest” because
the panel included three industry experts and two former employees of oil
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In addition, a 2009 survey of state regulators did not iden220
tify any verified case of water contamination from fracturing.
Two years later, the Groundwater Protection Council commissioned a study of fracturing in Texas and Ohio. According to the
study, between 1993 and 2008, 16,000 shale gas wells were
drilled in Texas, and after investigating 211 incidents of water
contamination, the Texas Railroad Commission did not identify
a single ground water contamination incident resulting from
site preparation, drilling, well construction, completion, hy221
draulic fracturing stimulation, or protection operation. The
study drew the same conclusion about the 185 incidents inves222
tigated in Ohio between 1983 and 2007.
The 2011 MIT study co-authored by Ernest Moniz identified forty-three incidents related to gas-well drilling, based on
223
its survey of the literature.
Fourteen were surface spills,
224
while most of the others involved methane contamination. “It
is noteworthy,” the MIT study says, “that no incidents of direct
invasion of shallow water zones by fracture fluids during the
225
fracturing process have been recorded.”
Likewise, the Department of Energy injected fracturing
fluid that contained tracer chemicals in a Pennsylvania drilling
site that was 8000 feet below the surface. After years of monitoring, they reported in 2013 that no tracer chemicals had been
detected in a monitoring zone above this drilling site (which
226
was itself 3000 feet below the surface).

companies. Letter from Weston Wilson, EPA Employee, to Wayne Alard & Ben
Nighthorse Campbell, then serving U.S. Senators, and Diana DeGette, U.S.
House Rep. (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://www.latimes.com/media/acrobat/
2004-10/14647025.pdf; see also Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 12, at
173 (claiming that there was no evidence that the experts were in fact biased,
as opposed to manifesting an appearance of bias).
220. McKay et al., supra note 139, at 135–36 & n.61 (discussing a 2009
survey conducted by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission of state
regulators).
221. SCOTT KELL, THE GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, STATE OIL
AND GAS AGENCY GROUNDWATER INVESTIGATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN ADVANCING REGULATORY REFORMS: A TWO STAGE REVIEW: OHIO AND TEXAS 2
(2011).
222. Id.
223. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 39.
224. Id.
225. Id. at app. 2E at 2; id. at 39–40.
226. Kevin Begos, DOE Study: Fracking Chemicals Didn’t Taint Water,
USA TODAY, July 19, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/
2013/07/19/doc-study-fracking-didn’t-taint/2567721/.
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So far, only one government study has concluded that “the
data indicates likely impact to groundwater that can be ex227
plained by hydraulic fracturing.” In December 2011, EPA released a draft study of water contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming, finding methane, benzene, and other organic compounds.
Yet, as the study pointed out, the gas wells in Pavillion are unusually shallow—at 1,000 to 1,500 feet, instead of 5000 to
228
10,000 feet. As a result, the findings are not representative,
as EPA itself emphasized: “[t]he draft findings announced today are specific to Pavillion, where the fracturing is taking
place in and below the drinking water aquifer and in close proximity to drinking water wells—production conditions different
229
from those in many other areas of the country.” In addition,
EPA did not find contamination in drinking water wells—
230
which complied with safety standards. Rather, they found
contamination in deeper monitoring wells that were dug specif231
ically for the study. Moreover, the owner of the natural gas
wells in Pavillion responded that U.S. geological surveys from
as early as the 1880s have documented the poor quality of
232
groundwater in Pavillion. It may be, therefore, that contaminants found by EPA occur naturally in the water (e.g., because
233
natural gas is so close to the surface) or derive from “legacy
234
pits” (i.e., old wells that predate fracturing).

227. EPA, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., DRAFT: INVESTIGATION OF
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING xiii (2011).
228. Id. at 33.
229. Press Release, EPA, EPA Releases Draft Findings of Pavillion, Wyoming Ground Water Investigation for Public Comment and Independent Scientific Review, (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/D/EF35BD26A80D6CE3852579600065C94E.
230. Id. (“Detections in drinking water wells are generally below established health and safety standards.”).
231. Id.
232. Press Release, Encana Corp.,Why Encana Refutes U.S. EPA Pavillion
Groundwater Report, (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.encana.com/news-stories/
news-releases/details.html?release=632327.
233. See Mead Gruver, Encana Mounts Response to EPA Fracking Report,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK. (Dec. 21, 2011, 10:48AM), http://www.businessweek
.com/op/financialnews/D9ROVVB00.htm.
234. See Jeffrey Folks, The EPA’s Unconscionable War on Fracking,
AMERICAN THINKER (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/12/
the_epas_unconscionable_war_on_fracking.html; The EPA’s Fracking Scare,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2011, at A18.
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EPA is currently conducting a more comprehensive study
of the risks to groundwater. Hopefully this study will shed fur235
ther light on these issues.
B. SECOND RISK: CONTAMINATION OF WATER WELLS WITH
METHANE
In addition to fracturing fluid and produced water, the
natural gas itself—which is predominantly methane—can also
contaminate groundwater. This is a more significant risk than
the migration of fracturing fluid, and there have been reported
incidents of methane contamination in fractured wells—and,
236
for that matter, also in conventionally drilled gas wells. Indeed, methane contamination is an old problem, which is not
unique to fracturing. Since methane can leak out through
cracks in vertical well pipes that pass through aquifers, the
most effective response is for states to regulate the thickness
237
and depth of well casings, something they already do. For example, Texas enacted legislation updating its well casing regu238
lations in 2013. In addition, old wells, which predate fracturing and horizontal drilling, also can leak if not sealed properly.
The novel risk presented by fracturing is the possibility that
methane might migrate from the fractured shale seam through
235. See generally EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4.
236. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that although there is no
evidence of the migration of fracking fluid, “[t]here is, however, evidence of
natural gas migration into freshwater zones in some areas”); id. at app. 2E at
2 (noting that approximately half of forty-three documented instances of water
contamination from oil and gas drilling in their survey of literature are from
methane contamination, mostly from cracks in well casing); FIRST 2011 DOE
STUDY, supra note 10, at 20 (“Methane leakage from producing wells into surrounding drinking water wells . . . is a greater source of concern [than the
leakage of fracking fluid].”); see also GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COUNCIL,
supra note 216, at 10 (finding no proven incidents of underground water pollution from methane).
237. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 41 (“The protection of groundwater aquifers is one of the primary objectives of state regulatory programs,
and it should be emphasized that good oil field practice, governed by existing
regulations, should provide an adequate level of protection from [methane
leaks].”); Benincasa, supra note 11, at 9 (“It should first be noted that the
states have always had well design, construction, and cementing standards to
protect USDW [underground sources of drinking water] that are encountered
during drilling operations. The states also have existing casing requirements
to ensure that fluids injected into the well and removed from the well are isolated from USDW.”).
238. Railroad Commission Today Adopts Amendments to Oil & Gas Well
Construction Rules, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (May 24, 2013), http://www.rrc.state
.tx.us/pressreleases/2013/052413.php.
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pre-existing fissures in the overlying rock—or fissures created
or enlarged by fracturing—into aquifers above or near the
seam.
The mere presence of methane in water wells, though, does
not establish that this methane contamination was caused by
fracturing. Some methane contamination occurs naturally,
since shallow methane deposits sometimes migrate up into the
239
water table on their own. For example, a U.S. Geological survey in forty-seven counties in West Virginia, which was conducted before shale gas drilling took place there (from 1997
through 2005), found methane in 131 out of the 170 residential
240
wells that they tested. Likewise, a 2011 study establishing
baseline levels of contamination in Pennsylvania before shale
gas drilling began found methane contamination in 40% of
241
wells. The study then compared levels of contamination after
the drilling, and found no statistically significant difference;
likewise, a 2013 study found methane in 78% of water samples
taken in Pennsylvania before drilling began, and noted historical evidence of “flammable effervescing springs and water wells
242
dating back to the late 1700s.” Although a 2011 academic
study claims to find a link between drilling and methane contamination—by showing that there is more methane in Pennsylvania water wells that are within a kilometer of active drill243
ing than in those that are more than a kilometer away —the
study did not do baseline testing to establish that the wells had
239. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 20 (“The presence of methane in wells surrounding a shale gas production sight is not ipso facto evidence of methane leakage from the fractured producing well since methane
may be present in surrounding shallow methane deposits or the result of past
conventional drilling activity.”).
240. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, METHANE IN WEST VIRGINIA GROUND WATER
1
(2006),
available
at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3011/pdf/
Factsheet2006_3011.pdf.
241. ELIZABETH W. BOYER ET AL., THE CENTER FOR RURAL PENNSYLVANIA,
THE IMPACT OF MARCELLUS GAS DRILLING ON RURAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES 12 (2011), available at http://www.rural.palegislature.us/documents/
reports/Marcellus_and_drinking_water_2011_rev.pdf.
242. Id. at 4 (“[S]tatistical analyses of post-drilling versus pre-drilling water chemistry did not suggest major influences from gas well drilling or
hydrofracturing (fracking) on nearby water wells, when considering changes in
potential pollutants that are most prominent in drilling waste fluids” and “no
statistically significant increases in methane levels [were found] after drilling . . . .”); Molofsky et al., supra note 201, at 336, 345.
243. Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172 (2011) (claiming to “document systemic evidence for methane contamination”).
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less methane before the drilling. It is to be expected, after all,
that companies would drill where there is more methane in the
ground (and therefore, perhaps, in the water). The study also
does not find any chemicals from fracturing fluid in the wells,
which one might expect to be present if fracturing—as opposed
244
to natural migration—is the source of this methane. In response, therefore, a 2013 study concluded that the presence of
methane in water correlates better with topography than with
shale gas production—it is more common in valleys and low areas—so that “the use of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in
northeastern Pennsylvania has not resulted in widespread gas
245
migration into the shallow subsurface.”
C. THIRD RISK: DISTURBANCE OF SLUDGE OR OTHER RESIDUES
IN WELLS DUE TO FRACTURING
A third source of water contamination comes from vibrations and pressure pulses caused by fracturing. Like a spoon
stirring a glass of milk with chocolate syrup in the bottom, fracturing can bring iron, manganese, and other contaminants up
246
from the bottom of the well into the water. This theory may
explain why some water wells near drilling sites appear dirty
but do not include fracturing chemicals. It is also consistent
with studies comparing water quality before and after fracturing that find no change except for increases in manganese and
247
iron. A key aspect of this risk is that the contaminants are already in the well. Residential wells are often dirtier than their
244. In light of the methodological limitations in the Osborn 2011 study,
Samuel Schon, a geologist at Brown, concludes that “[t]he data presented
simply do not support the interpretation put forth that shale-gas development
is leading to methane migration from the Marcellus into shallow groundwater.
These data especially do not justify coauthors’ reports in the popular press
about the process of hydraulic fracturing.” Samuel C. Schon, Hydraulic Fracturing Not Responsible for Methane Migration, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/08/25/1107960108
.full.pdf (citing Rob Jackson & Avner Vengosh, Strong Evidence that Shale
Drilling is Risky, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 10, 2011, http://articles.philly
.com/2011-05-10/news/29528421_1_water-wells-safe-drinking-natural-gas).
245. Molofsky et al., supra note 201, at 345.
246. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF
IAN DUNCAN 2, available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/RR_HF2012/Groundwater/
Presentations/DuncanTestimony.pdf (positing that “possible perturbation by
pressure waves associated with drilling and completion activities that can lead
to false positives”).
247. See BOYER ET AL., supra note 241, at 4 (comparing water wells before
and after fracturing, and finding no change in methane, but finding increases
in sediment and iron in water).
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owners realize. For example, a recent Pennsylvania survey
found that only 16% of rural wells have a sealed sanitary well
cap, while more than half were near septic tanks that had not
248
been pumped with sufficient regularity (if at all). While fracturing can stir up contaminants that are already in a water
well, other activities can as well, such as running multiple fau249
cets at once.
D. FOURTH RISK: FRACTURING WASTE AND PRODUCED WATER—
INJECTION WELLS AND SEWAGE FACILITIES
Once fracturing fluid has been used, energy companies
need to dispose of it. They also need to dispose of produced water, which is a byproduct of all oil and gas production. It is ex250
tremely important to dispose of this waste properly. Some
methods are risky, while others are safe. The worst method—
so-called land application, in which the fluid is simply poured
onto the ground—creates a meaningful risk that the fluid will
seep down into the water table; this practice should be (and
251
generally is) prohibited. The fluid may also be trucked to a
waste treatment facility. If all the facility does is to dilute it
and then release it into a body of water—as occurred in Pennsylvania before this practice was stopped—there is a risk of wa-

248. BRYAN R. SWISTOCK ET AL., THE CTR. FOR RURAL PA., DRINKING WATER QUALITY IN RURAL PENNSYLVANIA AND THE EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES 9, 11 (2009), available at http://www.rural.palegislature.us/

drinking_water_quality.pdf (noting that although septic tank should be
pumped every two to four years to avoid contamination of water wells, 28% of
the 625 wells in the survey with on-lot septic systems were never pumped,
while 33% were pumped less frequently than every four years).
249. Mark Eisner, Separating Fact from Fiction: Careful Hydrogeologic
Evaluation May Protect Against Unfair and Baseless Domestic Supply Impact
Allegations, Remarks at the AIPG Marcellus Shale: Energy Development and
Enhancement by Hydraulic Fracturing Conference (May 5, 2011), available at
http://www.aipg.org/Seminars/HFMS/Eisner,%20Mark.pdf (showing elevated
turbidity correlated only with domestic use fluctuations).
250. See Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated with Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1382, 1391 (2012) (using probability bounds analysis to conclude that “epistemic uncertainty was largest for wastewater disposal,” as opposed to four
other potential pathways of water contamination: transportation spills, well
casing leaks, leaks through fractured rock, and drilling site surface discharge).
251. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that surface
runoff is forbidden). In March 2011, a company in Pennsylvania was charged
with illegally dumping fracturing wastewater on land from 2003 to 2009.
Fracking and Water Pollution, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/
index.php/Fracking_ and_water_pollution (last visted Oct. 17, 2013).
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ter contamination, since the fluid is unlikely to be diluted to the
252
point where it is no longer toxic.
More sophisticated treatment processes do not present this
risk. It has become increasingly common for used fracturing
253
fluid to be recycled, as noted above, which is helpful in minimizing the total volume created. Another practice is to store
used fluid and produced water deep underground in so-called
254
injection wells drilled for this purpose and regulated by EPA.
To ensure that injection wells do not pose a risk to the water
table, their well casings need to be sufficiently thick and deep,
and the well itself should be deep enough so the waste is far below the water table. The issues here are similar to those presented by proposals to inject carbon dioxide from coal-burning
power plants into deep geological fissures (so-called carbon se255
questration).

252. See Renee Schoof, As Shale Fracturing Booms, Environmental Protection Lags, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc
.com/2011/12/21/133807/as-shale-fracking-booms-environmental.html#
.Uh9qQxtOOsp; Sheila M. Olmstead et al., Shale Gas Development Impacts on
Surface Water Quality in Pennsylvania, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4962, 4966
(2013) (finding that drilling does not increase presence of chlorides in surface
water, but that treatment and release of wastewater from waste treatment
facilities does increase chloride levels). For instance, a study of water downstream from a Pennsylvania plant that used to treat fracturing wastewater
found elevated levels of radioactivity, salts and metals. Nathaniel R. Warner
et al., Impacts of Shale Gas Wastewater Disposal on Water Quality in Western
Pennsylvania, ENV. SCIENCE & TECH. (2013) (“Overall we show that treatment
in Josephine Brine Treatment Facility reduces the concentrations of some elements before releasing them into the stream, but wastewater discharge nevertheless reduces the quality of downstream surface water and sediments.”).
Critics of this study note that the facility has not been used by members of the
Marcellus Shale Coalition since May 2011, and that radium levels were below
industrial discharge limits. Katie Brown, Five Facts About Duke’s Latest AntiShale Study, Energy In Depth, ENERGY IN DEPTH (last visited Oct. 7, 2013),
http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/five-facts-about-dukes
-latest-anti-shale-study/.
253. See Bell, supra note 165.
254. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 43 (“The optimum method for disposal of oil field wastewater is injection into a deep saline aquifer through an
EPA regulated Underground Injection Control (UIC) water disposal well.”).
255. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and
Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of
Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 115–19 (2008).
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E. THE EXISTING REGULATORY REGIME
1. State and Local Law
Since fracturing and horizontal drilling in shale beds are
relatively new practices, it is not surprising that regulatory regimes governing them are not fully developed. Since the goal of
this Article is to propose a regulatory response to the risk of
water contamination, we should first offer a brief overview of
current law.
Historically, states have been the principal regulators of oil
256
and gas. As a result, the risk that fracturing could contami257
nate water is regulated primarily at the state level. Obviously, tort liability is potentially applicable, although few cases
have been decided thus far, so it is unclear how key doctrines
258
will evolve.
In addition, every oil—and gas—producing state has an oil
259
and gas commission. These commissions require energy companies to file an Application for Permission to Drill (APD) before sinking an oil or gas well. Through this APD authority,
state agencies enforce pooling requirements, unitization re260
quirements, well spacing requirements, and so forth.
States also enforce regulations targeting environmental
harms, including, increasingly, regulations specific to fractur261
ing. In some states, such as Pennsylvania and New York,
256. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 477 (2012).
257. See id.
258. For a discussion, see infra Part VII.B. See also Thomas E. Kurth et al.,
American Law and Jurisprudence of Fracing—2012, 58 ROCKY MOUNTAIN
MIN. L. FOUND. 1, 56–62, available at http://www.haynesboone.com/american
-law-and-jurisprudence-on-fracing-2012/ (citing dozens of complaints, but no
reported opinions on the merits); Rubin, supra note 219, at 123–25 (considering application of precedents on subsurface trespass, nuisance, negligence, and
strict liability to fracturing).
259. A complete listing of state oil and gas commissions can be found on
the website of the Texas Railroad Commission, which serves as the oil and gas
commission for Texas. Oil and Gas Related Web Addresses, R.R. COMM’N OF
TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/links/statewebadd.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2013).
260. For a general discussion of state and local rules on permission to drill,
see Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and
Federal Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation,
44 URB. LAW. 533, 542–56 (2012).
261. For a very useful summary of recent regulatory activity in eighteen
states that have adopted statutes or regulations directed at fracturing, see
Kurth et al., supra note 258, at 64–157.
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these environmental harms are regulated by the state depart262
ment of environmental protection. Thus, state commissions
regulate the strength and depth of well casings and require
263
blowout preventers. They also require a minimum distance
between well pads or particular drilling activities and bodies of
264
water—and these distances vary by state —while others apply
these so-called “minimum setback” requirements also to
265
schools, property lines, etc. Colorado has a tiered regulatory
system: drilling that is closer to water and other sensitive areas
266
is subject to more exacting restrictions. States also have rules
seeking to prevent and contain surface spills (e.g. with walls
267
268
and steel tanks), and requiring leaks to be reported. In addition, states regulate the disposal of fracturing waste in vari269
ous ways. Many jurisdictions also require energy companies
262. Id.
263. For a discussion of different state approaches to these issues along
with citations, see supra notes 200 and 202 and accompanying text.
264. For example, Texas generally does not have a setback requirement.
See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37 (2012) (providing well spacing requirements
but no setback requirements). New York’s proposed regulations specify minimum distances from bodies of water, including 500 feet from private wells,
2000 feet from public reservoirs, and 4000 feet from unfiltered watersheds.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 750-3.3(a) (proposed Sep. 28, 2011) (expired on February 27, 2013). Setbacks in other states usually are smaller. See,
e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(a) (2012) (Pennsylvania requires 200 feet);
W.VA. CODE § 22-6-21 (2012) (West Virginia requires 200 feet); N.M. CODE R.
§ 19.15.17.10(A)(3)(d) (2011) (repealed effective June 28, 2013) (New Mexico
required 500 feet).
265. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603(a)(2), :603(a)(1) (2013) (Colorado requires 150 feet or 1.5 times a derrick’s height from surface property lines, and
1,000 feet setbacks in high occupancy areas from educational and other group
facilities); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.09(G) (2013) (Maryland requires 1000 feet
setback from schools or occupied dwellings).
266. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603, :604 (2013).
267. See, e.g., id. § 404-1:604(c)(2)(G) (Colorado requires that “secondary
containment devices shall be constructed around crude oil, condensate, and
produced water storage tanks”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 6, § 7503.7(k)(4), (7), (9), (l), (m), (n) (proposed Sept. 28, 2011) (expired Feb. 27, 2013)
(as condition of receiving a permit, New York’s proposed regulations require
an owner to have fluid disposal plan, spill prevention plan, containment system; to use a closed loop tank system for certain drilling fluids and cuttings,
and to maintain lined reserve pits in good condition).
268. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, 7.1.6, at 7-57 (N.Y. 2011) (New York requirement
to report spill within two hours of discovery); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-30
(2012) (North Dakota requirement to notify director within twenty-four
hours).
269. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-19.2 (2013) (“All waste associated with exploration or production of oil and gas must be properly disposed of
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to disclose the chemical composition of their fracturing fluid,
and some require energy companies to do baseline testing of
271
water quality before they begin drilling; we favor both of the272
se information-forcing rules, and discuss them further below.
While local governments do not generally have authority to
regulate health and safety issues, they do have the power to
regulate land use. A number of localities in various states have
273
sought to prohibit fracturing, and there has been litigation
274
about whether state law preempts these local ordinances.
The issue has generally been framed in terms of whether the
local ordinance is a form of “land use” regulation, or a regula275
tion of the operation of oil and gas wells. The former is understood to be a permissible local function; the latter is re276
served to the state.
in an authorized facility . . . .”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.9(1) (2012) (Texas
rule requiring underground injection control wells); DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, 7.1.8, at 7–63
(N.Y. 2011) (New York rule requiring approved wastewater treatment plant or
recycling).
270. Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Wyoming all require disclosure. See SUSAN WILLIAMS, IRRC DISCOVERING SHALE GAS: AN INVESTOR GUIDE TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1, 23
(2012), available at http://si2news.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/discoveringshale-gas-an-investor-guide-to-hydraulic-fracturing.pdf. So do West Virginia,
Maryland, and Ohio. See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-14 (2012); S.B. 165, 128th Gen.
Assemb., 2009–2010 Sess. (Ohio 2010); MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, OIL/GAS
WELL COMPLETION REPORT, Form No. MDE/LMA/PER.019, at 3 (2009). New
York included a disclosure requirement in its proposed regulations, N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 6, § 750–3.7(k)(1), (3) (proposed Sep. 28, 2011)
(expired Feb. 27, 2013), and North Dakota is considering such proposals as
well, see N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1(1)(g) (2013).
271. See, e.g., 58 P.A. CONS. STAT. § 3218(c)(1)(i) (2012) (Pennsylvania’s
provision authorizing testing and creating rebuttable presumption that a well
operator caused contamination within 1000 feet of a well); COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 404-1:317B(d)(4) (2013) (Colorado’s requirement of baseline surface water
data); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 6, § 750-3.7(k)(5) (proposed Sep. 28,
2011) (New York’s proposed, and since expired, requirement of pre-drilling
testing).
272. See infra Part VI.A.1.
273. ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1, 27–29 (2013), available at http://www.slideshare
.net/MarcellusDN/ r43152.
274. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2013); Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012).
275. See, e.g., Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d. at 714.
276. A similar distinction is found in federal preemption law. See Pac. Gas
& Elec. v. State Energy Res. Conservation Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983)
(holding that the federal government has exclusive authority over the regula-

200

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:145

2. Federal Law
Given the traditional primacy of states in oil and gas regulation, federal law has little to say about fracturing. Indeed,
277
key environmental statutes exempt the practice. For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was amended in 2005
to exempt fracturing from regulations that govern injection
278
wells (unless the fracturing fluid includes diesel). This means
SDWA permitting requirements generally do not apply to fracturing, although they do govern the disposal of fracturing waste
279
in injection wells.
The Clean Water Act is generally concerned with pollution
280
of surface water, not groundwater. Even with respect to surface water, the Act contains an exemption for storm water runoff from oil and gas production facilities (which was expanded
281
in 2005), although energy companies still usually need storm
water permits if the runoff is contaminated with waste prod282
ucts or soil sediment.
Oil and gas wastes from exploration and production activity are exempt from Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation
tion of the safety of nuclear reactors; states are allowed to regulate questions
of “need, reliability, [and] cost”).
277. For a survey of how federal environmental laws apply to fracturing,
see generally VANN ET AL., supra note 273.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding from the SDWA definition of underground injection “the underground injection of fluids or propping
agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations
related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities”); Energy Policy Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
279. Benincasa, supra note 11 at 9. The exemption does not apply to fracturing fluid containing diesel. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1).
280. The Act generally disallows the discharge of any pollutant except in
compliance with the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). Discharge of a pollutant is defined primarily as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12). The “navigable waters” are defined in
turn as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.
§ 1362(7). Although there has been much dispute about the meaning of “navigable waters,” see, for example, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742
(2006) (concluding in a divided decision that hydrologically connected wetlands are covered); Solid Waste Agencies of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (concluding in a divided decision that
an isolated gravel pit frequented by migratory birds is not covered), the term
is generally assumed not to include groundwater.
281. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2).
282. Id. § 1342(l)(2); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2005 act amending definition of the term “oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations or transmission facilities”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA,
526 F.3d 591, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking down an EPA effort to broaden
permitting exemption for storm water discharge for the oil and gas industry).
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and Recovery Act (RCRA), which regulates the disposal of haz283
ardous waste products. Natural gas and petroleum are also
exempt from the definition of “hazardous waste” under
284
CERCLA; presumably, therefore, contamination of groundwater by methane is not subject to remedial action under this
statute. Many of the chemicals in fracturing fluid are listed as
hazardous wastes. A release of such chemicals in large enough
volume might conceivably trigger an emergency response action
under CERCLA, although small spills or contamination in
285
highly diluted form most likely would not. The oil and gas industry is also exempt from reporting toxic releases under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
286
(EPCRTKA).
In contrast, the Clean Air Act applies. As we have seen,
EPA issued regulations in April, 2012 governing air emissions
287
from fracturing sites.
V. CHOOSING A REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR WATER
CONTAMINATION
How, then, should policymakers respond to the water contamination risks of fracturing? The overarching goal, we believe, should be to support the shale revolution by steadily improving our understanding of the water contamination risks
and working to reduce those risks. This means the system of
regulation must be dynamic. It cannot be designed simply to
address known risks using present-day technology. It must be
one that stimulates new extraction technologies and new risk
control techniques. The best way to achieve this goal, as we will
283. See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2006) (creating presumption of no oil-related or gas-related waste under the RCRA); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 229, 244–45 (2010) (summarizing regulatory history relating to
the determination of whether oil and gas is hazardous waste).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(F) (2006).
285. See id. § 9601(14) (defining hazardous waste to include any waste regulated under the Solid Waste Disposal Act or listed as hazardous under the
Clean Water Act and the Clean Act, among other statutes); id. § 9602 (establishing reportable quantities of hazardous wastes). Permanent removal actions
under CERCLA require that the site be listed on the National Priorities List,
which would be difficult to achieve for localized spills in relatively small quantities. See id. § 9605(e).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(A) (2006).
287. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.40–63.44 (2012); John M. Broder, U.S. Caps Emissions in Drilling for Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/19/science/earth/epa-caps-emissions-at-gas-and-oil-wells.html?_r=0.
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explain, is by adopting a blended regulatory scheme that combines best practices regulation with liability for fracturingrelated harms.
We start in Section A with observations about the dangers
of regulatory overkill. The miscellaneous risks we have labeled
“familiar,” canvassed in Part III, are unlikely to mobilize widespread public opposition to fracturing. The danger of water contamination is different, so it is all the more critical to calibrate
regulatory responses correctly.
Section B surveys five alternative regulatory strategies: (1)
prohibitions; (2) command and control regulations; (3) information disclosure; (4) liability rules; and (5) Coasean bar288
gains.
Section C highlights four factors that should influence the
choice of regulatory strategy by drawing on the literature on ex
ante versus ex post regulation, and the tradeoff it highlights
about the timing of when to determine optimal behavior: (1)
whether a uniform solution is likely to be optimal; (2) the magnitude of the expected harm; (3) the settlement costs of making
case-by-case determinations ex-post; and (4) the novelty of the
relevant technology. While the first two are familiar, the third
and fourth have not featured as prominently in the literature.
Section D applies these factors to fracturing, recommending a blended strategy of best practices regulations and liability. For issues that are already well understood, we would rely
on command and control regulations to enforce best practices.
For issues that are unique to fracturing and are not yet well
understood, we would rely on liability rules, motivating the industry to take precautions and develop risk-reducing innovations. We also would ban fracturing in a limited number of sensitive areas and would require certain types of disclosure.
Finally, Section E sets forth in summary form our proposed
regulatory strategy.
A. THE DANGER OF REGULATORY OVERKILL
1. Public Anxiety and Love Canal
The prospect of groundwater contamination can elicit a re289
sponse known as “dread.” In part this is because water is a
288. Compare infra Part V.B. with the discussion of the “regulatory toolkit”
in JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 44–51 (2d ed. 2007).
289. See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987) (de-
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necessity of life. If land is deprived of a source of water, its value can be seriously impaired. If the contamination is not detected, livestock and crops may be destroyed. Human consumption may lead to illness. We are also uneasy because we know
comparatively little about groundwater. Typically, we do not
know where it comes from, where it goes, whether aquifers are
interconnected, and how long it would take for contamination
to work its way out of the system. Thus, the prospect of water
contamination is uniquely disturbing because we do not fully
understand how to prevent or cure it.
We know that the prospect of groundwater contamination
can motivate the public to support draconian regulatory
measures. In the late 1970s, extensive publicity about toxic
chemicals leaking into basements in Love Canal (near Niagara
Falls, New York) produced a groundswell of concern about haz290
ardous wastes contaminating ground water.
Congress responded by enacting CERCLA, which generated massive funding for excavating and incinerating soil at hazardous waste
291
disposal sites. Federal laws on disposal of hazardous wastes
were also beefed up, and a de facto moratorium was imposed on
292
new solid waste disposal sites near urban areas. There is no
question that regulation of toxic waste had previously been too
lax. Yet with the benefit of hindsight, many commentators believe the cost of the response was disproportionate to the bene293
fit. The pressure driving this reaction was public apprehen-

fining “dread risk” as one characterized by a perceived lack of control, catastrophic potential, and an inequitable distribution of risks and benefits).
290. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (1999).
291. Id. at 691–98; see also supra notes 280–88 and accompanying text
(discussing oil and natural gas exception to CERCLA).
292. See, e.g., Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8–9.
293. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and
Policy Implications of Health Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW, 55, 78–81 (Richard L. Revesz
& Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995); Katherine D. Walker et al., Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment and Management, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW, at 25, 47–50; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, VOL. 1: PUBLIC HEALTH
AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 256–57 (1991). Although debate persists about the
social benefits of remediating waste sites, many commentators agree that the
transaction costs generated by the draconian liability scheme were disproportionate to any benefits obtained. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and
Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy
Reconcilable?, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 706, 717 (1998).
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294

sion about groundwater, stoked by the media and advocacy
295
organizations. It would be unfortunate if a similar dynamic
were to stifle the shale revolution. The solution, we believe, is
to adopt a sensible regulatory regime that reassures the public,
motivates industry to take appropriate precautions, and provides incentives to develop risk-reducing innovations over time.
2. Precautionary Principle
A related point concerns the relevance of the “precaution296
ary principle.” Translated roughly as “better safe than sorry,”
this principle is often invoked to restrict the use of new tech297
nology until potential risks are better understood. The precautionary principle is widely invoked in Europe and has
gained a foothold in the United States, although it has also
generated significant pushback among regulatory theorists
298
here. For several reasons, we think it is unhelpful in analyzing water contamination risks of fracturing.
First, the precautionary principle is most commonly in299
voked for potentially catastrophic risks, such as nuclear power, genetically modified organisms, human cloning, and climate
change. In each case, the harm is potentially irreversible and
could affect large numbers of people. In contrast, fracturing
300
poses risks primarily to individual aquifers. It is true, of
course, that fracturing could destroy an aquifer’s usefulness for
human consumption or agriculture, and that as fracturing be294. See GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 638–39 (1995).
295. Id. at 606–07, 638–39 (1995); Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P.
Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story
of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2193–2200 (2009). For a
case study highlighting the role of anxiety about water contamination in generating opposition to landfills, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of SWANCC:
Federalism and the Politics of Locally Unwanted Land Uses, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 283, 290–91 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds.,
2005).
296. Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 851 (1996).
297. See generally EUROPEAN RISK FORUM, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: APPLICATION AND WAY FORWARD 18–20 (2011) (defining and discussing
the precautionary principle’s origins).
298. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) (discussing various mechanisms that enable a fearful public to invoke the precautionary principle, which yields unjustified intrusions upon civil liberties).
299. See Frederick Schauer, Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech
and the Precautionary Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 304–06 (2009).
300. Spence, supra note 256, at 492–93.
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comes more widespread, more aquifers are put at risk. But substitute sources of water would remain available at a cost. In the
extreme case, contaminated water could be pumped out and de301
contaminated. So the potential harm, although not trivial, is
localized and reversible.
Second, critics of the precautionary principle urge us to
consider the risks not only of adopting a new technology but al302
so of not adopting it. Although fracturing poses environmental risks, a general ban on the practice would also entail enormous costs, including higher energy prices, reduced economic
activity and employment, deteriorating balance of payments,
not to mention the risks associated with continued dependence
on foreign sources of energy, greater emissions of greenhouse
gases and, of course, reliance on other risky sources of energy
(e.g. coal, nuclear power, offshore drilling). Indeed, a ban on
fracturing would arguably exacerbate global warming, a risk
that itself is often cited as subject to the precautionary principle. All of which supports the conclusion that the proper regulatory response to fracturing is to weigh all expected risks and
benefits, not merely a select list of environmental risks.
Third, invocation of the precautionary principle ignores the
decades of experience we already have with fracturing. Although fracturing in shale is only about a decade old, fracturing
itself has been used in oil and gas production in the United
303
States since the 1940s. Since then, the industry has executed
over two million “frack jobs” in the U.S. It is also widely used
around the world. This experience should inform preliminary
judgments about the risks of fracturing in shale. The evidence
suggests that the risk of widespread or systemic devastation to
304
water supplies is remote, and the prospect of local contami305
nation is manageable as long as fracturing is done properly.
In an effort to develop a more rigorous foundation for what
an optimal regulatory regime might look like, we turn to a consideration of different regulatory strategies, and how to choose
301. See Ground Water Cleanup at Superfund Sites, EPA (Dec. 1996),
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/conmedia/gwdocs/brochure.htm (explaining that ground water can be treated by pumping it to the surface, decontaminating it, and then discharging it back into the ground or into a stream or river).
302. E.g., Cross, supra note 296, at 860.
303. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8.
304. Spence, supra note 256, at 492–93.
305. See Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move in, Safety
Goes Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013, at A10.

206

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:145

among them.
B. FIVE POSSIBLE REGULATORY STRATEGIES
1. Prohibitions
One strategy for dealing with an environmental risk is
simply to ban it. This strategy has a long lineage, from local ordinances banning gunpowder in central cities (because of the
306
danger of fire) to European laws banning genetically modified
307
foodstuffs. Likewise, local zoning codes keep certain activities, such as industrial plants, out of sensitive areas like residential neighborhoods. Prohibitions can be temporary (moratoria) or permanent, and they can be jurisdiction-wide or local.
Activities should be banned when the risks of allowing
them outweigh the benefits. A ban is more likely if good substitutes are available; for instance, gunpowder can be stored outside central cities. Prohibition is obviously the most protective
regulatory strategy. If an activity is prohibited, the associated
risk is zero. A downside of prohibition, of course, is that it deprives society of the social benefits of the activity. When the
benefits are substantial and the risks are manageable, prohibition represents regulatory overkill. Prohibition also impedes
innovation by limiting possibilities for experimentation in developing new ways to reduce the risk.
2. Command and Control Regulation
An alternative to banning an activity is regulating it. The
oldest and most common form of command and control regulation mandates “best practices” to minimize external harms,
such as rules requiring ships to carry lifeboats, cars to have
seat belts, and the like. This type of regulation typically requires all firms to adopt practices that reflect the “state of the
art,” meaning something more stringent than common practice
308
that is still technologically and economically feasible. The
implicit judgment is that if some firms can operate profitably
while providing certain harm-preventing measures, all firms
306. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULANINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 60–71 (1996) (discussing the relationship between restricting gunpowder storage and regulation).
307. EUROPEAN RISK FORUM, supra note 297, at 23–24.
308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. d.
See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that it was negligent for coastal tug to operate without a radio receiver given that some tug
boat operators in the industry provided radio receivers for their vessels).
TION IN

2013]

FRACKING AND WATER CONTAMINATION

207

309

should be required to do so.
Although command and control regulation is less protective than prohibition, it can still offer significant reassurance to
the public. It is probably more reassuring than pollution taxes
or the prospect of ex post litigation to recover damages for
harms, since the latter have uncertain effects and are more dif310
ficult to perceive as providing an assurance of “safety.”
The familiar downside of command and control regulation
is that it can yield inefficient regulations, since they are usually
defined by the state of existing technology instead of a rigorous
assessment of costs and benefits. Thus, command and control
regulation can result in over-regulation of activity, which yields
a deadweight loss, or in under-regulation, which yields exces311
sive risk. As with prohibitions, such regulations can also discourage innovation by freezing best practices at a moment in
time.
Notwithstanding these defects, regulated industry often
prefers command and control regulation over other forms of
regulation because it generates relatively predictable regulatory costs. Especially in making significant long term investments, firms may prefer certain—even if potentially exces312
sive—costs to highly uncertain costs.

309. More sophisticated command and control regulations are expressed as
abstract standards, such as the maximum allowable release of harmful substances. For water pollution, these are called “effluent standards.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b) (2006). They usually use verbal formulas such as “best available,”
“best achievable,” or “best practicable,” and are set by determining how much
various technologies can reduce effluents. Id.; see also Notice of Final 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,286 (Oct. 26, 2011). Effluent
standards, like best practices regulations, are generally set using existing
technology as the relevant benchmark. Once the relevant range of standards is
identified based on existing technology, however, it is possible to use costbenefit analysis in selecting among appropriate technological benchmarks.
See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (upholding the use of cost-benefit analysis in setting effluent limits for thermal pollution from power plants).
310. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1985).
311. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–37 (1985).
312. Cf. Khalid A. Rahim, Why Pollution Standards Are Preferred by Industries: Pragmatism and Rent-Seeking Behavior, 16 ENVIRONMENTALIST 49,
52–53 (1996) (noting that industry would also have more certainty of political
influence, indirectly providing more predictable costs).
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3. Disclosure
A third strategy requires the party primarily responsible
for the external risk to disclose information about it. This is a
313
prominent strategy in environmental law, and is also one of
the duties imposed by tort law, such as informed consent in
medical malpractice and the duty to warn in products liability
law.
Information disclosure has regulative effects. When forced
to disclose risks, firms often make changes to eliminate or reduce them, if only to avoid adverse publicity or having consum314
ers vote with their feet. Yet information disclosure is a more
tentative regulatory response than prohibition or command and
control. It assumes that different persons respond to risks differently, that we should rely in part on potential victims to
315
avoid risks, and that disclosure can stimulate innovation.
The most general assumption is that more and better information about risks is a good thing, which is hard to dispute.
One must remember, however, that gathering and disseminating information can be costly, and that information overload
316
can be counterproductive.

313. It is reflected in environmental impact statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)–(d) (2006), and
its state analogues, the Toxic Release Inventory required by the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (2006),
OSHA’s Hazard Communications Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2012),
and California’s Proposition 65, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6
(2013).
314. See Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of
Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 165 (1998) (“[Information disclosure] relies heavily on markets and public opinion . . . enforcement of standards is expected to occur through the combined pressure of economic markets
and public opinion.”); see also Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information
as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 118 (1997) (describing the effects of
Toxic Release Inventory disclosure requirements on firm performance, finding
that those firms with lower TRI emissions outperformed those classified as
heavy polluters, and that TRI disclosure generally had negative impacts on a
firm’s share price).
315. See generally WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL
APPROACHES TO REGULATION (1992) (examining how people respond to disclosed safety risks); W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE (1983) (examining the
manner in which government regulation intersects with market forces and individual choice in regard to risks).
316. See generally, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. REV.
417 (2003).
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4. Liability Rules
A fourth regulatory strategy operates retrospectively rather than prospectively, levying monetary sanctions on firms
that have imposed external harms on others. Common law tort
liability is the most familiar example. Whether the harm is a
collision, a spill, or the invasion of property by harmful substances, injured persons can sue and recover damages if the
perpetrator has breached the relevant duty of care. Other types
of liability rules include pollution taxes, deposit and refund
317
schemes, and cap and trade regulations. Similarly, CERCLA,
the federal “Superfund” statute, uses liability to allocate the
318
cost of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. In each case, liability rules operate after the fact to levy a financial charge on externality-generating activity.
Liability rules have two significant advantages. The first is
deterrence. To avoid liability, actors have an incentive to reduce (or “internalize”) harms they are likely to cause, especially
if liability is imposed on the party with the best information
and expertise to minimize risks efficiently. Second, liability
provides compensation to those who suffer injury. The common
319
law of torts and the Oil Pollution Act, among other statutes,
have this compensatory feature, although other liability rules,
such as pollution taxes, cap and trade schemes, and CERCLA,
do not.
In practice, liability rules may not fully deliver on these
advantages. They often are accompanied by uncertainty because they operate after harm has occurred. In the common law
of torts, for instance, we sometimes do not know until the jury
returns whether particular actors will be liable. For this reason, it can be difficult for firms to predict the costs of their actions, leading to over- or under-deterrence. For the same rea317. Whether pollution taxes and cap and trade schemes are properly regarded as liability rules is debatable. Other commentators have classified these sorts of regulatory tools as a form of command and control regulation. See
Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313,
2325 (2010). Pollution taxes and cap and trade schemes are similar to liability
rules in that they set a price on an externality which is imposed only after it is
generated. It is also true, however, that greater ex ante regulatory effort goes
into setting up a pollution tax or cap and trade scheme than is the case under
other liability rules like the common law of tort. For present purposes, nothing
turns on this taxonomic issue, since we do not consider pollution taxes or cap
and trade to be feasible options for dealing with water pollution risks caused
by fracturing.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006).
319. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
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son, the compensatory feature of liability is also uncertain; it is
not necessarily reassuring to know we can file a law suit if a
320
new risk threatens us with injury.
Notwithstanding these imperfections, the prospect of liability clearly has a powerful effect on businesses. For instance,
products liability law has transformed the way consumer products are designed, and CERCLA has had a similar effect on
321
waste disposal. Liability, therefore, is especially effective in
encouraging risk-reducing innovation. This is a powerful argument for liability rules, even with all their uncertainties and
imperfections.
5. Coasean Bargains
A final strategy, associated with the work of Ronald Coase,
322
is to regulate external harms by contract. Contractual solutions are unrealistic when transaction costs are high, as with
323
highway accidents and smog. Yet contractual solutions may
sometimes prove feasible for water contamination from fracturing. Before energy companies begin drilling, they enter into
mineral leases with owners of the mineral rights, typically the
surface owners of the land above the oil or gas deposit. This
lease can address water contamination. For example, landowners in Noble County, Ohio, recently negotiated lease provisions
requiring the energy company to test water quality before and
after drilling and barring the company from drawing water for
324
fracturing from the leaseholders’ land. One could imagine
lease provisions that go even further, either making landown320. See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL
INJURY LAW 35–40 (1989) (discussing the deficiencies of tort as a compensation system).
321. There is disagreement about whether the social benefits associated
with these forms of liability exceed the social costs. See A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1437 (2010) (examining products liability); sources cited supra note 284
(CERCLA). But there is little doubt that the prospect of products liability and
CERCLA liability have changed the behavior of business firms. See, e.g., Carol
E. Dinkins, George O. Wilkinson, Margaret E. Peloso & Thomas S. Meriwether, The Role of Public and Private Litigants in Promoting Environmental Corporate Responsibility, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 130–32, 135 (2010);
Mark Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 1 ENCYCLODEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, SECOND EDITION, TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 287, 300–04 (Michael Faure
ed., 2009).
322. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
323. See id. at 16–19.
324. Keith Schneider, New Value for Land in Rural Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2012, at A11.
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ers whole for any water contamination or releasing energy
companies from any water contamination claim. In either case,
the price would be adjusted for the enhanced or diminished
325
rights. Regulators could enhance the prospects for such solutions by prescribing model contracts, which would serve as defaults the parties would be free to modify.
Other Coasean solutions are also imaginable. For example,
the driller could purchase both mineral rights and groundwater
rights, and could agree to sell groundwater to the landowner at
a specified price and quality. Or energy companies could purchase the full column of rights (a fee simple), effectively uniting
the mineral rights, groundwater rights, and surface rights under single ownership, with the objective of maximizing the joint
value of the rights considered separately.
Coasean bargains nevertheless have significant limitations
in this context. If fracturing threatens harm to parties not participating in a lease (like neighboring landowners), contractual
solutions become more difficult, if only because of the large
number of potentially affected persons. Another problem more
specific to the oil and gas industry is the prevalence of split estates, in which the surface owner transfers subsurface mineral
rights to a third party at t1, and the owner of the mineral estate
later enters into a lease with an energy company allowing frac326
turing at t2. In these circumstances, the surface owner may
have bargained away all rights to receive royalties from oil and
gas development at t1, and thus will view the costs of fracturing
at t2 in purely negative terms. Indeed, the surface owner may
resent the mineral rights owner’s good fortune in benefitting
from the unanticipated emergence of fracturing, and may seek
to obstruct fracturing as a way to force a renegotiation of the
decision to split the estate. This sort of “holdup” is not an auspicious setting for Coasean bargaining.
C. FOUR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHOICE OF REGULATORY
STRATEGY
This brief survey suggests that regulatory strategies present a series of tradeoffs, for instance, in protecting against
325. Groundwater contamination may, in some cases, trigger general liability policies of a polluter. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859
So. 2d 167, 190 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
326. See generally Timothy Fitzgerald, Evaluating Split Estates in Oil and
Gas Leasing, 86 LAND ECON. 294 (2010) (providing background information on
split estates and discussing their decreased value to oil and gas developers).
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risk, foreclosing benefits from risky activities, reassuring the
public, operating efficiently, and encouraging innovation. These
tradeoffs should inform our choices about regulatory strategies
for water contamination from fracturing. It is worth asking,
however, whether there is any more systematic basis for choosing among regulatory strategies. If our goals are to encourage
socially valuable behavior while also assuring an optimal level
of safety at a minimal level of administrative cost, which of
these five strategies—or what combination of them—should we
choose? How do we strike the balance?
While there is surprisingly little general theory on this
327
question, a useful starting point is the literature on ex ante
versus ex post regulation. While ex ante regulation seeks to reduce harmful externalities before they occur, ex post regulation
puts a price or sanction on harmful events after they occur,
328
thereby creating an incentive to reduce their incidence. The
focus of this literature is whether it is cheaper to determine optimal behavior before or after some discrete accident or other
329
external harm has taken place. Of course, with any system of
regulation, there will be at least some regulatory activity both
before and after the decision about optimal behavior is made.
Under a system that determines optimal behavior ex ante, resources must be devoted to enforcing the designated rules of
conduct. Likewise, even under a system that determines optimal behavior ex post, resources must be devoted to establishing
such a system and articulating general guidelines before par327. See generally REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ECONOMICS AND LAW (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011) (essays by Richard Posner,
Fred Schauer, and Richard Zeckhauser); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
328. See Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the
Choice Between Ex-Post Liability and Ex-Ante Regulation, 24 INT. REV L. &
ECON. 29, 35–38 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating after the Fact, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379–80 (2007); Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus
Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 193, 199–200 (1977). Louis Kaplow, in an important article, assimilates
the distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation to the distinction between rules and standards. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–62 (1992). Although we agree that
there is a strong association between ex ante regulation and the use of rules,
and that standards generally entail ex post regulation, we do not foreclose the
possibility that ex post regulation can have significant rule-like elements. A
pollution tax precisely calibrated to the tonnage of pollutants emitted would be
an example.
329. Kaplow, supra note 328, at 572 (“The difference in promulgation costs
favors standards, whereas that in enforcement costs favors rules.”).
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ticular harms are investigated. The basic principle for choosing
between ex ante and ex post regulation, then, is to pick the regulatory approach that minimizes the sum of external costs and
regulatory costs. With ex ante regulation, the regulatory costs
are front loaded; with ex post regulation, they are back loaded.
Consider a choice between requiring manufacturers to install safety devices like airbags in cars, and examining particular vehicles after accidents to determine whether they were designed safely. The first system (e.g., command and control
regulation) will entail extensive investigations of airbags and a
complicated process to shape the parameters of the regulation.
Once the rule is promulgated, it must be enforced with occasional spot checks, recall orders, and the like. Even so, more
costs will be consumed in crafting the regulation than in enforc330
ing it. In contrast, under a system that examines cars after
accidents (e.g., a liability rule), relatively little is needed to get
the system up and running, and regulatory costs shift to the enforcement phase when accidents are investigated.
This framework only pushes us to the next question: what
factors determine the relative effectiveness of ex ante or ex post
regulation, and in particular, whether fewer social resources—
including accident costs, costs of preventing accidents, and administrative costs—will be consumed by regulating in one mode
or the other? The existing literature here is less helpful. Distilling from a variety of commentary, we suggest four factors.
1. Heterogeneity of Risk
First, how much variation is there among the actions pro331
ducing the relevant harm? Injuries from secondary collisions,
for instance, are likely to be similar even in different types of
cars. This relative uniformity favors ex ante regulation (e.g.
mandatory installation of passive restraints). Conversely, every
accident in which human behavior plays a significant role is
different, involving heterogeneous variables such as how the
drivers were driving, whether they were impaired, the road and
weather conditions, and so forth. Here it seems more appropriate to apply a general standard of reasonable care and make
judgments ex post, so we do not have to provide rules in ad330. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 221–22, 228–29 (1990) (detailing the extensive costs and obstacles to
implementing passive restraint rules for automobiles).
331. Kaplow, supra note 328, at 563–64. Kaplow briefly mentions this factor but offers little discussion of it.

214

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:145

vance for an almost infinite range of scenarios.
2. Magnitude of Expected Harm
A second factor in choosing between ex ante and ex post
regulation is the expected frequency and severity of the harm.
A large expected harm is more likely to justify the upfront ex332
penditure of resources needed for ex ante rules. Thus, if many
people are killed and injured in car crashes each year, this jus333
tifies rules requiring seat belts. Even if the probability of
harm is low, if the severity of the harm is great enough, the
magnitude of expected harm may justify ex ante regulation, as
in the case of meltdowns in nuclear plants. Conversely, if a
harm is uncommon and not especially severe, it probably is
more cost effective to rely a general standard of care applied after the fact. Consider the risk of being struck by a ball hit out of
334
a sports stadium. These accidents are rare and, unless someone is struck in the head, injuries are not severe. Therefore, it
is cheaper to wait for relatively rare accidents and then determine responsibility after the fact.
3. “Settlement” Costs of Ex Post Judgments
A third factor influencing the choice of regulatory approach, which has received little attention in the literature, is
the cost of making case-by-case judgments ex post. Borrowing
from the takings literature, we call this variable the “settle335
ment costs” of engaging in ex post enforcement of a standard.
332. Kaplow argues that the frequency with which the two types of costs
(promulgation costs and enforcement costs) will be incurred is the primary factor in choosing between rules and standards. Kaplow, supra note 328, at 573;
see also Noam Sher, New Differences Between Negligence and Strict Liability
and Their Implications on Medical Malpractice, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
335, 344–45 (2007) (discussing relative advantages of liability regimes based
on enforcement costs).
333. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has required by
rule that all new vehicles have seat belts since 1968. The NHTSA adopted this
rule in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208; the current form of this
regulation is in 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2012). All states except New Hampshire
now require by law that people wear seat belts while driving.
334. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) 852–54 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
335. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1214 (1967). Michelman’s discussion is recast in terms of deterrence and compensation in Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution
in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. Rev. 997, 1004 (1999). See also ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 324 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing
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Settlement costs can vary substantially in different contexts. If
the sources of an external harm are diffuse, or victims are numerous, the costs of case-by-case adjudication may be prohibitive. Consider the case of urban smog. It would be impractical
to impose liability on individual drivers, because there are so
many sources of smog and everyone is harmed, at least to an
extent. When settlement costs are high, ex ante rules (e.g., requiring all cars to have catalytic converters) may be the only
336
feasible regulation.
4. Novelty of Risk
A fourth factor, which is not extensively addressed in the
literature, is the novelty of the risk. When technology is new,
we can predict some harm that it could cause, but not all of
them, and not always with confidence about their magnitude
and severity. Also, it is especially difficult to devise solutions
for these harms. Effective predictions and solutions—and, thus,
effective ex ante regulation—require experience. Without experience, we generally will be better off with some form of ex post
regulation.
For example, when vehicles powered by internal combustion engines were first invented, it may have been possible to
predict that they would cause accidents and frighten horses.
But it took time and ingenuity to develop solutions (e.g., better
brakes and mufflers). Meanwhile, no one predicted that engines
would cause urban smog. It took experience to design (and mobilize popular support for) regulations addressing this unexpected problem. Similar stories can be told about steam boilers,
organ transplants, and other novel technologies. The general
lesson is that we need significant exposure to a novel technology before developing efficient ex ante regulations.
To sum up, then, we have, in a very rudimentary form, a
general framework for choosing between ex ante and ex post
regulation. The theory consists of a general principle: minimize
the sum of ex ante and ex post costs of creating incentives for
optimal behavior. The general principle is fleshed out with four
factors illuminating sources of these costs: whether the sources
of the harm are heterogeneous; whether the expected harm is
the problems of settlement costs when individual harms are small and injurers are numerous).
336. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE
ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR AIR POLLUTION, 1940–1975, at 158 (1977).
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high; whether settlement costs of allocating responsibility ex
post are high; and whether the technology is novel.
D . APPLYING THESE FACTORS TO THE RISK OF WATER
POLLUTION FROM FRACTURING
This Section applies this framework to the risks of water
pollution from fracturing and recommends a blended regulatory
strategy, using command and control regulation for issues that
are already well understood with liability as a backstop for these and other issues.
1. Heterogeneity of Risk
In controlling water pollution from fracturing, some
sources of the risk are homogeneous while others are heterogeneous. Virtually all oil and gas production poses the risk of
337
blowouts, leaks from vertical drill pipes into aquifers, and
338
improper disposal of drilling waste and produced water. Each
of these risks is present in conventional drilling (i.e., vertical
drilling in porous rock) as well as fracturing, and technologies
are available to address them. For example, blowout preventers
are by now familiar, and the need for them is sufficiently uni339
form to require them. The same is true of rules governing the
thickness and depth of well casings (to prevent leaks), as well
as surface containment ponds for drilling waste and the safe
340
transportation of produced water. Other water contamination
337. Blowouts are “gushers” or the uncontrolled release of gas or oil. See
MARK ZOBACK ET AL., WORLDWATCH INST., ADDRESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS FROM SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 8–9 (2010); see also Seamus McGraw,
Pennsylvania Fracking Accident: What Went Wrong, POPULAR MECHANICS
(Apr. 21, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/
coal-oil-gas/pennsylvania-fracking-accident-what-went-wrong-5598621 (detailing a widely-reported near-blowout at a Pennsylvania fracking operation run
by Chesapeake Energy).
338. Produced water is briny water from deep below the earth’s surface
that comes up with the oil or gas during the drilling process. See supra Part
IV.A.1.
339. States are already discussing and implementing such requirements.
For example, Colorado Oil and Gas rules incorporate a blowout preventer requirement, and one was recently proposed by the Texas Railroad Commission
(the state body that oversees oil and gas exploration) as part of broad changes
to the state’s regulation of energy extraction. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 4041:603(e)(4) (2013) (“Blowout Prevention Equipment”); Kate Galbraith, Proposed Rules on Fracking Gain Cautious Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, at
A39 (describing proposed Texas rules including blowout prevention equipment).
340. See, e.g., FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 (noting the
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risks are unique to fracturing, but also present issues that
should not vary greatly from one fracturing site to another, including the risk of surface spills of fracturing fluid and of the
341
improper disposal of flow-back. Best practices regulations are
also appropriate for this sort of issue—indeed, they already are
342
common in states with oil and gas drilling.
We assume that best practices regulations would be adopted by the relevant regulatory authority through notice and
comment rulemaking. They would be developed through a variety of sources. The oil and gas industry would have an interest
in proposing such regulations, if only to assure that maverick
operators would not create spills or leaks that would exacerbate
public uneasiness about fracturing. Other sources of proposed
regulations would include manufacturers of control equipment,
environmental organizations, and associations of local landowners. Regulations adopted by other jurisdictions could act as
a source of inspiration, with trade associations, environmental
groups, and perhaps the federal government serving as clearinghouses to disseminate the relevant information from one ju343
risdiction to another.
While some risks are homogeneous—and thus are especially well suited to this sort of effort—others are clearly heteroge344
neous, including the risk of fracturing fluid or methane escaping from target shale beds and migrating to aquifers, and
the risk of vibrations from fracturing dislodging methane deposits near the surface or substances at the bottom of water
need for well casing to be thick, muti-layered, and properly set, and describing
well casing as an “ideal example” of a best practices approach); id. at 20 (recommending spill-containment technologies).
341. Flow-back is used fracturing fluid that is pushed back to the surface
by the pressure of gas and oil released in the fracturing process. See supra
Part IV.A.1.
342. See supra Part IV.A.2 (describing and citing various state regulations).
343. Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2014) (manuscript at 51, 61–62), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257047.
344. See George E. King, Thirty Years of Gas Shale Fracturing: What Have
We Learned?, (Society of Petroleum Engineers, Working Paper No. SPE
133456, 2010) (“No two shales are alike. Shales vary aerially and vertically
within a trend, even along a well bore . . . . There are no optimum, one-sizefits-all . . . designs for shale wells.”); see also HEATHER COOLEY & CHRISTINA
DONNELLY, PAC. INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND WATER RESOURCES:
SEPARATING THE FRACK FROM THE FICTION 21 (2012) (detailing the variations
in the composition of fracking fluids to compensate for the specifics of local geology and individual wells).
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wells. These risks vary with the depth of the shale bed, the size
of the producing field, the depth of the water aquifer, the distance separating the producing field from the aquifer, the porosity of the rock between the shale and aquifer, the mix of
chemicals used in fracturing, and the number of persons who
345
draw water from the aquifer. There is also no one technology
346
that can address these risks in a uniform way. It is possible
that new technologies will emerge to address some of these
risks, such as the development of non-toxic fracturing fluid that
is cost effective. If so, it may be appropriate to ban toxic ver347
sions. Yet this sort of judgment cannot be made until the necessary technology has been developed and widely tested. In all
of these efforts, industry groups can play a role by helping to
348
formulate a set of best practices.
Still, for these residual
risks, some form of ex post regulation is needed, at least for
now.

345. The State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations
(STRONGER), a nonprofit that has developed guidelines for state regulations,
did not establish numerical criteria or uniform standards because “states vary
too much in climate, geology, hydrology, topography, and other factors to be
amenable to one-size-fits-all regulation.” Memorandum of the STRONGER Bd.
of Dirs., to Persons Interested in the Hydraulic Fracturing Guidelines (February 8, 2010), available at http://www.strongerinc.org/sites/all/themes/
stronger02/downloads/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20posting.pdf; see also FIRST
2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that “shale plays in different
basins have different geological characteristics” and that “[t]his geological diversity means that engineering practice and regulatory oversight will differ
widely among regions of the country”).
346. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10 at 10 (“The realities of regional diversity of shale gas resources and rapid change in production practices
and technology mean that a single best engineering practice cannot set for all
locations and for all time.”) (emphasis omitted).
347. See Joe Carroll, Chesapeake Testing ‘Green’ Fracking Fluids in Shale
Wells, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-10-02/chesapeake-testing-green-fracking-fluids-in-u-s-shale-wells
.html.
348. See, e.g., AM. PETROLEUM INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE /
BEST PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (HF) (2012), available at http://
www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Hydraulic_Fracturing_
InfoSheet.pdf; see also FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 27 (recommending “creation of a shale gas industry organization dedicated to continuous improvement of best practice through development of standards, diffusion
of these standards, and assessing compliance among its members”) (emphasis
omitted); SECOND 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 144, at 9 (reiterating recommendation and noting that regional industry groups are taking regional approaches to best practices); infra notes 354–58 and accompanying text (describing industry-NGO partnerships developing codes of conduct for shale oil
and gas drilling).
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2. Magnitude of Expected Harm
The second factor, the frequency and severity of the harm,
also varies with the pathway of contamination. Here again, certain activities present an obvious risk of significant harm if not
controlled, such as dumping flow-back or produced water on the
ground or into streams, drilling without protective well casings,
or spilling toxic chemicals on the surface. These sorts of risks
are either already regulated by best practices regulations, or if
not, they should be.
Other risks appear to be more remote, such as the risk that
either fracturing fluid or methane gas might migrate from
shale seams into aquifers during fracturing. The evidence so far
suggests that such incidents will be uncommon. Fracturing has
been used for over sixty years to enhance production from conventional oil and gas wells, with only limited evidence of
349
groundwater contamination. To be sure, fracturing in shale
has a shorter history, but at least so far its track record does
not seem to be different. According to a number of studies,
there are no documented cases in which fracturing fluid has
migrated into aquifers from deep shale seams or from wells for
350
storing used fracturing fluid.
Methane contamination of
groundwater is more common, although it is often naturally occurring, so that only a subset of these incidents is caused by
351
drilling. If such migrations of fracturing fluid and methane
occur, how severe would they be? For now, it is impossible to
make any categorical pronouncements. With fracturing fluid,
352
for instance, the chemicals involved are a crucial variable.
Some are a cause for concern even in diluted form, while others
(e.g., biodegradable detergents) are less worrisome. Alleviating
uncertainty about this variable is a good reason to require disclosure of chemicals used in fracturing, a subject to which we
will return.
349. See, e.g., EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES
OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 12 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_
attach_uic_exec_summ.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL
GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 39 (2009),

available
at
http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/state_oil_and_gas_
regulations_designed_to_protect_water_resources_0.pdf.
350. See supra Part IV.A.1.
351. See supra Part IV.A.2.
352. For a list of chemicals commonly used in fracturing fluid, see What
Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS.ORG, http://fracfocus.org/chemical-use/what
-chemicals-are-used (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
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The risks whose severity are hardest to assess are those in
which vibrations from fracturing disturb contaminants already
in proximity to water sources, including pockets of methane
near water wells or contaminants already at the bottom of water wells. This sort of event is hard to distinguish from naturally occurring contamination and, in any event, would not include
(toxic) fracturing fluid.
Whatever the pathway, another important variable is the
number of persons and properties affected by an episode of contamination. Water aquifers have finite dimensions, and are
353
generally presumed to be isolated from other aquifers. If this
is the case, the impact of any contamination will be localized.
In some cases, however, a contaminated aquifer may be interconnected with other aquifers or with surface water. We do not
354
know how common this is, or how far chemicals used in fracturing operations must travel before becoming sufficiently diluted not to affect water quality. Because of these uncertainties, there is some risk—most likely small but currently
impossible to quantify—that contamination from fracturing
could damage water over a significant area. Likewise, aquifers
or surface waters that serve millions of people, such as the watersheds supplying New York City, pose a different level of risk
and warrant more stringent regulation, as discussed further
below.
Still another factor is whether the harm will be limited to
property damage or will involve health effects. If contamination
is detected early, injuries should be primarily economic; since
alternative sources of water are available by truck or pipeline
(at a price), the primary consequence should be a decline in
property values. But if the harm is not detected early, so that it
exposes people to toxic chemicals for an extended time period,
there could be health effects that are significantly more costly.
353. See, e.g., Luke W. Harris & Christopher J. Sanchez, Considerations for
Analyzing Colorado Ground Water: A Technical Perspective, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 105, 121–22 (2011).
354. See Nathaniel R. Warner et al., Geochemical Evidence for Possible
Natural Migration of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,961, 11,965 (2012) (detecting salinity
in shallow groundwater in Pennsylvania which was present before fracturing
operations began, and which did not include fracturing fluid chemicals, and
thus probably was not caused by fracturing; concluding that this saline water,
which resembles produced water, may have migrated naturally up from deeper areas over time, suggesting the presence of “a preexisting network of crossformational pathways that has enhanced hydraulic connectivity to deeper geological formations”).
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3. Settlement Costs
If we implement an ex post regulatory strategy for fracturing, how difficult will it be to determine who is responsible and
who deserves compensation? In other words, how high will settlement costs be? Usually, the number of energy companies
fracturing in a given locale will be small. Thus, identifying potential defendants should not be a problem. Proving they are
causally responsible and have violated the applicable standard
of care, though, is another matter. The legal issues posed by a
liability regime could prove daunting, making ex post liability
an expensive proposition.
A critical variable is whether the amount of injury per
claimant—reflected in a loss in property values and possibly also in health effects—is sufficiently large to warrant individualized assessments. If water contamination goes undetected, resulting in significant exposure to livestock and humans, the
potential damages could be large enough to warrant individualized adjudication. But if contamination is quickly detected and
results in avoidance measures that prevent significant harm
(like relocating water wells), the potential damages might be
too small to sustain a liability regime. And of course, if significant time has elapsed between fracturing and the discovery of
contamination, identifying a defendant sufficiently solvent to
pay damages may be difficult. These considerations about the
magnitude of settlement costs (relative to the amount in controversy) provide a reason to rely, at least in significant part,
on command and control regulation rather than a pure liability
regime.
The possibility that the settlement costs will be too large
relative to the injuries sustained by claimants also suggests the
need for some modifications in the common law, insofar as it is
used to backstop best practices regulations. We discuss these
issues in Part VI.
4. Novelty of Risk
As we have seen, ex ante regulation is more challenging
with a novel technology (or a novel application of existing technology), because there is no baseline of existing precautions to
define the “best practices” regulatory standard. With new technology (or new applications) there is thus a strong reason to rely at least in part on ex post regulation.
Neither fracturing nor horizontal drilling is a new technol-
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355

ogy. What is new is the application of this technology in
shale. Thus, insofar as fracturing in shale presents water contamination risks identical to those in conventional oil and gas
production—such as disposing of produced water, minimizing
well casing leaks, and controlling blowouts—the risks and potential solutions are familiar, so this experience can support ex
ante best practices regulation. Similarly, certain risks common
to all fracturing sites—such as spills of fracturing chemicals on
the ground and disposal of flow-back—are analogous to other
activities that pose water contamination risks, and should also
be amenable to best practices regulation.
However, ex ante regulation is much more difficult for
pathways of contamination that are novel to fracturing. These
include the risk that fracturing fluid or methane will migrate
from shale seams to aquifers during fracturing, as well as the
risk that vibrations from fracturing will disturb existing methane pockets near aquifers or stir up contaminants already at
the bottom of water wells. For now, there is insufficient understanding of the frequency and magnitude of these risks, as well
as how to minimize them, to support a system of ex ante regulation.
E. THE REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR WATER CONTAMINATION
FROM FRACTURING
We are now in a position to draw these considerations together and propose in broad outline a regulatory strategy. In
brief, we would rely on best practices regulation backstopped by
liability, and we would tailor our liability rules to encourage
compliance with, and development of, efficient best practices
regulation.
1. The Need for Both Best Practices Regulation and Liability
As a core element of our regulatory strategy, best practices
regulation offers three advantages. First, it is especially well
suited to risks that are either common to all forms of oil and
gas production or are familiar from other types of industrial
operations, including surface spills, vertical well leaks, blowouts, disposal of produced water, and disposal of flow-back, as
355. Nicolas Loris, The Fracking Truth on Government’s Role in Natural
Gas Production, THE FOUNDRY (Jan. 31, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://blog.heritage
.org/2012/01/31/the-fracking-truth-on-governments-role-in-natural-gas
-production/ (stating that in the 1940s Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation began testing of fracking and horizontal drilling).
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discussed above. Second, the idea that a public regulatory body
is “on the case” is reassuring to the public. Given the enormous
potential benefits of the shale boom, it is important to persuade
the public that the practice is safe. Otherwise, we risk losing
these potential benefits if, for example, an anti-fracking crusade marshals public support for a ban on fracturing. As a result, the entire industry has a strong stake in promoting public
confidence in shale oil and gas drilling, and in assuring that actions of a few irresponsible companies do not jeopardize the entire industry. Third, because energy companies must make
substantial investments to drill in shale, they need to estimate
what regulatory costs they will face. Best practices regulation
356
offers this predictability.
However, best practices regulation has three important
drawbacks, so that it must be backstopped by liability. First,
best practices regulation is only as effective as the resources
committed to enforcing it. If budget cutbacks result in irregular
inspections and legislative inaction allows the real value of
fines to erode, energy companies will have diminished incen357
tives to comply. Second, best practices regulation is ineffective for heterogeneous or novel risks. As a result, risks that are
unique to fracturing of shale seams and have no clear analogous counterpart in other operations should be regulated ex
post with liability rules. This includes the risks, discussed
above, of migration from shale seams and of disturbance of existing contaminates near water sources. This is not to suggest
that these risks would remain forever in the ex post camp. As
we learn more about these risks, we presume industry will develop ways of minimizing them, at which point they can move
to the best practices column. Third, as we have seen, command
and control regulation provides relatively poor incentives to develop new risk-minimizing innovations. Liability rules provide
a much more powerful incentive in this regard.

356. Of course, energy companies may prefer best practices regulations for
less laudable reasons, such as imposing costs on potential new entrants and
competitiors, shifting blame to the regulator if things later go wrong, and so
forth.
357. Even after a recent comprehensive revision in its oil and gas law,
Pennsylvania caps civil penalties for violations of best practices regulations at
$75,000 plus $5,000 per day for each day the violation persists. 58 PA. STAT.
§ 3256 (2013).
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2. Three Rules to Coordinate Liability with Best Practices
Regulation
The two anchors of our regulatory strategy—best practices
regulation and liability—should be coordinated, so that liability
standards vary depending on whether a best practices regulation governs the conduct that caused the contamination. Specifically, we envision three different liability rules depending on
compliance with best practices regulations. First, any water
contamination causally attributable to the violation of a best
practices regulation should be considered negligence per se and
should result in liability.
Second (and conversely), any claim that water contamination was caused by the failure of an energy company to adopt a
measure more protective than required by an applicable best
practices regulation should generally be defeated by a regulatory compliance defense (although we would include an exception
for best practices regulations that are significantly less protective than comparable rules in other jurisdictions). These two
per se rules, working in tandem, create a powerful incentive for
industry to support the development of protective best practices
rules and to comply with them.
The third rule fills any gaps left by the first and second: if
the water contamination is causally attributable to the defendant’s fracturing, but cannot be linked to an activity governed by
a best practices rule, we would apply a version of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. In such a regulatory vacuum, proof that the
energy company caused the contamination would create an inference that the firm was negligent, shifting the burden to the
company to prove it exercised reasonable care. In effect, the energy company would have to show that the contamination was
an inevitable accident that could not be prevented by any exercise of reasonable care. Because this showing would be very difficult, the standard of care, as a practical matter, would approach strict liability. This high probability of liability for
harms not covered by best practices regulations would give energy companies a strong incentive to learn how to reduce the
residual risks not governed by best practices regulations and to
help regulators develop new best practices regulations.
3. The Supporting Role of Prohibitions, Disclosure, and
Coasean Bargains
Our proposed strategy would not ignore the other modes of
regulation we have discussed, but each would play a subordi-
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nate role. Although we would not rely on prohibitions as the
principal strategy, they are appropriate where risks are especially great. In New York State, for example, we would ban
fracturing near the Catskill and Croton watersheds that supply
358
virtually all of New York City’s water. The expense of developing an alternative source of water for millions of people on
short notice would be massive. Even a small risk of this costly
scenario should be ruled out; if the risk assessment changes
over time, then the ban can be reconsidered later.
Information disclosure would also play an important if secondary role. Mandatory disclosure becomes more important
over time as we learn which information is crucial. We already
know, though, that blowouts and leaks should be disclosed, as
well as the chemicals used in fracturing fluid. Indeed, many
companies have begun voluntarily disclosing the composition of
their fracturing fluid, and a nonprofit has compiled some of this
359
information in a searchable database. Many states have begun requiring disclosure, and EPA (under the Toxic Substances
Control Act) and the Bureau of Land Management are also de360
veloping federal disclosure standards.
A more ambitious information disclosure strategy would
be to require regulators to prepare an environmental impact
358. The New York City water supply originates in the Catskill Mountains
and Hudson River Valley, an area of over 1900 square miles within dozens of
counties, towns, and villages. The watershed—and the city’s drinking water
specifically—is protected by a 1997 Memorandum of Agreement, which created
a watershed partnership council and series of regulations on water quality
throughout the watershed. N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, ARTICLE I (1997), available at http://www
.dos.ny.gov/watershed/nycmoa.html. See also ARTHUR, URETSKY & WILSON,
supra note 155, at 10 (noting that Catskill and Croton Watersheds supply all
water to New York City and the surrounding area, including Northern New
Jersey).
359. See New Website Makes Information on Fracking Chemicals More Accessible to the Public, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www
.foreffectivegov.org/new-website-makes-info-on-fracking-chemicals-more
-accessible (discussing a new searchable website launched by SkyTruth); What
Chemicals Are Used, supra note 352.
360. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing on
Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160) (development of new BLM standards); ARNOLD
& PORTER LLP, ADDITIONAL FRACKING CHEMICAL SUBSTANCE REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS UNDER TSCA MAY FURTHER COMPLICATE LANDSCAPE (2012),
available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%
20Additional_Fracking_Chemical_Substance_Reporting_Requirements_
Under_TSCA_May_Further_Complicate_Landscape.pdf. For a discussion, see
infra Part VI.A.1.b.
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statement (EIS), along the lines of the federal NEPA process,
before issuing any permission to drill that contemplates the use
of fracturing. This would require consideration of all environmental impacts—road damage, noise, water usage, habitat destruction, and induced earthquakes, as well was water contamination—before production commences. Proposed alternatives
that would mitigate harms along each of these dimensions
could be explored, which might lead to beneficial modifications.
Public participation would be possible, either in the form of
comments on a draft impact statement or in one or more public
hearings. And information about impacts and mitigating alternatives for each project could be assembled in a large database,
providing feedback to regulators in developing new best prac361
tices regulations.
Experience with the federal NEPA program, nevertheless,
suggests strong reasons for caution about mandating such an
ambitious information disclosure program for every application
for permission to drill. The full-blown EIS process is very ex362
pensive. The discussion of impacts and alternatives usually
requires hiring an environmental consulting firm, which adds
considerably to the expense of any energy project. Responding
to comments entails further diversion of staff resources by regulatory bodies. To the extent that compliance with disclosure
requirements is enforced through judicial injunctions, the costs
mount even higher. Moreover, the threat of injunctions transforms the benign-sounding information disclosure regime into a
weapon for delay by disgruntled opponents, driving up the costs
of projects even further and often forcing cancellation of other363
wise beneficial undertakings. Enforcement through injunctions also has the effect of shifting de facto authority over production decisions from landowners, production companies, and
regulators to environmental organizations and judges, who may
have relatively little perspective on the larger societal interests
at stake. Perhaps the most decisive objection, however, is that
one cannot take a “hard look” at the environmental conse361. Federal NEPA rather notoriously includes no provision for follow-up
monitoring. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring
and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 908 (2002).
362. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 930–34 (6th ed. 2009), and sources cited therein.
363. For an instructive case study, see William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory
Fragmentation Continuum, Westway, and the Challenges of Regional Growth,
21 J.L. & POL. 323 (2005).
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quences of fracturing, as recently mandated by a federal magis364
trate judge in California, until we have more experience tell365
ing us what those consequences are. Information disclosure
only works when there is information—as opposed to specula366
tion—to disclose.
We also view Coasean bargains as an appropriate regulatory strategy. Given the uncertainty about water contamination
risks, it is unrealistic to expect landowners and energy companies systematically to engage in negotiations about allocating
these risks by contract, although as previously noted, there is
evidence this is beginning to happen in some lease negotiations.
The problem is not just the familiar one of asymmetric information, but the concern that neither the energy companies nor
the landowners have definitive information about the nature
and magnitude of the risks. We therefore expect at least some
parties to be reluctant to allocate these risks by contract. Yet
the process should become easier with time and experience.
One promising development is that energy companies have
begun working with environmental organizations to formulate
private codes of best practices. For example, the Center for Sustainable Shale Development—a joint venture of energy companies with NGOs such as the Environmental Defense Fund—
offers certification to energy companies whose drilling practices
367
meet their standards. This initiative is analogous to LEED
368
certification for green buildings.
It gives landowners a
364. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. C 11-06174
PSG, 2013 WL 1405938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2013).
365. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 creates a “rebuttable presumption” that
certain oil and gas development and production activities on federal lands are
categorically excluded from NEPA. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 390, P.L. 10958, 119 Stat. 594, 747–48. Examples of excluded activities include surface disturbances of less than five acres and drilling within five years of previous drilling activity. Id. § 390(b)(1), (2). These exclusions were apparently not at issue
in Center for Biological Diversity. See generally, Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
2013 WL 1405938, supra note 364.
366. Magistrate Judge Grewal’s opinion in Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
acknowledges that water contamination is the most serious environmental issue. But rather than citing any concrete evidence supporting a risk of water
contamination, he relies heavily on the existence of “public controversy” as a
reason to delay fracturing on public lands until a new EIS is completed. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity, 2013 WL 1405938, supra note 364, at *11–15.
367. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://www.sustainableshale.org/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
368. How to Certify a Building Project, USGBC LEED, http://www.usgbc
.org/leed/certification (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (describing process for securing LEED certification for green buildings).
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straightforward way to require best practices when negotiating
a mineral rights lease: instead of having to specify various
practices, they can simply require certification. Similarly, the
International Energy Agency has developed a set of “Golden
369
Rules for a Golden Age of Gas.” This sort of initiative is a useful supplement for best practices regulation and liability, and
could ultimately reduce the need for such regulation.
VI. DESIGNING A REGULATORY REGIME FOR WATER
CONTAMINATION
In this Part, we offer more detail about our proposed regulatory regime, focusing on the design of the liability rule and its
interaction with best practices regulations. We also consider
other features, including comparative negligence, the measure
of damages, attorneys’ fees, and the risk of insolvency. The next
Part addresses institutional options for implementing these
features, including who should establish the best practices regulations.
A. CAUSATION
In designing the liability system, we begin with causation,
which we regard as the most crucial issue. We distinguish three
questions. First, did oil or gas production cause the water contamination? If not, there should be no liability. Second, what
was the pathway of the contamination? Third, what was the
scope of the harm caused by the contamination? Did it impair
the value of property by rendering the water supply useless?
Did it cause further harm to vegetation, livestock or human
health?
1. Contamination Injury
For energy companies to have the right incentives, they
370
should be liable only if they actually cause harm. Thus, plain369. Int’l Energy Agency, Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas, WORLD
ENERGY OUTLOOK (May 29, 2012), available at http://www.worldenergyoutlook
.org/goldenrules/.
370. In theory, one could impose liability for imposing not just harm, but
also a risk of harm. But this risk of contamination would be virtually impossible to calculate. If one imposed liability for risk of harm, it would also be necessary to reduce recoveries in all cases to expected damages, in order to avoid
over-deterrence. This, too, would be very difficult to calculate. Over a large
enough number of cases, imposing liability only for actual harm generates the
same aggregate liability as expected harm, and it has the added virtue of
providing full compensation to those who are actually injured, as opposed to
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tiffs should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that fracturing was a but-for cause of water contamina371
tion on their property.
This showing is challenging for three reasons. First, if the
plaintiff’s water well contains an unusual chemical, how do we
know it comes from fracturing, as opposed to a natural cause or
some other source of pollution? Even if the plaintiff’s water contains methane, how do we know it was not naturally present in
the water? Second, if several energy companies are fracturing
in a given locale, how do we know which one is responsible?
Third, what if contamination is discovered years after energy
companies have stopped fracturing in a particular locale? How
do we know whether the contamination comes from a longclosed oil or gas well or some other source? These questions are
difficult because the parties have only limited information. After all, fracturing occurs deep underground, and aquifers are
also underground (though much closer to the surface), so neither can be observed directly from the surface.
To generate reliable answers to these questions, the liability regime should create incentives to develop better information. We suggest three ways to pursue this “information
372
forcing” goal, ranked in order of importance: baseline testing;
those who experience near misses.
371. Our focus is on cause-in-fact—in effect, “but-for causation”—and not
on the narrower concept of proximate cause, which asks whether a cause-infact was sufficiently direct or foreseeable or otherwise relevant to the policies
pursued by the liability regime. One can imagine issues of proximate cause
arising. For example, suppose A is engaged in fracturing under B’s land, and B
digs an extremely deep water well that reaches the shale bed, and thus becomes contaminated with fracturing chemicals. Here, there is no doubt that
A’s fracturing activity is a cause-in-fact of the water contamination. Nevertheless, the water well’s unusual depth would probably be regarded as superseding cause of the injury, such that A’s drilling would likely not be treated as a
proximate cause. Or suppose fracturing by C sets off weak vibrations on the
surface, causing explosives stored in a cabin miles away to fall off a shelf and
explode. Here too, the fracturing is a cause-in-fact of the explosion, but it is
not foreseeable and thus is unlikely to be regarded as a proximate cause. These hypotheticals suggest that proximate cause issues will arise only in unusual
circumstances. We therefore put issues of proximate cause to one side, and assume that they can be resolved using the doctrinal tools developed in ordinary
tort suits.
372. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information Forcing Environmental
Regulation, 33 FLORIDA ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006). Information forcing can be
considered a variant on “action forcing,” which has long been a centerpiece of
environmental regulation, for example, under NEPA. See Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976) (describing NEPA’s requirements as “actionforcing provisions intended as a directive to all agencies to assure consideration of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking”) (internal
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disclosure; and tracer chemicals.
a. Baseline Testing
The most important step is to test groundwater before fracturing begins in order to establish a benchmark of water quality. Then, if an allegation of contamination is made, the water
would be tested again. If contaminants are found that were not
present in the baseline sample, this would support the allegation that fracturing caused the contamination. Conversely, if
the contaminants were already there, this would powerfully re373
but such a claim. In illuminating causation in this way, baseline testing is the most important information forcing strategy
we propose. A number of states have recognized the value of
374
baseline testing and have moved to require or encourage it.
Baseline testing has four limitations. First, its inferential
value erodes over time. If contamination is found one year after
baseline testing was conducted, the inference of causal responsibility is strong. But if contamination is found twenty years
later, the inference is much weaker. Over twenty years, the water could have been contaminated in many ways having nothing to do with fracturing. A solution to this problem would be
periodic testing, which has the further advantage of alerting
landowners to emerging water quality problems, thereby reducing risks to health that otherwise could arise from contamination. Of course, periodic testing increases the cost of any testing
program.
Second, the inferential value of baseline testing also diminishes with distance. The farther a water well is from fracturing,
the less likely it is that fracturing has caused any water contamination. So how close must fracturing be to water in order
for baseline testing to be required? Obviously, a longer distance
quotation marks omitted).
373. See FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 23 (“Availability of
measurements in advance of drilling would provide an objective baseline for
determining if the drilling and hydraulic fracturing activity introduced any
contaminants in surrounding drinking water wells.”).
374. Wiseman, supra note 163, at 157–58 (discussing regulations in Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania).
Two states (Pennsylvania and West Virginia) have sought to encourage baseline testing by adopting a rebuttable presumption that, if the testing is not
done before drilling, water contamination within a certain time and distance
of a fracturing operation was caused by the operator. Id. at 158. Wyoming is
also likely to require baseline sampling. Mark Wilcox, Baseline Water Testing
Moves Forward, WYO. BUS. REP., June 12, 2013, http://www
.wyomingbusinessreport.com/article.asp?id=65090.
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means more water wells have to be tested, and thus higher
costs.
Third, baseline testing cannot be conducted if landowners
do not allow access to their water wells. They might be motivated by a desire for privacy or, for that matter, by a concern
that any negative information they learn would have to be disclosed when they sell their property. Whatever their reasons, if
landowners refuse to consent to a baseline test, they should pay
a price for doing so. We would require them to overcome a presumption that the drilling activity did not cause the contamination. Or if a stronger incentive is needed, we can bar them from
bringing suit.
Fourth, baseline testing does not prevent certain types of
litigation-related misconduct. For instance, landowners might
deliberately pollute their own land after the test in order to
seek damages in a lawsuit and, correspondingly, energy companies might introduce pollutants before the test. We think it
will be rare for landowners to foul their own nest by destroying
their water supply or for energy companies to risk liability for
this sort of willful misconduct, but we recognize the possibility.
If it happens, the parties would be free to introduce evidence of
the other side’s misconduct; admittedly, though, this effort may
prove costly and may not always succeed. To deter this sort of
misconduct, therefore, we should deem any such tampering a
criminal offense subject to severe penalties.
Notwithstanding these four limitations, we believe the cost
of baseline testing is justified. We say this even though it is
possible that a large scale program will seem wasteful if fracturing turns out to present little or no danger, as its proponents
maintain. Yet even in this best case scenario, testing offers the
significant advantage of allaying public anxiety about fracturing, as well as the collateral benefit of educating landowners
about the quality of their water. Of course, if incidents of contamination do occur, testing becomes all the more valuable. It
reduces the risk of health effects by ensuring that contamination is detected, while also increasing the accuracy and reducing the cost of adjudicating disputes.
Moreover, while the cost of performing these tests is not
trivial, it is modest compared with the revenue generated by a
375
successful oil or gas well. We assume the energy company
375. The cost of performing the test is likely to be between $200 and $1500
per well, depending upon which analytes (and how many) are included in the
test. There would be further costs in hiring professionals to gather samples.
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would fund the baseline test (for instance, as a condition of receiving permission from the state to drill). For successful oil or
gas wells, companies presumably would pass on some or all of
this cost—as well as the costs of any periodic testing—to leaseholders through adjustments to the royalty. It may also be possible to contain costs, for instance, by testing only wells that
are quite close to fracturing, or by gathering samples only from
some, but not all, water wells in an area, if they draw on the
376
same aquifer. Landowners who prefer more comprehensive
testing can negotiate for it in return for a reduced royalty. Adjustments can be made over time as we develop a better understanding of the risks.
b. Disclosure of Fracturing Chemicals
We should also require disclosure of all chemicals used in
fracturing fluid, a step taken voluntarily by many companies
377
and now required in a number of states. When paired with
baseline testing, disclosure can make determinations of causation more accurate, at least when the claim is that fracturing
378
fluid caused the contamination. For example, assume that
plaintiffs find hydrochloric acid in a water well, and that baseline testing did not show any hydrochloric acid before fracturing began nearby. If the energy company discloses that its fracturing fluid contains hydrochloric acid, a court will likely
conclude that fracturing caused the contamination.
We thank our colleague, Mike Gerrard, as well as Nelson Johnson of Arnold &
Porter LLP, for this estimate.
376. If fracturing occurs in an area where there are no existing water wells,
baseline testing would be far more expensive. We would rely on the appropriate regulatory authority to develop local rules addressing this situation. In
these circumstances, we would also recognize a general privilege on the part of
energy companies to engage in baseline testing, at their own expense, should
they wish to do so as a form of assurance against future unfounded claims.
377. Kate Galbraith, Seeking Disclosure on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/business/energy-environment/
seeking-disclosure-on-fracking.html?_r=0 (noting that Texas, Pennsylvania,
Wyoming, Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, Oklahoma and Ohio all require disclosure, and that Ohio legislature had approved mandatory disclosure as well).
For a discussion of voluntary disclosure by companies, see supra note 314.
378. This disclosure is less helpful with contaminants other than fracturing
fluid, such as methane or other naturally occurring contaminants. Also, a potential downside is that disclosure might inadvertently facilitate fraud by potential plaintiffs. Someone who wishes to add pollutants to their own water in
order to collect damages in a law suit (or an energy company that wishes to
embarrass a competitor) is better able to do so if they know what chemicals to
add. Yet our hope is that this sort of misconduct would be rare, and all the
more so if deterred with criminal penalties, as discussed above.
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Disclosure of fracturing chemicals has other benefits as
well. It should also encourage energy companies to minimize
the use of toxic or carcinogenic ingredients, if satisfactory substitutes are available. Likewise, landowners may respond by
negotiating for limits on the use of these substances (e.g., if
nontoxic fracturing fluid proves to be viable). In addition,
knowledge of the chemicals will assist physicians in treating
individuals who have been exposed to fracturing fluid.
Disclosure of fracturing chemicals is also cheap to administer. Energy companies know what chemicals they use, and
would be required to share this information with the relevant
regulator or post it on a website. Regulators would have to ensure that the disclosure is accurate, so the main expense here is
to fund enforcement.
The primary objection to disclosure is that the composition
of each energy company’s fracturing fluid is a trade secret.
While confidential disclosure to regulators would not destroy a
trade secret, disclosure to the public is more of an issue. Even
then, however, the trade secret would not necessarily be compromised if companies were required to disclose only the ingredients in their fluid, but not the quantities or proportions
379
used. The critical question is whether companies will continue to try to improve fracturing fluid—making it safer and more
effective—if they have to share innovations with competitors.
We believe they will, if only to reduce their potential liability
for contamination. If so, then mandatory disclosure has the advantage not just of reassuring the public and making liability
determinations more accurate, but also of helping more energy
380
companies learn about risk-reducing innovations. Moreover,
379. We thank Mike Gerrard for this observation. Also, if the recipe is sufficiently novel to be patented, mandatory disclosure would not eliminate the
energy company’s right of exclusive use. But we have encountered no reference
to patented chemical mixtures in the literature, and it seems unlikely that alterations in the use and proportions of existing chemical additives would satisfy the standard of nonobviousness required for a patent. See Sara DastgheibVinarov, Comment, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4. MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.REV.
143, 151–153 (2000).
380. If government-mandated disclosure destroys a trade secret, this cost
would be borne by the government—not by the energy company—if it qualifies
as a taking of property. The Supreme Court has held that mandatory disclosure of trade secrets can be a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987–88 (1984). The Court has distinguished between disclosure of trade secrets associated with existing operations
(which can be a taking) and disclosure that is required to receive a permit for
new operations (which is not a taking because applying for a permit is treated
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even if mandatory disclosure discourages innovation, the added
reassurance to the public is probably of greater benefit in terms
of securing the future of this form of production.
c. Tracer Chemicals
A third information forcing strategy would require energy
companies to include tracer chemicals in their fracturing flu381
id—a kind of DNA testing for fracturing. Each energy company would include a unique but harmless and nondegradable
chemical in their fracturing fluid, and would register it with
the relevant regulator. If water contamination is alleged, the
water would be tested for this chemical marker. If it is found,
the energy company’s fracturing fluid probably caused the con382
tamination; if not, it presumably did not.
Tracer chemicals would be especially helpful when baseline
testing and disclosure do not provide enough certainty about
causation—for instance, when contamination occurs at some
distance from fracturing, when contamination is alleged years
after fracturing took place, or when more than one energy company is operating near the water.
In theory, landowners eager to bring a law suit could inject
tracer chemicals into groundwater, while also contaminating
their own water to establish liability. Similarly, there is the
risk that one energy company would try to use another’s tracer
chemicals to deflect blame for any contamination it causes. As
discussed above, this sort of misconduct would hopefully be rare, and should be deterred with criminal penalties.
Another objection to tracer chemicals is grounded in feasibility and cost. Many industry participants believe that it
would be relatively easy to identify enough chemicals with the
required criteria—unique, harmless, nondegradable, detectable—making a rule requiring the use of tracer chemicals feasible and relatively inexpensive. But this remains to be demonstrated. If the idea proves feasible, there will nevertheless be
costs associated with registering the chemicals and enforcing
as a waiver of trade secret protection). Id. Assuming this reasoning is followed,
states that mandate disclosure only prospectively for new oil and gas wells
should not be liable.
381. Chris Mooney, The Truth about Fracking, 305 SCI. AM. 80, 80–85
(2011) (describing the introduction of tracers into fracking fluid mixtures as
“relatively easy,” but facing industry opposition).
382. Like disclosure of the ingredients in fracturing fluid, tracer chemicals
are less helpful with contaminants other than fracturing fluid, such as methane or other naturally occurring contaminants.
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383

the relevant rules.
To sum up, then, baseline testing and disclosure go some
distance in resolving issues of causation, and tracer chemicals
could help as well. More generally, since the problem here is
inadequate information, the solution should be to generate
more information.
2. Pathway of Causation
Once the plaintiff establishes that fracturing activity
caused the contamination, the next issue concerns how the water was contaminated—and, in particular, whether the pathway of contamination was governed by best practices regulations. As we detail more fully in the next subpart, we would
apply different liability rules depending on whether the pathway is governed by best practices regulations. Consequently, it
is important to make a determination about the pathway of
contamination.
We suspect that direct proof of the pathway of contamination will be possible only in a subset of cases. We would allow
either party to introduce such evidence. For example, if the
plaintiff can show that the contamination was caused by a
blowout, the plaintiff may then be able to prove that the energy
company violated best practices regulations governing blowout
preventers. If the defendant can show that a blowout did not
cause the contamination, its compliance with the regulations
prescribing blowout preventers would be irrelevant.
In many cases, the evidence will not reveal exactly how the
water was contaminated, and thus whether a best practices
regulation addressed the relevant conduct in the case. In these
circumstances, we would rely on rebuttable presumptions of
causation. Specifically, if the plaintiff proves both (1) that fracturing caused the contamination and (2) that the energy company violated a best practices regulation governing a particular
pathway of contamination, we would create a presumption that
384
this was the pathway of contamination. The energy company
383. We would not impose a requirement of using tracer chemicals until its
feasibility has been fully vetted. But the idea is sufficiently promising that the
oil and gas industry, or perhaps the Energy Department or EPA, should undertake a study examining its benefits and costs. If doubts about feasibility
remain, it could be implemented on a pilot basis.
384. This is analogous to what Ken Abraham calls “self-proving causation,”
Kenneth S. Abraham, Self-Proving Causation (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Research
Paper Series, September 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2320596, although we would ground the inference of causation in the violation
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would be free to rebut this presumption. For example, assume
that baseline testing reveals that contaminants emerged after
drilling began, and that the plaintiff establishes that the well
casing was an inch thinner than the regulations require. Unless the energy company can show otherwise, we would presume that this violation of the well casing rule caused the contamination. Alternatively, if the energy company shows that it
was in compliance with applicable best practices regulations
governing a particular pathway of contamination, and there is
no evidence it was otherwise negligent with respect to this
pathway of contamination (e.g., the well casing is sufficiently
think and deep and was set properly), we would create a presumption that this was not the pathway of contamination. This,
too, would be subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff.
The difficult cases fall in the residual category—where (1)
the plaintiff can prove that fracturing caused contamination,
(2) there is insufficient direct evidence of the pathway of contamination, and (3) no presumption based on best practices
regulations is available to identify the pathway of contamination. In these cases, we would adopt a rebuttable presumption
that the contamination was caused by a pathway not governed
by any best practices regulation. As we discuss further below,
we would adopt a rule similar to res ipsa loquitur in such cases.
3. The Scope of the Harm
Once landowners have established that fracturing has
caused water contamination, and the tribunal has determined
the pathway of contamination, it is necessary to determine the
scope of the harm. In nearly all cases, the contamination will
have caused property damage. In addition, contamination that
goes undetected for some time might also have caused more serious injuries. The landowner might have irrigated crops or
other vegetation that were damaged, or hydrated cattle that
were sickened. Or the landowner and her family might have
consumed the water, developing health problems or, in the
worst case, cancer or some other potentially fatal disease.
In establishing any of these more severe harms, plaintiffs
face an uphill battle. Proving harm from exposure to chemicals
385
is uniquely challenging. Extensive expert testimony is needed
of the best practices regulation rather than in a finding of negligence.
385. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and
Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV.
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to identify which chemicals are hazardous, drawing on epidemiological data, animal studies, or molecular comparisons. Experts also have to develop a dose-response curve relating different levels of exposure to the probability of harm, and they have
to show the extent and scope of the plaintiff’s exposure. All of
this expert testimony is expensive, and serious concerns have
been raised about whether it is within the comprehension of
386
judges and juries.
Nor is an information-forcing strategy available to increase
the reliability and reduce the cost of these judgments. After all,
although a reliable and relatively inexpensive baseline test can
be performed for water quality, the same cannot be said for
human health.
Instead, the best we can do may be to establish additional
presumptions. In the common law, for example, if we know a
plaintiff’s injury was caused by either A or B, but we do not
know which, there is a presumption of joint causation, in effect
387
forcing defendants to show they are not responsible. Similarly, CERCLA establishes four categories of “potentially responsible parties,” who are presumed to be causally responsible for
388
contamination of a hazardous waste site.
By analogy, in deciding whether exposure to water contamination caused further injury, we could rely on EPA guidance
under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Specifically, EPA
has established a series of maximum contaminant levels
(MCLs) for a variety of chemicals found in drinking water. These regulatory standards apply only to public drinking water
supply systems, and hence do not directly regulate private water wells drawing on groundwater—the situation of principal
concern here. Nevertheless, the MCLs can be adopted as a kind
of shorthand for resolving disputes about exposure injury from
845 (1987).
386. The Supreme Court has held that in federal cases, trial judges must
serve as gatekeepers excluding expert testimony that is not grounded in studies that have been peer reviewed and published. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
387. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948).
388. They are current owners and operators of the site; owners and operators of the site when the wastes were deposited; persons who arranged for the
deposit of wastes at the site; and persons who transported the wastes to the
site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). For qualifications of the rule of joint and several liability, see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.
599, 616 (2009); Aaron Gershonowitz, The End of Joint and Several Liability
in Superfund Litigation: From Chem-Dyne to Burlington Northern, 50 DUQ. L.
REV. 83 (2012).
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contaminated private wells. Specifically, (1) if an energy company has increased the concentration of a chemical in a water
well; (2) the concentration exceeds the applicable MCL under
the SDWA; (3) the landowner has been exposed to the water for
an appreciable period of time (e.g., at least one year); and (4)
the landowner has experienced an injury associated by EPA
with exposure to the chemical, then a presumption would arise
that exposure to the chemical caused the injury. The burden
would shift to the energy company to rebut the presumption.
Admittedly, our proposal may leave gaps unfilled. Although EPA has established a large number of MCLs for a wide
range of chemicals found in drinking water, it is conceivable
that fracturing could give rise to contamination by a chemical
389
not covered. In addition, the MCLs are established with a
view to human health effects, which may not translate easily to
vegetation or livestock.
A more general concern, of course, is that such presumptions are an inherently imperfect mechanism. Yet without such
a presumption, a health effects claim would entail prohibitive
costs, which would be impractical except, perhaps, in a large
class action. If the liability system is to provide meaningful recovery for exposure injury—and thus a meaningful incentive to
avoid this type of harm—some kind of shortcut, such as the
proposed presumption, is needed.
To be sure, the presumption creates a risk of subjecting energy companies to liability for health effects they did not cause,
and thus of deterring socially valuable economic activity. Yet
energy companies can mitigate this risk with self-help. By periodically testing the water, as recommended above, they can either ensure that it is not contaminated or act promptly (e.g.,
within a year) to clean or replace it if it is. After all, energy
companies cannot be liable for health effects unless there first
is a showing that they contaminated the water.
B. STANDARD OF CARE
Once issues of causation are resolved, it is necessary to
specify the standard of care we will use to evaluate the energy
company’s conduct. Most discussions assume there are two options: strict liability and negligence. Under strict liability, defendants must offer compensation for any harms they cause.
389. Current EPA regulations list MCLs for 79 chemicals. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 141.61–.65 (2012).
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Under negligence, by contrast, defendants are liable only if
they fail to take reasonable precautions. Under the so-called
Hand formula, they are negligent (and thus liable) if (a) the
marginal benefits of the untaken precaution (in terms of reduction in the probability or severity of the harm) are greater than
390
(b) the marginal costs of taking the precaution.
1. Our Hybrid Proposal
In contrast, we recommend a hybrid approach that, in
form, is based on negligence, but as a practical matter would
function like strict liability in many circumstances. Our main
goal in offering this hybrid approach is to integrate best practices rules with the liability regime. Specifically, we recommend
adopting a negligence framework requiring energy companies
to conform to a standard of reasonable care that would be defined in significant part by best practices regulations.
Thus, we would apply three different standards of care depending on the circumstances: First, violation of best practices
regulations would establish negligence per se (which functionally resembles strict liability). Second, compliance with best practices regulations would establish a (qualified) regulatory compliance defense. Third, if no best practices regulations govern
the problem leading to the contamination—or, relatedly, if it is
impossible to identify how the contamination occurred—we
would apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which would, for
practical purposes, function much like strict liability. Thus,
although we are advocating a rule that is negligence-based in
form, the practical effect is a combination of a regulatory compliance defense with what otherwise is in function (if not in
form) strict liability (i.e., when energy companies violate best
practices regulations or when no best practices regulation governs the cause of the contamination).
2. Comparison of Strict Liability, Negligence, and Our Hybrid
Proposal: Five Factors
To explain this recommendation, we should step back and
390. The “Hand formula” derives from an algebraic formulation of negligence developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). As Judge Posner explains, “If . . . the benefits
in accident avoidance exceed the costs of prevention, society is better off if
those costs are incurred and the accident averted, and so [injurers are] made
liable, in the expectation that self-interest will lead [them] to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort judgments.” Richard A. Posner,
A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
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evaluate how strict liability and negligence—and, for that matter, our hybrid proposal—compare on five dimensions: the incentive they create for defendants to take precautions; decision
costs; the incentive for defendants to modulate the level of their
activity; the incentive of plaintiffs to take precautions; and the
interaction with best practices regulations.
a. Incentive to Take Precautions
Strict liability and negligence are thought to create essentially the same incentive for defendants to take efficient pre391
cautions (as, of course, would a hybrid of the two). Under negligence, defendants will take precautions as long as the
marginal cost is lower than the expected harm (or, otherwise,
they will be liable). They will do the same under strict liability,
since their choice is either to take the precaution or to pay the
damages, and they will presumably choose the course that is
392
less expensive.
b. Decision Costs
With respect to decision costs, negligence and strict liabil393
ity potentially diverge. In its cost-benefit or Hand formula incarnation, negligence requires two calculations: first, the expected harm if a precaution is not taken; and, second, the cost
of taking the precaution. In contrast, strict liability requires a
calculation only of the actual harm the plaintiff has incurred,
without any need to determine the cost of taking precautions.
Thus, strict liability requires one less calculation—and a less
complicated one at that (actual as opposed to expected harm).
For this reason, strict liability is thought to reduce decision
costs. Nevertheless, there is an offsetting factor: strict liability
is likely to generate more cases, since defendants are liable
391. See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort
Law: The Puzzle of Negligence, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 707, 715–16 (2010) (“[E]arly
on, economic analysts of law recognized that negligence rules and strictliability rules provided similar incentives to injurers.”); Richard A. Epstein,
Causation—In Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 661 (1987)
(“[T]he incentive effects of both the strict liability rule and the negligence
rule—in the situation of private necessity or not—are essentially identical.”).
392. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291,
1297–98 (1992).
393. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 65–66 (1987); Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1921–22 (2007).
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394

even if precautions are not cost-justified. In other words, the
reduction in decision costs per case must be weighed against
the cost of processing more cases, making it on balance unclear
which standard generates higher decisional costs. In any event,
our proposal obviously requires a determination not only of
whether the defendant caused the harm, but also of how (i.e., so
that a determination is made about whether the conduct was
subject to a regulation). This second inquiry potentially adds to
decision costs. It is impossible to determine, however, whether
the hybrid would impose higher decision costs than either a
pure negligence or a strict liability regime, since it would incorporate elements of both.
c. Incentives to Reduce the Level of Activity
Although negligence and strict liability provide identical
incentives to take efficient precautions, strict liability creates a
greater incentive to reduce the level of potentially harmful ac395
tivity. Unlike negligence, strict liability imposes liability even
if all efficient precautions are taken. This liability—even for
non-negligent conduct—can motivate defendants to avoid potentially harmful conduct. Relatedly, strict liability creates
stronger incentives to innovate. Since defendants bear all accident costs, they are motivated to find new ways to minimize
396
them. Negligence, by contrast, spares defendants from liability as long as they take identified precautions, which usually
are grounded in existing practices. If the status quo is enough
to avoid liability, there is less incentive to improve upon it. This
difference motivates us to incorporate aspects of strict liability
in our hybrid proposal (through negligence per se and res ipsa
loquitur). After all, since fracturing in shale is relatively new, it
is important to create incentives for energy companies to take
water contamination risks into account in deciding where (and,
indeed, whether) to drill and to develop risk-reducing innovations.

394. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 393, at 65.
395. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
7 (1980); see Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d
1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“By making the actor strictly liable . . . we give him
an incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care, assumed to be
futile, but instead relocating, changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing
point) the activity giving rise to the accident.”).
396. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 335, at 340.
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d. Incentives for Plaintiffs
Negligence and strict liability create different incentives
for plaintiffs. Under negligence, plaintiffs cannot collect from
397
defendants who have taken efficient precautions. In this circumstance, plaintiffs have a greater incentive to adjust their
own behavior to avoid injury, an incentive that does not arise to
398
the same extent under strict liability. At the margin, it is of
course helpful to motivate plaintiffs to take precautions, although in the context of fracturing, their largely passive role reduces the importance of this variable.
e. Coordination with Best Practices Regulation: Three
Liability Rules
Although the analysis so far might suggest a mild preference for strict liability (given its incentive effects on activity
levels and innovation), a key advantage of a negligence framework is it can be adapted more readily to reinforce best practices regulation, which, as discussed above, is an important element of our regulatory strategy. Indeed, we can use a
negligence framework to encourage both compliance with such
rules and the development of new rules. At the same time, we
can couple the negligence framework with the doctrines of negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur so that it operates functionally like strict liability in settings that are not yet governed by
best practices regulations.
Let us now take a closer look at the three liability rules.
Under the doctrine of negligence per se, any violation of a statutory or regulatory standard of care that causes harm automat399
ically gives rise to liability. In effect, the tribunal forgoes any
397. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 194
(4th ed. 2012) (noting that a negligence regime can be characterized as “strict
liability for the victims of non-negligently caused accidents”).
398. If plaintiff recoveries are reduced by comparative negligence, then this
doctrine motivates plaintiffs to take precautions—even if it is paired with
strict liability, as it is in some states. See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d
1162, 1168–69 (Cal. 1978). Comparative negligence has been adopted by legislation and occasionally by judicial decision in 46 states. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 517–22 (5th ed. 2010). The proliferation of comparative negligence clearly diminishes the advantage of negligence in motivating plaintiffs to avoid harm.
399. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (2010) (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons
the statute is designed to protect.”); id. at cmt. a (“statute” should be broadly
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direct comparison of the benefits and costs of taking particular
precautions, using the regulatory determination instead. As a
result, any violation of a best practices regulation that causes
water contamination would yield a finding of negligence. This
doctrine provides a powerful incentive for firms to comply with
best practices regulations. It also reduces the factfinder’s decision costs by eliminating the need for a cost-benefit analysis.
The mirror image of negligence per se is the regulatory
compliance defense. Just as a violation establishes liability,
compliance with a regulation can shield the defendant from lia400
bility. For example, if a best practices regulation requires a
four-inch cement casing, the plaintiff cannot argue that reasonable care requires six inches. To be sure, the regulatory
compliance defense would not, however, stop a plaintiff from
showing that the energy company was negligent in the way it
implemented the required best practice. Thus, even if the well
casing was the requisite four inches, the energy company could
still be deemed negligent if it installed or maintained the casing improperly. Even so, the regulatory compliance defense,
like the doctrine of negligence per se, provides a strong incentive to comply with best practices regulations.
The regulatory compliance defense comes in two versions: a
strong version, in which the regulatory standard serves as a
“ceiling” as well as a “floor” in establishing the defendant’s duty
401
of care; and a qualified version, in which compliance with a
regulatory standard is regarded as “evidence of nonnegligence”
402
but is not conclusive. Most commentators favor the qualified
version of the defense, on the ground that regulatory requirements will often lag behind the state of the art, perhaps because agencies are underfunded or become captured by the
firms they are supposed to regulate. These are legitimate con403
cerns. But watering down the defense reduces the incentives
defined to include administrative regulations); see Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979 (2009).
400. E.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993).
401. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210 (1996).
402. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 16 (2010); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety
Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1988).
403. A related problem is that best practices regulations will generally be
formulated as minimum standards of safety. Relying on a breach of such a
standard to establish negligence, as under the negligence per se doctrine, is
unproblematic, because the defendant has clearly fallen below the minimum
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of the industry to support the development of additional best
practices regulations. It also overlooks the dangers of allowing
courts and juries to second-guess regulators in matters that entail considerable scientific uncertainty, and ignores the substantial savings in litigation costs from adopting regulatory
404
standards as the measure of reasonable care. On balance, we
prefer a relatively robust version of the regulatory compliance
defense, leaving open the possibility of overriding it in unusual
circumstances. Thus, we would suggest that compliance with
best practices regulations should create a presumption that the
defendant has exercised reasonable care with respect to the
conduct governed by the regulation, but should be subject to
rebuttal if the plaintiff could show that the relevant best practices rule deviates substantially from the rule followed in other
405
oil and gas jurisdictions.
What if water is contaminated through a pathway that is
not governed by any best practices regulation? In this circumstance, we would use the burden-shifting rule associated with
406
the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Specifically,
required standard of care. Relying on compliance with a minimum standard to
establish the absence of negligence is potentially problematic, however, if the
minimum standard falls below the standard that would be established using
the cost-benefit approach of the Hand formula. See Mark Geistfield, Tort Law
in the Age of Statutes, 98 IOWA L.REV. (forthcoming 2014). Although it is not
clear how often this theoretical possibility would emerge with clarity in actual
practice, it provides an additional reason to adopt a qualified rather than complete version of the regulatory compliance defense.
404. Ausness, supra note 401, at 1265–66.
405. The use of best practices regulations to establish negligence per se or
regulatory compliance could be mandated by statute, in which case these understandings would of course be binding on the liability tribunal as a matter of
legislative supremacy. Absent such legislation, we believe tribunals should defer to best practices regulations as a matter of comity to the legislature or the
agency exercising delegated authority that has adopted these regulations. See
Geistfield, supra note 403. Because such deference would be grounded in comity, the tribunal would not need to consider such questions as whether it was a
purpose of the regulation to protect the plaintiff or the defendant. The tribunal
would also be free, in appropriate cases, to conclude that the regulation does
not reflect a considered judgment about the appropriate degree of precaution
necessary to establish or defeat a claim of negligence.
406. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 (2010) (“The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been
negligent when the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of accident
that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of actors of
which the defendant is the relevant member.”). Courts have traditionally required, in addition, that the agency or instrumentality that caused the harm
be “within the exclusive control of the defendant” and that the injury “must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
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provided the evidence eliminates other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, the fact
finder would be authorized to infer that the energy company’s
negligence caused the contamination—in effect, without any direct evidence of such negligence. Although this inference would
satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof in showing negligence, the
defendant can try to rebut it, for instance, by arguing that the
contamination was caused by an Act of God (like an earthquake), or was an inevitable accident that would have occurred
407
even if fracturing had not taken place in the vicinity.
In practice, this application of res ipsa loquitur would operate something like strict liability for pathways of contamination not governed by best practices regulations. Defendants
would rarely have the information needed to rebut the presumption—for example, about movements deep underground
that may have caused fracturing fluid or methane to migrate
from shale seams aquifers. Thus, they would likely be found
negligent. By subjecting energy companies to a high certainty
of liability where there is no applicable regulation, we give
them yet another incentive to support the development of new
risk-reducing technologies or practices which, in turn, would
provide the basis for additional best practices regulations.
A further reason to use something like de facto strict liability for unregulated pathways of contamination is to ensure that
compensation is available to injured parties. Compensation is
especially important where insurance is unavailable. Since
fracturing in shale deposits is relatively new and there is un408
certainty about the magnitude of the relevant risks, insurance companies are unlikely to issue landowners policies covering water contamination, at least for now. A relatively secure
right to compensation for risks that are especially uncertain
could also marginally help reduce public apprehensions about
409
fracturing.
plaintiff.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
244 (5th ed. 1984).
407. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FORPHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 cmt. g (2010).
408. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.6.
409. As George Fletcher has argued, strict liability is appropriate for nonreciprocal risks: that is, when defendants are imposing risks on plaintiffs, but
plaintiffs are not imposing comparable risks on defendants. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 541–48 (1972).
Although energy companies create a risk that a landowner’s water will be contaminated, landowners do not impose a comparable risk on energy companies
(other than the risk of liability). As a result, fracturing presents the sort of
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Which sorts of risks would be governed by one of the per se
rules based on best practices regulations and which would be
governed by res ipsa loquitur? By and large, the per se rules
would apply to those water contamination risks that are best
understood and have the highest probability of occurring, such
as surface spills, leaks of fracturing fluid or methane through
well casings, and improper disposal of flow-back or produced
410
water. Conversely, those risks that are less well understood—
and that would appear, based on what we know so far, to present lower probabilities of occurring—would be governed by res
ipsa loquitur. This would include migration of methane or fracturing fluid from shale seams, and contamination produced by
vibrations that dislodge pockets of gas or contaminants already
present in aquifers or water wells.
C. PLAINTIFF FAULT AND RELEASES FROM LIABILITY
We do not expect plaintiff fault to be an issue in the typical
water contamination case, where the energy company is active
and the landowner is passive. But the issue could arise in some
cases. For instance, assume that an abandoned well on plaintiff’s property contributed to the contamination, and the plaintiff knew about the well but did not disclose it before the energy
company began fracturing. In this sort of case, energy companies should be allowed to raise the plaintiff’s comparative negligence as a defense. Liability should be apportioned between
the plaintiff and the defendant based on how much each con411
tributed to the contamination. Likewise, if the plaintiff invokes a health effect, but has also engaged in unhealthy behavior (e.g., smoking), the energy company could argue
comparative negligence.
In some cases, we would also recognize a defense of assumption of risk. In theory, one could hold that the plaintiff assumed the risk simply by signing a mineral lease, with the expectation of sharing in oil and gas revenues. Given the large
uncertainties about the risks associated with fracturing, we are
reluctant to endorse any such broad defense. If, however, a
plaintiff has signed a lease that includes a written (and prominently disclosed) release of liability for water contamination—
nonreciprocal risk that favors strict liability.
410. For discussion of these risks see supra Parts IV.A–D.
411. To be clear, we do not recommend contributory negligence, which affords a complete defense to liability, since this might undercut defendants’ incentives to take precautions.
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and especially if this entitles the plaintiff to extra consideration—we would respect the release.
D. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Any harm incurred by the plaintiff should be measured ac412
curately. A key element of harm will be damage to the land,
which ordinarily is measured by the decline in the land’s fair
market value. Yet this measure could undercompensate landowners by ignoring their subjective valuation of the land; after
all, the fact that owners have not sold it means they value it
413
more than its market value. A partial solution is to let the
plaintiff choose instead to recover the cost of restoring access to
potable water, for instance, by decontaminating the existing
414
well, digging a new one, or piping or trucking in water. In
addition, damages for any health effects will also have to be
calculated. This sort of damages is, of course, familiar in other
types of litigation, and is sometimes accompanied by damages
for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and other noneco415
nomic damages.
412. Accurate compensatory damages are more important under strict liability than under negligence. Under the Hand formula, as long as the compensation is sufficiently large to influence the conduct of the defendant, under- or
over-compensation arguably does not matter: the defendant will take only
those precautions that are cost-justified. Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2324 (2010). Under strict liability, by
contrast, the defendant will take efficient precautions only if the measure of
damages accurately mirrors the costs incurred by the plaintiff. If the damages
are too low, the defendant will take insufficient precautions; if they are too
high, the defendant will take excessive precautions. Since our liability scheme
will operate in part like a strict liability regime—relying extensively on negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur—accuracy in measuring damages is important to maintaining correct incentives for defendants.
413. Ignoring the subjective value of landholdings may work two harms:
first, by undercompensating property holders and thereby creating perverse
incentives for injury; second by denigrating the personal connections that render land important to owners in the first place. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U.
L. REV. 677, 722–23 (2005).
414. We do not believe the difference in these damage measures would be
so great as to render the “cost of cure” grossly disproportionate to the benefit
to the plaintiff, at least in the usual case. At most, the restorative measure
would be the cost of installing a large tank and paying periodically to truck in
water to fill it. Cf. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109
(Okla. 1962) (refusing to award cost of cure when the fair market value measure of damages was $300 and the cost of restoring land disrupted by mining
was $25,000).
415. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering
Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal
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Punitive damages are another matter, since they can lead
to large and unpredictable awards that can chill socially valuable activity. One potential rationale for punitive damages—the
416
need to offset the difficulty of detecting harm —should not
apply if our suggestions about periodic retesting and presumptions about health effects are adopted. We believe punitive
damages would be appropriate for defendants who falsify reporting requirements or knowingly violate regulations insuring
well integrity or preventing surface spills. However, we would
preclude the award of punitive damages for defendants who are
in full compliance with all best practices regulations and disclosure requirements, engage in periodic testing, and are free of
any affirmative misconduct. This safe harbor rule would give
energy companies an added incentive to comply with these
safety-promoting rules.
E. ATTORNEY’S FEES
Will competent lawyers be willing to bring cases? A contingent fee should be a sufficient inducement if the potential recovery is large enough, as, for instance, in class actions or cases
417
involving serious health effects. In cases that present only
property damage to individual landholdings, however, recoveries may not be sufficient to attract the contingent-fee bar. To
eliminate this possibility, we can adopt a one-way fee shifting
rule, like those found in the civil rights laws and the citizen
418
suit provisions of environmental laws. In these regimes, if defendants are held liable, they have to pay the plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. Experience with civil rights and environmental claims suggests that such a fee-shifting rule is
sufficient to attract legal representation, even if damage
419
awards are modest in scope.

for Change, 100 NW. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006) (reporting that pain-and-suffering
awards comprise fifty percent of total awards in some areas).
416. Id. at 2075.
417. Cf. Janet C. Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 350 (1998) (describing a benefit of contingent fees as being access to representation for those who otherwise would not have it).
418. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (civil rights suits); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e)
(2006).
419. Martin A. Schwartz, Attorney’s Fees in Civil Rights Cases—October
2009 Term, 27 TOURO L. REV. 113, 114–15 (2011).
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F. INSOLVENCY RISK
Liability regimes cannot achieve their deterrence and compensation goals if defendants are insolvent when the action is
brought. In general, we think the risk of insolvency is low, if
only because any contamination from a particular oil or gas
well will probably be localized, and this will largely eliminate
the prospect of catastrophic liability. Yet the cumulative effect
of many incidents of contamination could create at least some
risk of insolvency, especially if health effects emerge. In addition, this insolvency risk could increase with time. If water contamination arises only years after fracturing (e.g., because it
takes time for chemicals to migrate), the energy company might
be gone by the time the problem comes to light.
The standard private solutions to insolvency risk are bond420
ing and insurance. Bonding is common in the oil and gas industry to ensure proper well closure and site remediation once
drilling is over. These bonds are commonly required by mineral
leases and, in some states, by law. For instance, energy companies often can secure a drilling permit only if they post a bond
421
or otherwise demonstrate their solvency. This makes sense.
At least one state, Maryland, has required that energy companies show evidence of insurance before they may undertake oil
422
or gas drilling activity.
Solvency is less of an issue, moreover, as an increasing
share of shale oil and gas production is conducted by major
companies. Large production companies are gradually replacing the small and independent firms that pioneered this prac423
tice. Even the small companies are likely to partner with
large and well capitalized well servicing companies, which
424
build the wells and engage in fracturing. There is some evi420. See generally Klass & Wilson, supra note 255, at 160–64 (explaining
the ways bonding and insurance are used to manage risk).
421. See, e.g., Heather Ash, EPA Launches Hydraulic Fracturing Study to
Investigate Health and Environmental Concerns While North Dakota Resists
Regulation: Should Citizens Be Concerned?, 87 N.D. L. REV. 717, 737–38
(2011) (comparing North Dakota’s bonding requirements to Pennsylvania’s).
422. MD. CODE ANN., Envir. § 14-111(7) (West 2013). For a discussion, see
Hannah J. Wiseman & David A. Dana, A Market Approach to Regulating the
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
423. See Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move in, Safety
Goes Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013, at A1.
424. In 2003—which was early in the development of the practice of fracturing in shale beds—three companies (Halliburton, Schlumberger, and BJ
Services Company) performed 95% of all fracturing services in the United
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dence, moreover, that larger and better capitalized companies
generally make fewer mistakes and use safer, state of the art
425
practices.
If insolvency turns out to be a problem, a mixed liability/government insurance regime may be needed. The Price
426
Anderson Act, which applies to nuclear power, is one model;
427
the Oil Pollution Act, governing oil spills, is another. In this
spirit, any energy company that engages in fracturing could be
required to contribute to a general insurance fund, which would
cover the damages if the responsible energy company is insolvent. If the fund is exhausted, taxpayers would make up the
difference. In other words, the first recourse would be the firm
responsible. But if it cannot satisfy the judgment, the insurance
fund would step in, backstopped by the government. To mitigate moral hazard, firms should be charged experience-based
fees, so that those with a record of accidents have to pay more.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS
So far, our analysis has focused on the functional characteristics that our proposed regime should have. We now turn to
the separate question of institutional choice, namely, which
level of government should implement it (federal, state, or local) and which branch should do so (legislature, administrative
agency, or court).
In considering these issues, we add an assumption that has
States. See EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. More companies
have begun engaging in pressure pumping, so that this sector has become
more competitive. Alison Sider, Fracking Firms Face New Crop of Competitors,
WALL ST. J., July 9, 2013, at B6. Even so, the Department of Justice has begun
an antitrust investigation of the pressure pumping industry. Alison Sider,
U.S. Starts Antitrust Probe of Pressure-Pumping Sector, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732361070457862660257
2779248.html.
425. Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move In, Safety Goes
Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013, at A1 (“Regulators and some environmentalists
say the multinationals bring more rigorous approaches, mindful that one big
mistake can affect their ability to operate everywhere.”); id. (“The rate of environmental violations has steadily dropped as major energy companies have
bought up smaller drillers, according to a Journal review of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection inspection records for Marcellus operations from 2008 to 2012.”).
426. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). For a general overview of the Price Anderson
Act, amendments, and implementing regulations, see Dan M. Berkovitz, PriceAnderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?—The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
427. 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006).
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not featured in our analysis so far: historical practice will have
significant influence over these allocations of authority. Institutions that have regulated issues in the past will have a presumptive claim to do so in the future, based on their expertise,
their relationships with important interest groups, and their
natural inclination to protect their turf. Of course, if the status
quo were severely dysfunctional, we would recommend a
change. But as we will suggest, reasonable normative arguments support the existing allocation of authority.
Another preliminary point is that ambiguity about the ultimate assignment of authority can be a virtue. The threat of
enhanced federal regulation of fracturing, for instance, may
428
motivate states to invigorate their regulatory systems. Likewise, pressure from local governments which may be eager to
regulate fracturing may cause states to reconsider their poli429
cies. Indeed, in the same way that we do not yet have enough
information to adopt best practices regulations for all pathways
of contamination, we also should not rush to finalize the allocation of regulatory authority. In the face of pervasive uncertainty, the existing alignment of authority is a sensible place to
start, and it can be revisited if new information justifies a
change.
A. JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE
1. Historical Practice
Currently, states have principal regulatory responsibility
over oil and gas production as well as groundwater. Indeed,
states have been primarily responsible for oil and gas regulation ever since Colonel Drake erected his first oil well in west430
ern Pennsylvania in the nineteenth century. This is because
oil and gas production involves difficult issues of property law,
including allocating oil and gas reserves among different landowners, as well as regulating the common pool problem and the
incentives for waste created by the rule of capture. As a result,
every state where fracturing is taking place has an oil and gas
431
commission.
428. Kurth et al., supra note 258, at 174–75.
429. Cf. id. at 156–57.
430. Cf. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8, 9 (discussing state control over oil
and gas regulation for more than a century).
431. Cf. Kurth et al., supra note 258, at 65–154 (detailing state regulations
of fracking). Although Utah does not specifically regulate fracking, it does
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In contrast, the federal government has played almost no
432
role in regulating oil and gas production on private land. Although it regulates production on federal lands through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the Department of Interior, historically the BLM has largely tracked the regulations of
433
the state where federal lands are located. Another division of
434
the Department of the Interior regulates offshore drilling.
Although environmentalists often criticize the lack of federal
oversight—describing exemptions from federal environmental
law as “loopholes”—an alternative explanation is that states
were already regulating these issues when these statutes were
435
enacted, and there was no perceived need to replace them.
The regulation of groundwater has a similar history.
Again, the states’ role emerged from property law. Starting
with a simple rule of capture by surface owners, states have
evolved toward either “reasonable use” regimes where groundwater is plentiful or more elaborate prior appropriation and
436
permitting systems in arid areas. Today, many state water
authorities regulate the use of pesticides to protect groundwater, a number of states have wellhead protection programs, and
437
a handful of states mandate groundwater monitoring. The
Federal Clean Water Act generally leaves groundwater to state
438
regulation, except that the federal Safe Drinking Water Act
have an oil and gas commission. Id. at 140. See Utah Oil and Gas: Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining, UTAH DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://oilgas.ogm.utah
.gov (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
432. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 477 (2013).
433. BLM is in the process of completing a major rulemaking to establish
preliminary best practices regulations for fracturing activity on federal lands.
Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal
and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 3160).
434. Once called the Minerals Management Service, it was reorganized and
renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) after the Deepwater Horizon accident. See Reorganization of Title 30, Code of Federal Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,051 (Oct. 4,
2010).
435. For a general discussion of the exemptions fracking operators have
secured in Congress, see Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 242–44 (2010).
436. Cf. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 4:1,
4:7–12, 6:1, 4:28–32 (John Damico & Barbara J. Hagan eds., 2013).
437. See generally PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 184–92 (2004)
(explaining factors affecting state decisions to pass these regulations).
438. See generally Jason R. Jones, The Clean Water Act: Groundwater Regulation and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J.

2013]

FRACKING AND WATER CONTAMINATION

253

(SDWA) offers a partial exception (primarily) for public water
439
systems. After the Eleventh Circuit applied the SDWA’s Underground Injection Control program to fracturing opera440
441
tions, Congress amended the act to exempt fracturing. Injection of waste water is still covered by the program, as is the
use of diesel fuel in fracturing. This has again been decried as a
442
“loophole,” but it can also be seen as restoring the status quo
ante existing before this decision, in which states regulated
groundwater quality unless public water systems were impli443
cated.
2. Policy Justifications for State Regulation
Of course, if the states’ historical role is unjustified on policy grounds, we should change it. In theory, we could try to resolve this question based on an abstract assessment of the effects of inter-jurisdictional competition. Does environmental
444
federalism inspire “races to the bottom” or “races to the top”?
Likewise, does NIMBYism (the “not in my backyard” syndrome)
445
affect one level of government more than others? These debates often turn on competing hypotheses—built on conflicting
assumptions—about the distribution of interest group influence
446
at different levels of government. At the state and local level,
some observers contend that energy companies have captured
regulators; others claim landowners ultimately call the shots.
At the national level, some think oil and gas interest groups
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93. 101 (1999).
439. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)8 (2006) (providing authority to regulate public water systems and groundwater).
440. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478
(11th Cir. 1997).
441. See sources cited supra note 278.
442. See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2009, at A28.
443. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 246 (2010).
444. Compare Kirstin H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a “Race” and Is it “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (defending the race to the bottom thesis), with DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (1995) (arguing for race to the top).
445. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Why Are there NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON.
144, 145 (2001) (arguing that homeowners comprise most NIMBYs and that
homeowners exert “major political force” at a local level).
446. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the ‘Race-to-the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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have undue clout; others claim that environmentalists have
disproportionate influence. We have no unique empirical insights that would allow us to endorse or condemn state regulation based on one of these inter-jurisdictional competition mod447
els. Instead, we focus on four other policy considerations.
a. Matching Principle
We believe a regulatory jurisdiction generally should correspond to the geographic scope of the externality, sometimes
448
known as the “matching principle.” Thus, the federal government should regulate interstate pollution, the states should
regulate spillovers confined to a single state, and localities
should regulate externalities with local effects. This assures
that the regulator considers all costs and benefits of the activity
without ignoring those borne by outsiders, while simultaneously preserving flexibility to account for local conditions, traditions, and preferences. The Europeans call this the principle of
449
subsidiarity. In this spirit, groundwater contamination from
oil and gas production is generally assumed to be a local issue.
Contamination from fracturing is likely to affect only water
450
that is close to the relevant drilling or waste disposal. Cases
in which an aquifer straddles more than one county or crosses a
state line are thought to be rare. If these assumptions are correct, the scope of the externality suggests that localities should
take the lead, perhaps as an adjunct to zoning and other land
use controls. Of course, there is uncertainty about the possible
scope of contamination, like much else. If it turns out that incidents of contamination affect multiple jurisdictions, this variable should be reconsidered.

447. For an (inconclusive) debate about these issues, compare David B.
Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2012) (concluding that state regulation is
optimal) with Michael Burger, Response, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150 (2013) (arguing for federal regulation).
448. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 204 (1974).
449. See George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339
(1994).
450. Spence, supra note 256, at 492–93 (concluding that groundwater contamination issues “are local”).
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b. Economies of Scale
451

Economies of scale in regulation are also important.
Complex issues require a staff of experts, and a tax base that
can support them. All else being equal, then, more complex issues are likely to be addressed centrally, where there is greater
capacity to raise revenue and less duplication of effort. Indeed,
the best justification for the SDWA—and the federal role in
regulating local public drinking water systems—is the technical expertise required, although actual enforcement ordinari452
By analogy, scale economies
ly remains with the states.
might justify federal regulation of fracturing. After all, the
technology is complex, and the federal government—and, in
particular, EPA—has a comparative advantage in mobilizing
resources for field research, gathering and comparing data from
across the country, and so forth.
Cutting against this, however, is EPA’s lack of expertise in
oil and gas production. States have much more experience with
this industry, as do other parts of the federal government (e.g.,
BLM and BOEMRE). Likewise, federal expertise about
groundwater hydrology is concentrated in the U.S. Geological
Survey, another unit of the Department of the Interior (although EPA also has relevant experience from administering
CERCLA, RCRA, and the SDWA). In regulating fracturing,
then, EPA would need to build out its expertise substantially.
Federal regulation also tends to be ponderously slow, perhaps
in part because the stakes are higher and consequently more
453
interest groups get involved. While the states have fewer resources overall, they have a significant head start in regulating
oil and gas and, to a lesser extent, groundwater. Although this
expertise is divided among the states, and there is undoubtedly
451. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L. J. 1196, 1212 (1977); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 614–15 (1996) (“[T]echnical capacity generally
will be weakened by devolution . . . . Data collection and quality control, fate
and transport studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and risk assessments all represent highly technical activities in which expertise is important and scale economies are significant.”); Buzbee, supra note 363, at 111–
12.
452. Cf. Sarah E. Lewis, The 1986 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water
Act and Their Effect on Groundwater, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893, 894–95 at
n.17 (1989) (mentioning a major motivation argued by proponents of the
amendment as being the states lack of expertise).
453. Cf. Christopher S. Kulander, Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Issues and Trends, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1001, 1141 (2013).
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duplication of effort, it is also true that production technology
varies significantly from one oil and gas field to another, as do
groundwater conditions.
c. Brandeisian Experimentalism
The third factor, Brandeisian experimentalism, favors
454
states and localities over the federal government. States have
adopted diverse approaches in regulating groundwater, as well
as oil and gas, because physical conditions vary dramatically,
as do property rights. As a result, states (and localities) are
likely to implement different liability regimes, offering a natural experiment about what works best and why. State regulators talk to each other, and are likely to emulate approaches
455
adopted in other states that prove successful. Institutional
mechanisms have been created to promote the exchange of information, including STRONGER (a coalition of state oil and
gas regulators) and the Groundwater Protection Council (a
456
group of state groundwater protection regulatory agencies).
d. Capacity to Adjudicate Disputes
Finally, because our regulatory scheme incorporates a liability rule, the relevant regulatory jurisdiction must have the
capacity to adjudicate disputes about water contamination ex
post and enforce judgments. Both the states and the federal
government have judicial systems that have extensive experience with liability regimes. Localities generally do not have
their own liability regimes, which is a sufficient reason to eliminate local regulation as an option. In addition to their judicial
systems, states have experience with worker compensation
schemes, and the federal government has a variety of specialized liability regimes, many of which are implemented by ad457
ministrative agencies. It is not clear that either the states or
454. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”). For a recent defense of state experimentalism, see JOHN
O. MCGINNIS, ACCELERATING DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMING GOVERNANCE
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 40–59 (2013).
455. Empirical studies show that state legislators are more willing to pass
groundwater regulations “when neighboring states have already done so, as
political uncertainty is reduced and legislators may also benefit from a ‘bandwagon effect.’” TESKE, supra note 437, at 191.
456. For a discussion, see SURYA RAJAN, PRUDENT OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF US REGULATIONS 2 (2013).
457. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in National Child-
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the federal government has any strong advantage on this score.
e. Policy Justifications: Summing Up
Admittedly, these four factors do not all point in the same
direction. Arguably, the geographic scope of the externality favors localities, although uncertainties about the scope of contamination would perhaps warrant centering regulation in a
458
body having a larger jurisdictional scope, like the states.
459
Economies of scale favor the federal government. The states
are a viable compromise on both dimensions, since they are
closer to the externality than the federal government and have
greater expertise and resources than local governments. At the
same time, states are well positioned to serve as Brandeisian
laboratories and also have deep experience regulating the oil
460
and gas industry. The states also have significant experience
with liability regimes. Therefore, it is certainly reasonable—
and arguably preferable—for states to take the lead in regulating the risk of water contamination from fracturing, at least for
now.
Although we believe it makes sense for states to spearhead
the regulatory response to the water contamination risk, the
federal and local governments can still play a role. Given the
federal government’s superior resources and data-gathering capacity, it is reasonable for it to sponsor studies, and to encourage the exchange of information about best practices among
461
state regulators. Also, we reiterate that this analysis applies
to the water contamination risk, but not to other environmental
risks. Air pollution risks, for example, which could have national or even global implications, may more sensibly be regulated by the federal government than the states. That question
is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. IMPLEMENTING BODY
If states are the logical locus of regulatory authority, then
the relevant state regulatory commission is the logical body to
hood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 352–54 (2011) (detailing
the compensation structure under the NCVIA).
458. Supra Part VII.A.2.a.
459. Supra Part VII.A.2.b.
460. Supra Parts VII.A.2.c., VII.A.1.
461. See Wiseman, supra note 163, at 810 (urging that “the federal government should provide a comprehensive database of state, local, and regional
oil, gas, and fracturing regulations and should separately document regulatory
modifications as they occur”).
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adopt best practices regulations for water contamination risks.
In most states, this is the oil and gas commission; in some it is
the department of natural resources or the department of environmental protection. This follows from our pragmatic principle
of starting with what already exists. Every state in which fracturing is taking place or is contemplated has a functioning regulatory commission. Although they have varying degrees of discretionary authority to adopt new regulations, all have at least
some authority in matters of well construction, spacing, and
safety. State water authorities are another possible locus of authority, although in many states they are thinly staffed and
462
have little experience with oil and gas contamination issues.
We will assume, therefore, that state commissions with current
regulatory authority over oil and gas production are the place
to start.
Legislation may be needed to augment their authority. As
previously discussed, regulators should be empowered to require baseline testing of water quality and to compel public disclosure of chemicals used in fracturing. In addition, commissions should be authorized to adopt best practices regulations
to minimize the risk of water contamination from fracturing
and from the disposal of wastewater. They likewise should have
authority to modify these regulations in light of experience.
A further question is who should implement the liability
regime that we propose. Should it be a specialized administra463
tive tribunal or a generalist court? There is much to be said
for using an administrative tribunal. The evidence, especially
on causation, is likely to be highly technical. Recent experience
suggests that administrative tribunals can minimize the costs
and delay of adjudication, while achieving a high degree of satisfaction on the part of claimants. Examples include the 9-11
Commission, the BP Oil Spill Tribunal, and the arbitral awards
464
entered under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.
462. Cf., e.g., Camille Pannu, Comment, Drinking Water & Exclusion: A
Case Study from California’s Central Valley, 100 CAL. L. REV. 223, 262–63
(2012) (asserting California’s water agency is “understaffed and unable to
achieve consistent protection of its own agency goals”).
463. See generally Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION:
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW, supra note 327.
464. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/vcffaq.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2013); Colin McDonell, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the Deepwater
Horizon Litigation: Judicial Regulation of Private Compensation Schemes, 64
STAN. L. REv. 765, 770–72 (2012) (describing the claims process for BP oil spill
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State worker compensation systems provide another possible
example. Further, if the administrative tribunal is organized as
an adjunct to the body regulating the industry, it can provide
valuable feedback to commissioners charged with developing
best practices regulations, apprising them of issues that warrant additional attention. Finally, an administrative forum reduces uncertainty associated with judicial adjudication, especially the prospect of irrationally large damage awards from
unsophisticated hometown juries.
Yet notwithstanding these advantages, it does not make
sense to establish a tribunal that has nothing to do. At this
point, it is not clear that fracturing will generate water contamination on a scale that will require the adjudication of very
many disputes. If a case arose after a period of dormancy,
moreover, the tribunal would have no body of precedents or
procedural conventions to process the claim, which could lead
to delay and confusion. We also doubt legislatures will be motivated to enact a new regime of this sort, unless and until it appears that fracturing has produced a significant water contam465
ination problem. As Jim Krier recognized years ago,
legislatures rarely are inspired to act by potential environmental risks, and are moved only when there is incontrovertible
proof of harm.
Fortunately, if courts must adjudicate water contamination
claims, we have an off-the-rack liability regime: the common
law of torts. This brings us to a justification for tort law that is
rarely encountered in the literature. Whatever its imperfections, the common law has the important advantage of providing a general form of ex post regulation applicable to virtually
any new technology that presents novel and poorly understood
risks. Tort law can be viewed as a default regime that allows
new technologies to be implemented without advance govern466
ment approval, encouraging innovation. And it provides a
form of protection for those injured by technological innovations, while information gradually accumulates that may eventually lead to more protective ex ante regulation.
victims); Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 352–54 (2011) (detailing the
compensation structure under the NCVIA).
465. See James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
851 (1994).
466. Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375,
385 (2007) (commenting that “[e]x post accountability is the prerequisite for ex
ante liberalization”).
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Admittedly, the common law of tort does not have all the
features we would ideally like to see in an ex post liability regime, like fee shifting and insolvency protections. Nevertheless,
it is sufficiently flexible to replicate many aspects of our proposal.
Consider, first, the questions about proof of causation. Ordinarily, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation,
which will be difficult without evidence about pre-fracturing
water quality. Thus, an ideal liability scheme would require periodic testing, mandatory disclosure of fracturing chemicals,
and perhaps also tracer chemicals in fracturing fluid. Although
common law courts cannot mandate these measures, at least
before any suit is filed, they can use presumptions to get to a
similar place. For instance, a court can presume that energy
companies caused the contamination if they failed to conduct
baseline testing before fracturing. In response, energy companies would likely seek to conduct a baseline test when negotiating mineral leases, in order to reduce the risk of future liability.
Likewise, if a landowner were to block the energy company
from taking water samples, the court could adopt a counterpresumption of no causation if the landowner later decided to
sue. This reverse-presumption would provide a further inducement to landowners to consent to testing. At the same time, energy companies are likely to engage in periodic testing to ensure that they are not held liable for health effects, especially if
courts hold that periodic testing generally insulates companies
from punitive damages.
With respect to the standard of care, the common law everywhere recognizes the doctrines of negligence per se (based on
the defendant’s violation of a statutory or regulatory standard),
and most jurisdictions recognize some form of regulatory com467
pliance defense. Likewise, nearly all jurisdictions recognize
some version of res ipsa loquitur. In its standard formulation,
res ipsa requires that “the event must be of a kind which ordi468
narily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence.”
467. See William E. Westerbeker & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1053 (2001) (comparing Kansas
negligence per se to the doctrine in “every other state” and their use of criminal statutes and administrative regulations). As previously discussed, we
would nudge the regulatory compliance defense in the direction of making it a
presumption of reasonable care, subject to rebuttal if the state regulation is
badly out of sync with the regulation in other states. See supra text accompanying notes 399–404.
468. KEETON ET AL., supra note 406, at 244.
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How can we say with confidence that the contamination, although caused by the fracturing company rather than the plaintiff or a third party, would ordinarily be due to negligence? The
answer, we think, lies in the impressive track record that fracturing has amassed to date in avoiding appreciable incidents of
water contamination. Fracturing, if done properly, ordinarily
469
does not cause contamination. If and when it does cause contamination, it is fair to raise an inference that somewhere,
somehow, the energy company was negligent. This is all that
res ipsa requires. As noted, the inference is subject to rebuttal
by the defendant.
There is some risk that courts will adopt a rule of strict liability to all cases involving fracturing, instead of the blended
regime we recommend, perhaps on the theory that fracturing is
an “abnormally dangerous” activity. Although the precedents
470
are mixed, the doctrinal support for this is strained. The Restatement of Torts defines an “abnormally dangerous activity”
as an activity that presents “a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exer471
cised by all actors” and “is not one of common usage.” Frac469. Cf. Gilbert & Gold, supra note 305 (noting that well-financed operations improve safety).
470. See, e.g., Hannah Coman, Balancing the Need for Energy and Clean
Water: The Case for Applying Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing Suits, 39
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 147–54 (2012) (discussing rationales, factors involved, and applications in cases with varying outcomes). Although we recognize the parallels between fracturing and the classic English case adopting
strict liability, Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R. (H.L.) 330 (appeal taken from
Eng.), there are important differences. In Rylands, the defendant constructed
a reservoir on his land. Id. at 331–32. The weight of the water caused abandoned mining shafts below the reservoir to collapse and fill with water, which
then caused mining shafts running under neighboring property to flood. Id. at
332. Contamination from fracturing, like Rylands, involves a water-borne substance propelled from one landowner’s property to another. Yet the incident in
Rylands, where the water completely inundated neighboring mineshafts, deprived the neighbor of possession of the mine shafts, and was in the nature of
a trespass. See id. The anticipated injuries from fracturing are in the realm of
nuisance rather than trespass. And nuisance has long between understood to
require a balancing of interests, more akin to negligence law, not the strict liability associated with trespass.
471. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010). The Restatement (Second) of Torts provided a more elaborate six-part test for strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979). The additional factors required that the harm be “great,” that the activity be “inappropriate[] . . . to the
place where it is carried on,” and that its “value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.” These factors were eliminated in the
Third Restatement, evidently to make the inquiry more categorical and less
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turing does not present a “highly significant risk of harm,”
since there is little evidence to date of water contamination
472
from fracturing. Nor is it the case that reasonable care cannot reduce the risk of water contamination. Quite to the contrary, the whole premise of best practices regulation is that adoption of state of the art control technology and operational
practices will significantly reduce the risk of contamination. It
is also hard to argue that fracturing is not a matter of “common
usage,” now that an estimated two million fracturing treatments have been pumped in the United States, and virtually
every new oil and gas well drilled in the U.S. today uses frac473
turing.
In addition to its capacity to accommodate our proposal,
the common law has the added virtue of already addressing virtually any issue that a liability regime is likely to face, including defenses based on plaintiff misconduct, joint and several liability, the measure of damages, and the enforcement of
judgments. Indeed, any regime created through legislation will
undoubtedly be incomplete, and will have to draw on the common law by analogy.
Finally, state legislatures often legislate on discrete issues
that arise in common law adjudication. If they intervene on only one issue, our priority would be to require baseline testing of
water before fracturing begins. Of course, given the Krier
rule—that no environmental legislation is forthcoming until
474
harmful effects occur —even this may be too much to hope for.
But it is worth a try, and this legislation may appeal to both
energy companies and local opponents as a way to alleviate uncertainty about the effects of fracturing.
CONCLUSION
Fracturing is transforming the energy landscape of the
United States. By unlocking massive reserves of natural gas
and oil in shale beds and other tight rocks, fracturing is creating drilling jobs, fueling a revival of domestic manufacturing,
strengthening consumer purchasing power, improving our balance of payments, enhancing our energy independence, and reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
contextual and nuisance-like.
472. See Spence, supra note 447, at 492.
473. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 2.
474. See Krier, supra note 465.
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Yet at the same time, fracturing poses a number of risks.
Some arise in conventional oil and gas drilling as well as in
other economic activities, such as competition with renewable
energy, traffic and congestion, air pollution, the use of significant amounts of water, and the risk of inducing earthquakes.
Fracturing also poses unique risks of water contamination,
which are the focus of this Article. Although there is only limited evidence of water contamination from fracturing so far, the
risks are not yet fully understood and mechanisms for regulating them are not yet fully developed.
In response, we offer a general framework for regulating in
the face of uncertainty and apply it to water contamination
from fracturing. A core element of our proposal is best practices
regulation, which should provide significant reassurance to a
public worried about water contamination, as well as predictability to energy companies making large commitments of capital. Since best practices regulations cannot be adopted until we
know what the best practices are, we favor such regulation only
for issues that are already well understood. This includes the
thickness and depth of well casings, the need for liners for storage pits and blowout preventers, and the like. Over time, as we
develop more experience, the number of issues governed by
such regulations is likely to grow.
Meanwhile, we can encourage the development of a robust
best practices regime by backstopping it with liability rules.
Under our proposed liability regime, unless an energy company
is in full compliance with applicable best practices regulations,
it generally would have to pay for any water contamination
harms caused by fracturing operations. Such a liability system
will motivate energy companies to take precautions and develop risk-minimizing innovations, and will also compensate victims. Moreover, it spares regulators the need to mandate best
practices before we know enough about the risks and how to
address them. A key challenge in implementing such a liability
regime is to make reliable judgments about causation, and we
recommend a system of information-forcing rules to inform these judgments, including baseline testing, the disclosure of fracturing chemicals, and possibly also the use of tracer chemicals.
We also consider the proper measure of damages, the allocation
of attorney fees, the risk that defendants will be judgment
proof, as well as other issues.
Finally, we believe our proposed regime should be implemented at the state level. Although this could take the form of
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new legislation prescribing all desirable elements of the liability regime, a more realistic option, at least in the near term, is
to adapt the existing common law of torts to the unique problems posed by fracturing. In our view, this blended strategy—
an evolving body of best practices regulation paired with a wellcrafted liability regime—can perform the vital function of protecting our water resources, while also harnessing the substantial economic, national security, and environmental advantages
of the shale oil and gas revolution.

